

By the same author

THE RĀJ-GOND MAHĀRĀJĀS
OF THE SĀTPURĀ HILLS

*A history of the Garha (Mandlū)
and Deogarh dynasties, mainly
based on Mahomedan authorities.*

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BRITISH RELATIONS
WITH
THE NĀGPUR STATE
IN THE 18TH CENTURY

*An account, mainly based on
contemporary English records.*

by
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BRITISH RELATIONS
WITH
THE NAGPUR STATE
IN THE 18TH CENTURY

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

The object of this monograph is to sketch the relations between the British in Bengal and the Marāthās of Nāgpur from the days of Clive to those of Wellesley, to give some account of the Englishmen who visited the Nāgpur territories in the 18th century and to illustrate from the records they have left behind them the political and economic condition of the Nāgpur State in the days of its independence.

Object of
this mono-
graph.

2. "Forty years forgotten" would be a not inappropriate title for this little book. No adequate account of the local Marāthā dynasty has yet been written. The English reader, unless he patiently collects the scattered references to the Nāgpur Marāthās in Grant Duff's *magnum opus*, cannot

Period to
which it
relates.

ascertain even the outlines of local Marāthā history from the collapse of the Mogul empire to the establishment of British ascendancy in 1803 A.D. Still less is he able to trace the early British relations with the Nāgpur State or follow the fortunes of the adventurous Englishmen who in those days penetrated the wild country between Bengal and the Bhonsle's capital at Nāgpur. It is partly to supply this missing link in the chain of local history that I have ventured to prepare the following review of the British connection with the Nāgpur *rāj* prior to 1803 A.D.

English
authorities.

3. The eastern and southern boundaries of the Nāgpur State in the 18th century marched with those of Bihār, Bengal and the Northern *Sarkārs*; but no one has hitherto attempted to extract from contemporary English records the numerous notices of their Marāthā neighbour. It is the material derived from this hitherto neglected source that has encouraged me to make a special study of the period. As this material is inaccessible to the general reader and is, indeed, for the most part made available now for the first time to officials of government, I have thought it best to make my own comments as brief as possible and to leave the original authorities, so far as space permits, to tell the story in their own words. This is my excuse for the long extracts from these authorities which are included in the text.

4. I have, in order to complete the story, sketched the rise of the Nāgpur Marāthās from

their first establishment in Berar; but I would make it clear from the outset that I have in no sense aspired to make a contribution to Marāthā history. I have attempted no special study of Indian authorities for the period; and have been content with the accepted frame-work of Marāthā history as given in standard English works on the subject, merely filling in the detail of particular local episodes in which Englishmen took part from the material at my disposal.

5. As this volume is based exclusively on English sources of information, it cannot claim to present any other than an English point of view; and, at first sight, there might seem, particularly in these days of rising national Indian sentiment, to be some objection to a one-sided presentment of local history. But the English evidence for the period, though far from complete, is undoubtedly evidence of value; and, what is more, it is impartial evidence. Throughout the 18th century official relations between the Nāgpur and Calcutta governments were consistently amicable. Even during the first Marāthā war, when the two States were formal enemies, they remained secret friends. The impressions of English visitors, drawn from what they heard and saw in dealing with the Rājā and his officers and in travelling to and from Nāgpur, may have been inaccurate in some respects but must have been, in the main, unprejudiced. What these men wrote provides us, therefore, with dispassionate notes and opinions on the Nāgpur State recorded at first hand during residence at its

Value of
English
records.

distant capital or on long journeys through its extensive territories, then almost a *terra incognita* to Europeans.

Period in
review not
extended
beyond
1803 A.D.

6. So anxious have I been to maintain the impartial character of my evidence that I have thought it best to limit the scope of this volume to the period of continued "good neighbourhood and mutual civility" which was rudely terminated by the war of 1803 A.D. In that year the British and the Marāthās of Nāgpur took, for the first time, opposite sides on the field of battle, with results disastrous to the Nāgpur State. This member of the Marāthā confederacy thereafter ceased to be, what it had hitherto been, a practically independent power; and its history becomes a subject ancillary to the general history of the British Empire in India. Although, therefore, I have spent some time and trouble in collecting the Nāgpur despatches of Mountstuart Elphinstone and Richard Jenkins from 1804 A.D. onwards, I have preferred to leave these records as material for some future history of the period of British intervention. I deal in this place exclusively with the days of Nāgpur's political autonomy.

CHAPTER II.

THE RISE OF THE NĀGPUR STATE.

7. Of the ancestors of the Marāthā Rājās of Nāgpur the first to come into prominence was a certain Parsoji Bhonsle, a trooper* in the service of Shivāji the Great, who distinguished himself during that Marāthā Chieftain's operations against the degenerate forces of the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb. After Aurangzeb's execution of Sambhāji, the son and successor of Shivāji, in 1689 A.D. Rājārām, Sambhāji's brother, succeeded to the headship of the Marāthā State; and, at Rājārām's instance, Parsoji was despatched before the close of the 17th century A.D. to give spirit to the Marāthās in their raids on the Mogul *subah*, or province, of Berar. He was authorized to fly the *zari pathā*, or golden pennon, and was invested with the title of *Senā Sāheb Subhā*, the retention of which was afterwards regarded by his descendants as essential to the validity of their position. In 1699 A.D. Rājārām himself made an incursion into Berar and, when he quitted it shortly before his death, left Parsoji behind him to continue the collection of the various levies on that province which he himself had begun to raise. From this period may be said to date the regular connection

*He was originally a common *Silāhdār*—a trooper who provides his own horse, as distinct from a *Bārgir* who is mounted by the State. (Grant Duff, *History of the Marāthās*, I, p. 323.) The Family Tree of the Nāgpur Bhonsles is given in Appendix A.

of the Nāgpur Bhonsle family with Berar, which was destined to continue for a hundred years.

Kānhoji Bhonsle 8. Shāhu Rājā, Sambhāji's son whom Aurangzeb had kept a prisoner, was released after Aurangzeb's death in 1707 A.D. in order, by raising an opposition to Shivāji II, the son and successor of Rājārām, to cause a split among the Marāthās. Parsoji joined Shāhu Rājā's standard. He thus threw in his lot with a Chief whose imbecility enabled his *Peshwā*, or Brāhman Minister, to appropriate all real power in the State and thereby to establish an authority over Parsoji's successors which, as we shall see, they often challenged but were never wholly able to disown. Parsoji died about 1715 A.D. ;* and his son Kānhoji succeeded to his father's possessions and to the title of *Senā Sāheb Subhā*. In 1719 A.D. Bālāji *Peshwā*, on Shāhu's behalf, negotiated the famous settlement with the Emperor Muhammad Shāh Ghāzi by which Shāhu, besides securing certain districts in the neighbourhood of Sātārā and Poona as *swarāj*, or as his own, obtained authority to levy the *chauth* (25 per cent) and *sardeshmukhi* (10 per cent) on the whole revenue of the six *subahs* of the Deccan. Kānhoji, under the scheme inaugurated for the collection of these impositions, received formal charge of Berar *painghāt*, or North Berar, and took up his permanent residence at Bhām, now the site of extensive ruins in the modern Yeotmal

*Grant Duff, I, p. 373. Jenkins (*Report of 1826*, p. 55) says he died about 1709 A.D.

district.* He was further authorized to make conquests and exact tribute from the Rāj-Gond States to the eastward of Berar. Of his operations in these outlying areas we have no detailed information, but we are told that he was "an officer of great enterprise who made some partial conquests in Gondwāna and headed one incursion into Cuttack."†

9. For reasons which are not disclosed but probably, as stated in one account, because of irregularity in his payments of tribute,‡ Kānhoji fell into disgrace about the year 1734 A.D. and was confined at Sātārā where he lived, a prisoner at large, for many years. His place as *Senā Sāheb Subhā* was taken by a first cousin's son, Raghoji, called the Great. Raghoji secured his advancement through the interest of Shāhu Rājā himself with whom he stood in high favour. "Shāhu married him", Grant Duff writes, "to the sister of one of his own "wives of the Shirke family which, except their "having the same surname (Bhonsle) and that they "may, possibly, have been originally relations and "rivals for the hereditary right of *Patel* (or head-man) of their village, is the only connection which "can be traced between the families of Sātārā and "Nāgpur."§ On receiving the *sanad* or deed of

*Berar *painghāt* (below the passes) as distinct from *bālāghāt* (above the passes) comprised practically all Berar north of the *Paingangā* river—vide map facing p. 135 of Lyall's *Gazetteer of Berar*. Bhām is described on p. 179 of the same work.

†Grant Duff, I, pp. 389 and 442.

‡See p. 226 below.

§Grant Duff, I, p. 442. The British were later led to believe that Parsoji was a brother of Shāhu Rājā. See Appendix B. For Raghoji's connection by marriage with Shāhu Rājā, see Appendix A.

appointment for Berar, Raghoji gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horse for the service of the State; to pay an annual sum of nine *lākhs* of rupees towards the expenses of the Sātārā Rājā's establishment;* and to remit to the head of the government the half of all tribute, prize-property and collections, exclusive of *ghūs-dānā*,† which came into his hands. He also bound himself to raise, when required, a body of 10,000 horse with which to accompany the *Peshwā* or proceed on any other service.‡

Family pre-
tensions of
Nāgpur
Bhonsles.

10. Raghoji the Great was the real founder of the Nāgpur State. The importance of his position as such has always been recognized in local history. It is less widely realized how prominent and independent a part he played in the general Marāthā history of his time. As members of the old Marāthā military aristocracy dating from the time of Shivāji, his family enjoyed a higher social status than the Chiefs of later date like Sindia and Holkar. The latter again were creations of the *Peshwā*'s power while the Nāgpur Bhonsles owed their elevation, as we have seen, to the Rājās of Sātārā and proclaimed the connection on their official seal.§ There was also some affinity between the two Bhonsle families, as is shown by their inter-marriages and by the admitted suitability of

*The *Sketch of 1811* says the nine *lākhs* was "for the kitchen expenses."

†Forage-money, a levy which the *Senā Sāheb Subhā* had, like other Chiefs, been accustomed since the time of Rājārām to reserve for himself—Grant Duff, I, pp. 319 and 338.

‡Grant Duff, I, pp. 442 and 551.

§See footnote † on page 51 below.

members of the Nāgpur family for adoption into that of Sātārā.* When the latter house sank under the *Peshwā's* influence into insignificance, the former naturally took the lead in fostering the traditional rivalry, of which Marāthā society shows traces to the present day, between Brāhman and Marāthā (Kshatri);† and this, in turn, disposed them to side with any movement hostile to the

*The Nāgpur Bhonsles, to strengthen their position, put forward claims, mainly based, it would seem, on the identity of their surname, to blood relationship with the house of Sātārā Warren Hastings, writing in 1774 A.D., describes Sābaji Bhonsle as "descended from the ancient Rājās of Sātārā" and was persuaded that Mudhoji Bhonsle had been adopted by Shāhu Rājā (see page 50 below and Appendix B). Neither of these claims can be substantiated; but the Nāgpur Chiefs' jealousy of the *Peshwā's* power and position received a double stimulus from their fictitious interest in the Sātārā *gaddi* and from their natural hostility, as Marāthās, to a Brāhman authority. These family pretensions provide the key to Nāgpur politics in the 18th century and colour most of the negotiations of importance which that Court pursued with Calcutta, Poona and Hyderabad—a point which, though it cannot be elaborated in a sketch of this character, will be sufficiently illustrated in the course of the narrative. For the English view of the position of the Nāgpur Bhonsle *vis-à-vis* the Sātārā Rājā and the Poona *Peshwā* see Appendix B.

†The age-long struggle between the Brāhmins and the "Kshatriyas . . . assumed an acute shape in the Deccan as for "back as the days of Shivaji when the Brāhmins resisted the "rising ambitions of the martial classes to assert their social "rights. As in those times, so again in this century, political "jealousy of the Marāthā was a class motive colouring the religious issue in the trial of strength that took place from 1901 "onwards between the ruler of Kolhāpur and the Brāhman "hierarchy." (Sir S. Fraser's Preface to the *Memoirs of H. H. the Mahārājā of Kolhāpur* by A. B. Latthe, 1924.) The term "Marāthā" is said by Mr. Latthe to signify the caste, "Marhātthā" being the name of the people. This distinction has not the support of common use; and in the text I have preferred to add "Kshatri" to mark the narrower signification wherever this is needed to avoid ambiguity. The Brāhmins still challenge the claim of the Nāgpur Bhonsles to rank as Kshatriyas. See p. 216 below.

Peshwā which might redound to their own advantage.

Rivalry of
Raghoji and
Bāji Rāo.

11. Raghoji, soon after his appointment as *Senā Sāheb Sibhā*, showed signs of antagonism to the *Peshwā*, Bāji Rāo. Bāji Rāo found himself in 1738 A.D. involved in a desperate struggle with the Nizām acting under the full authority of the Emperor. He sent an urgent summons to Raghoji to join his standard—an order with which the latter evaded compliance on the pretence that he apprehended an invasion of Berar. Bāji Rāo “wrote, beseeched and threatened” but without effect; and, just when Bāji Rāo had come to close quarters with the Nizām in Bhopāl, Raghoji saw his chance and made an incursion north of the Nerbudda river as far as Allāhābād whence, after defeating and slaying the *Subahdār*, Shujah Khān, he returned loaded with booty. This unauthorized expedition gave serious offence to the *Peshwā* who, after his victory over the Nizām, turned his attention to the task of chastising Raghoji. But a plundering party sent forward into Berar was defeated and, the news of the sack of Delhi by Nādir Shāh reaching Bāji Rāo about this time, he abandoned his purpose. Grant Duff writes in this connection, “Jealous of the Brāhman ascendancy he “[Raghoji] meditated a revolution by getting the “Rājā [Shāhu of Sātārā] into his own power; or, “as Shāhu had no prospect of an heir, Raghoji may “have contemplated the possession of the Marāthā “supremacy by being adopted as his son. “Raghoji had many difficulties to overcome in

"prosecuting a scheme of the kind. Although a
 "party existed inimical to the *Peshwā*, Bāji Rāo's
 "friends and dependants surrounded the Rājā and
 "possessed his ear, if not his entire confidence.
 "Nor could Raghoji Bhonsle nor Dumāji Gaikwār
 "concert a plan or transact the slightest business
 "without Brāhman agency. . . . The subsisting
 "difference between Raghoji and Bāji Rāo arose
 "from Raghoji's having plundered the province of
 "Allāhābād and not having joined when he was
 "ordered according to the terms on which he held
 "his lands and title. The *Peshwā* affirmed that he
 "had no authority for levying contributions north
 "of the Nerbudda and declared his determination,
 "at the time of his marching from Poona at the
 "end of 1738, to enforce restitution— not to the
 "owners but to the Marāthā State—and to punish
 "the aggressor. A temporary compromise took
 "place on the arrival of the Persians at Delhi; but
 "the dispute was unsettled and nothing but a sense
 "of injury to their mutual interests prevented an
 "open war. This state of affairs laid the founda-
 "tion of schemes which had a great effect in extend-
 "ing the spreading, but unstable, power of the
 "Marāthās. Unfortunately there are few direct
 "proofs to illustrate this part of their history. It is,
 "however, certain that Bāji Rāo and Raghoji had
 "a meeting and that they were reconciled."*

12. Soon afterwards in 1740 A.D. Bāji Rāo died and was, in spite of Raghoji's support of a rival
 Occupation
of Garha-
Mandlā.

claimant for the post of *Peshwā*, succeeded by his son, Bālāji. But, though the Brāhman was victorious in the intrigue, the Marāthā found a counterpoise in further military successes. Raghoji had already intervened in the affairs of the adjoining Rāj-Gond State of Deogarh and had pushed his incursions far beyond it into Cuttack. His expedition to Allāhābād has already been mentioned, in the course of which he made himself master of Garha-Mandlā. In 1740 A.D., after Bāji Rāo's death, he headed a very successful expedition into the Carnatic,* while in 1742 A.D. his *Diwān*, Bhāskar Pant, reduced the Rājās of Chhattisgarh and carried an invasion into Bihār.† It was time for Bālāji to bestir himself. He had recently secured from the titular Sātārā Rājā the exclusive right of collecting revenues and levying contributions north of the Nerbudda. Fortified by this confirmation of his father's claims, he seized the opportunity, presented by Raghoji's own absence in the Carnatic and the preoccupation of his *Diwān* in Bihār, to make himself master of the Garha-Mandlā kingdom which Raghoji had so recently conquered. The *Peshwā's* seizure of Garha-Mandlā near the centre of Raghoji's dominions was a standing offence to the Nāgpur Bhonsles; and their efforts to recover it, which were successful only after protracted negotiations and many disappointments,

*Described at length in Kincaid and Parasnis, II, pp. 273—280.

†“In 1742, Calcutta being threatened, the English inhabitants caused to be dug the imperfect fortification known as the “Marāthā ditch which long formed the boundary of the settlement” (Smith's *Oxford History of India*, p. 487).

will be referred to more than once in the succeeding pages.

13. The *Peshwā* also put a spoke in the wheel of Raghoji's progress to the east. Bhāskar Rāo had been severely defeated by Allāhvārdi Khān, *Nawāb* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa; and Raghoji, who had meanwhile returned from the Carnatic, now hastened to avenge the defeat of his *Diwān*. The Emperor, therefore, on his *Nawāb's* behalf enlisted the support of Bālāji *Peshwā* by promising to confirm him in the government of Mālwa. Bālāji promptly marched through Allāhābād to Murshidābād and, on Raghoji's arrival in Bengal, defeated him and drove him back towards Berar. But the very rapidity of Raghoji's retreat was a menace to his victorious opponent. Bālāji was fearful of an active combination between Raghoji and the Gaikwār while he himself was busy far from home. He had in fact "to make his election between war with these Marāthā Chiefs or the resignation of Bengal to Raghoji." He chose the latter alternative; and a secret compact was entered into between him and Raghoji in 1744 A.D., designed to avoid the interference of each with the operations of the other. Raghoji was vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Cuttack and was also permitted to take contributions from Lucknow, Patna, and lower Bengal including Bihār; while the *Peshwā's* southern and eastern boundaries in Hindostān were defined by the Nerbudda, the Son and the Ganges.*

Agreement
between
Bālāji and
Raghoji.

*Grant Duff, I, pp. 501-2.

**Extension
of Raghoji's
possessions.**

14. Next year Raghoji was recalled from further operations in Bengal by a disputed succession to the principality of Deogarh in which the Rājā of Chāndā was involved. Raghoji's intervention ended in his subjugation of these territories; and both Deogarh and Chāndā were annexed to his dominions in 1745 A.D.* At the same time the Rājā of Ratanpur was deposed; and during the next eight or ten years the Marāthā yoke was extended not only over Deogarh and Chāndā but also over the whole of Chhattisgarh (*i.e.*, Ratanpur and Raipur) and Sambalpur, while the chiefships formerly dependent on these local powers were rendered tributary.† Nor did Raghoji's successes end here. On the death of Shāhu Rājā in 1749 A.D. he was summoned to Sātārā where, as the leader of the Marāthā (Kshatri) against the Brāhman party, his attitude had a decisive influence on the course of events. His personal ambition "was now controlled by the caution of age and the admonition of experience"; and, in spite of the fact that Shāhu's adoption of Raghoji's son, Mudhoji, which had been strongly canvassed, was negatived by the dramatic discovery of a direct heir of Shivāji the Great in the person of Rāmrajā, a son of Shivāji II, Bālāji Peshwā secured Raghoji in his interest. Raghoji approved of Rāmrajā's succession to the

*Jenkins gives 1743 A.D. as the date of Raghoji's final establishment in Deogarh, but in the text I follow Grant Duff, I, p. 507. Most dates at this period are uncertain as the authorities at my disposal are seldom unanimous in this respect. It was, presumably, about this time that Raghoji shifted from Bhām and made Nāgpur his capital.

†Jenkins, p. 56.

titular sovereignty, escorted him to Poona and received in return for his complaisance new *sanads* for Berar, Gondwāna and Bengal.*

15. Raghoji then turned to make "those acquisitions which closed his long and active life with great reputation among his countrymen." His son, Jānoji, was sent into Cuttack to invade Bengal. That province had been free from the Marāthās for a whole year, but they now returned with a keener desire to possess themselves of its resources; and Allāhvārdi Khān, seeing no alternative, ceded to them in 1751 A.D. the whole province of Orissa as far north as Balasore.† "Twelve *lākhs* of rupees, in lieu of further claims, "was the amount which was settled as the *chauth* of "Bengal and Bihār; but the reason of Raghoji's "accepting a sum so inadequate is found in the "events which were passing in the Deccan. As "soon as the *Peshwā* and Salābat Jang (the Nizām) "went to war,‡ Raghoji surprised and took Gāwilgarh and Narnālā, made himself master of Mānikdrug, occupied the districts dependent on these

His occupation of Orissa and capture of Gāwilgarh, Narnālā and Mānikdrug

*Another version of this affair is given in Warren Hastings' minute of the 9th of July 1778 A.D. (see pp. 50-51 below), obviously inspired by someone anxious to magnify the political importance of the Nāgpur Rājā. See also Appendix B. For details of the dramatic discovery referred to in the text see Kincaid and Parasnis, *History of the Marāthā People*, II, p. 297 et seq.

†The story of the conquest of Orissa by the Nāgpur Marāthās is told at length on pp. 454-486 of Stewart's *History of Bengal* (1813).

‡Bālkāji was actively engaged in the long war of succession in Hyderabad which ensued upon the death of Nizām-ul-Mulk in 1748 A.D. Grant Duff, I, p. 524 et seq.

“forts and not only laid the whole country between “the Paingangā and Godāvari under contribution “but drove out the Mogul *thānās* [military posts] “and established his own.”* He had subsequently to withdraw his garrisons to behind the Paingangā; but, nevertheless, this extension was one of the first importance to him both politically and strategically. Gāwilgarh became the chief fortress of his kingdom and remained continuously in the possession of his family until 1822 A.D., save when occupied for a short time by the Nizām in 1775 A.D.† and again when seized by the British in 1803 A.D.‡ When thus at the zenith of his prosperity Raghoji Bhonsle died in 1755 A.D.§

Raghoji's
status in
Berar.

16. It will be convenient at this point to take stock of the position which Raghoji the Great had established. To make that position clear his status in Berar must be distinguished from his status in the areas further east. “The Bhonsle family never “pretended to anything like sovereignty in Berar. “They quartered themselves on the country as military commanders with authority (which soon became hereditary) to levy the Marāthā dues and to “realize large assignments for the support of their “troops. But even in the exercise of this power

*Grant Duff, I, p. 534.

†See Grant Duff, II, p. 60.

‡See p. 181 below.

§Grant Duff (I, p. 550) places Raghoji's death in March 1753. Kincaid and Parasnis (III, p. 35) say he died of dysentery on the 14th of February 1755 A.D. and add that “thirteen Marāthā ladies had, in his honour, thrown themselves on his flaming pyre.” Jenkins (p. 56) supports the date 1755 A.D. The local Marāthi chronicles say that Raghoji had thirteen wives, of whom eight only became *sati*.

"they were nominally subject to the *Peshwā*, while
 "the Nizām's share in the revenue was always formally admitted. . . . The districts were called
 "*do-amli*, that is, 'jointly administered'; and in all
 "the revenue papers the collections are divided, the
 "Marāthā share being usually sixty *per cent.*."*
 "The Bhonsles posted their officers all over the
 "province, they occupied it with their troops, they
 "collected more than half the revenue and they
 "fought among themselves for possession of the
 "right to collect. But, with the exception of a few
 "*parganahs* ceded to the *Peshwā*, the Nizām
 "through all his misfortunes has constantly maintained his title as *de jure* sovereign of this country,
 "and it was always admitted by the Marāthās."†

17. Eastward of Berar (which was understood by the Marāthās to include only so much of that old Mogul province as was still subject to the Nizām) Raghoji was able to assert a territorial title which, though nominally subordinate to the Sātārā Rājā and through him to the *Peshwā*, was practically independent and was, at any rate, exclusive. To

His status
in Deogarh,
Chāndā,
Chhattisgarh and
Orissa.

*Lyall's *Gazetteer of Berar*, pp. 125-6.

†Lyall's *Gazetteer of Berar*, p. 122. I would only add that to translate the term *do-amli* as "jointly administered" is misleading. The Marāthās had no concern with the administration of Berar but only with the collection of its revenues. In 1803 A.D. Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote of Berar to Col. Stevenson, "The government has, in fact, been in the hands of the Nizām; and his officers are already in all the principal places in the country. The Rājā [of Nāgpur] had the largest share of the revenue; but he collected the money by sending his *kārkins* (clerks) into the different districts, at the time the revenues were paid, or by having them constantly residing in the districts at the same time that the Nizām's officers were carrying on the business of the government." (Wellington's Despatches, Vol. II, p. 605.)

be historically precise, Deogarh, Chāndā, Chhattisgarh and Sambalpur were all, as much as Berar under the Nizām, component parts of the old Mogul empire; and, to be logical, it should have been as difficult in these cases as in Berar for Raghoji to assert an exclusive territorial title. But these remoter kingdoms had all after Aurangzeb's death become independent and had discarded even that nominal allegiance to the Emperor which the Nizām always professed; and this, coupled with the fact that the Chiefs of these estates, unlike the Nizām in this respect also, were not strong enough to resist Raghoji, enabled him to assert an exclusive right of possession or, in other words, of levying tribute which, as we have seen, was formally recognized by Bālāji *Peshwā* in 1744 A.D. To quote Sir Alfred Lyall again, "After Aurangzeb's death "the *trans-Wardhā* country must have revolted. "Raghoji found the Deogarh Chief independent "and the Chāndā Chief in possession of Wun *tāluk* "westward of the river. He suppressed them both "and seized their dominions, which he treated as "conquered territory—not as part of Berar where "he only claimed to share the revenue."* Raghoji and the *Peshwā*, in short, regarded Deogarh and Chāndā as suitable for complete absorption in the Marāthā dominions.† And a similar claim to exclusive sovereignty was asserted over the other

*Lyall's *Gazetteer of Berar*, p. 136.

†Sir R. Jenkins (*Report of 1826*, p. 75) attaches political significance to certain formal relations which subsisted between Raghoji and the Rāj-Gond Chiefs of Deogarh. He writes "The Bhonsle family founds its right to the government of "Deogarh on a treaty with its original possessors.

more easterly possessions which came into Raghoji's hands. In Chhattisgarh the Rājās of Raipur and Ratanpur were totally suppressed; in Sambalpur the local Chief was made tributary, though he was never—owing, probably, to the nature of the country—brought for very long under adequate control; while in Orissa Raghoji's title was defined by treaties executed by the *Nawāb* of Bengal.

18. Before his death, then, Raghoji the Great had laid the foundations of a territorial State, nominally subordinate to the Head of the Marāthā Empire, which comprised the following areas:—

Extent of
Raghoji's
dominions.

- I.—The former Rāj-Gond States of Deogarh and Chāndā with their dependencies.
- II.—The former Rājput States of Chhattisgarh (Ratanpur and Raipur) with their dependencies.
- III.—The Rājput State of Sambalpur with its dependencies.

"It has probably been less from a sense of obligation than of policy and convenience that they have allowed any marks of the original terms of their entry into Deogarh to be preserved—of convenience for internal government. of policy for foreign purposes, perhaps, as allaying jealousy or as indicating that their dominion was obtained from the ruler of the country and not from the *Peshwā* or the Rājā of Sātārā, though permitted by the latter and accomplished by Raghoji whilst holding the high office of *Senā Sāheb Subhā* and Collector of the *chauth* of Berar." But the outward form of Rāj-Gond sovereignty in Deogarh can hardly have had any value "for foreign purposes". Otherwise the same fiction would, surely, have been maintained in Raghoji's relations with Chhattisgarh and Chāndā also. His "treaty" with the Rāj-Gond Chief was the product, more probably, of Raghoji's previous relations with that ruler, in the course of which he gradually rose from being a servant to being the master of the Deogarh government.

IV.—The Mogul province of Orissa with its dependencies.

Over this wide tract of country he asserted an exclusive right to the collection of the revenue. From Bengal and Bihār he claimed an annual payment of twelve *lākhs* of rupees by way of *chauth*. In Berar he claimed the right to share the revenue with the Nizām under the curious system of *do-amli*, besides appropriating to himself the fortresses of Gāwilgarh, Narnālā and Mānikdrug with the districts immediately dependent on them.

‘Rājā of
Berar’ a
misnomer.

19. It adds to the confusion of a naturally confusing situation to find that English writers constantly refer to the Nāgpur Bhonsles as the “Rājās of Berar”—thus, by implication, crediting them with sovereign rights over an area in which they had neither an exclusive revenue interest nor exclusive territorial possession. In Clive’s time the mistake is not so apparent; and his emissary, Motte, in his narrative of 1766 A.D. refers to Jānoji as the Nāgpur Rājā. But Hastings had no other name for Sābāji or Mudhoji than Rājā of Berar—a province which he describes in a minute of 1774 A.D. as adjoining the southern and western boundaries of Bengal. Rennell, the famous geographer of Hastings’ time, gave confirmation to this error. Writing in 1785 A.D. he maintained that “in the “general division of the empire the *subah* of Berar “is unquestionably meant to include the whole tract “between Khāndesh and Orissa.”* But there was

**Memoir of a Map of Hindostan*, 1785 edition, Section VII, pp. 105—112.

no one name for the heterogeneous collection of States, independent and tributary, which for a hundred years came under the semi-centralized control of the Nāgpur Marāthās. Moreover, as Sir Alfred Lyall long ago pointed out, "the title " 'Rājā of Berar' bears in its style evidence of "being an European misnomer . . . The Marāthā "conquerors never assumed territorial designations. "The Bhonsle Chief's highest title (*Senā Sāheb*) was "official; and, even if he had obtained undisturbed "possession of Berar, . . . he would never have "styled himself Rājā of Berar."*

*Lyall's *Gazetteer of Berar*, p. 126, footnote. The name of Berar or, as it is written and pronounced in Marāthi, Warhār originally signified the tract on the banks of the Wardhā river. ("Its original name was *Wardatut* from *Wardā*, the river of that name, and *tat*, a bank", Jarrett's *Ain-i-Akbari*, II, p. 228.) I would hazard the conjecture that the adjoining area known as Nimār originally signified in the same way the tract on the banks of the Nerbudda or Narmadā river.

CHAPTER III.

MOTTE'S NARRATIVE OF 1766 A.D.

Jānoji 20. Raghoji at his death in 1755 A.D. left four
Bhonsle. sons—Jānoji, Mudhoji, Bimbāji and Sābāji. His place at the head of affairs was taken by Jānoji. Mudhoji, a younger half-brother of Jānoji but by an elder wife of Raghoji, “excited to opposition by the *Peshwā* who was jealous of the rapid rise of the Nāgpur State,”* opposed his succession but was reduced to obedience; and Jānoji, on agreeing to the terms to which his father had subscribed, obtained from the *Peshwā* formal investiture as *Senā Sāheb Subhā* and sanction to the treaty with Allāhvardi Khān which had transferred Orissa to Raghoji’s possession in 1751 A.D.† Mudhoji was given Chāndā as an appanage; Bimbāji received Chhattisgarh; while Sābāji retained Dārwhā in Berar which he had previously received from the Nizām.‡

His submission to the Peshwā. 21. Jānoji exhibited but few of the military qualities of his father. He has been given some

*Jenkins’ *Report of 1826*, p. 56.

†Grant Duff, I, pp. 550-1. For the terms of Jānoji’s agreement see p. 8 above.

‡Sābāji’s *jāgir* in Berar, which was a foreign State, seems curious. But such arrangements were customary. Later another cadet of the Nāgpur house (Chimnāji) was given Garha-Mandlā as a *jāgir* by the *Peshwā*, though it formed no part of the Nāgpur dominions at that time. See Jenkins, p. 76, and also pp. 100 and 102 below.

credit as a civil administrator; but he failed altogether to maintain the strong position *vis à vis* the *Peshwā* which he inherited from Raghoji the Great. He joined in intrigues against the Nizām but was completely defeated by him in 1759 A.D.* He took no part in the disastrous battle of Pānipat in 1761 A.D.; but, after the death of Bālāji *Peshwā* in the same year, was foolishly tempted, by an ill-conceived revival of the scheme for the advancement of his house to the position of regent in place of the *Peshwā*,† to join hands with the Nizām. The latter hoped to take advantage of the old jealousy between the Brāhmans and the Marāthās (Kshatris); but after some fighting, in the course of which Poona was plundered, Jānoji in 1763 A.D. turned upon his Mahomedan ally at the battle of Rākshasbhuwan.‡ His double treachery, first towards the *Peshwā* and then towards the Nizām, only served to secure him the lasting enmity of both. In 1766 A.D. the *Peshwā* and the Nizām combined against him and wrested from him three-fourths of the territory he had received as his reward for deserting the Mahomedan.§ Three years later he was made to disgorge the remaining one-fourth, Nāgpur was plundered and he was compelled to sign an agreement at Kankāpur acknowledging his subordination to the *Peshwā*. "A treaty or, in the language of the "*Peshwā* who did not admit the independence

*Grant Duff, I, p. 588.

†See p. 10 above.

‡Grant Duff, I, pp. 636-7.

§*Ibid.*, I, p. 644.

Treaty of
Kankāpur.

“which treaty implies, an agreement was concluded
 “on terms extremely favourable to the *Peshwā* on
 “the 23rd March [1769 A.D.]—eleven days prior to
 “the masterly manœuvres by which Haider Ali
 “dictated a peace to the English at the gates of
 “Madras. The agreement between Mādhav Rāo
 “*Peshwā* and Jānoji Bhonsle, *Senā Sāheb Subhā*,
 “was concluded at the village of Kankāpur on the
 “north bank of the Bhimā near Brimeshwar and
 “consisted of 13 articles, by which Jānoji restored
 “the remainder of the districts he had received for
 “deserting the Moguls at Rākshasbhuwan
 “The tribute of *ghās-dānā*, hitherto levied by the
 “*Senā Sāheb Subhā* from the *Peshwā*’s districts in
 “Aurangābād, was discontinued; and, in lieu of
 “such tribute due from any other district belonging
 “to the *Peshwā* or Nizām Ali, a stipulated sum
 “was to be fixed and paid by an order upon the
 “Collectors; but, in case the Moguls should not pay
 “the amount, the *Senā Sāheb Subhā* should be at
 “liberty to levy it by force; he was neither to in-
 “crease nor diminish his military force without
 “permission from the *Peshwā* and to attend when-
 “ever his services were put in requisition; to pro-
 “tect no disaffected *Silāhdārs* nor to receive
 “deserters from the *Peshwā*’s army; to maintain no
 “political correspondence with the Emperor of
 “Delhi, the *Subahdār* of the Deccan, the English,
 “the Rohillaes and the *Nawāb* of Oude. A *Vakil*
 “was permitted to reside with the English in Orissa
 “and at the court of Nizām Ali, but his business
 “was to be strictly confined to revenue affairs.

"Jānoji Bhonsle also submitted to pay a tribute of "rupees five *lākhs* and one (5,00,001) by five annual "instalments. On the other hand, the *Peshwā* "agreed not to molest Jānoji's districts by marching "his forces towards Hindostān by any unusual "route; to pay no attention to the pretensions of "his relations as long as he continued their just "rights; he was to be permitted to send a force "against the English, who were represented as "troublesome in Orissa, provided his troops were "not required for the service of the State. There "are a variety of other items mentioned in the "agreement but the above are the most important. "The form of the *Senā Sāheb Subhā*'s dependence "upon the *Peshwā* is maintained throughout; but "it seems more particularly marked by avoiding "the usual terms of an offensive and defensive "alliance, instead of which the *Peshwā* agrees, at the "request of the *Senā Sāheb Subhā*, to assist him "with troops in case of an invasion of his territories "by any other power."* Jānoji died in 1772 A.D. having, during the 17 years he was on the *gaddi*, allowed himself to fall from the position of an equal rival of the Poonā *Peshwā* to one of admitted dependence on that minister, without securing an equivalent of any kind in wealth or territory.†

*Grant Duff, I, pp. 663-4, For the garbled Nāgpur version of this treaty, see p. 230 below.

†Kincaid and Parasnis give three different dates for Jānoji's death (see *History of the Marāthū People*, Vol. III, pp. 51, 104 and 121). Jenkins gives May 1772 A.D. and is supported by Forster's sketch of 1788 A.D. (see p. 229 below.) I, therefore, take this date rather than 1773 A.D. given by Grant Duff (Vol. I, p. 697).

Beginning
of English
relations
with Jānoji.

22. It is during Jānoji's reign that we find, for the first time, a political interest in the Nāgpur State awakening among the British in Bengal and that we can glean from the English records of the period some impressions of the Nāgpur Chief and of the eastern provinces over which his sway extended. The Northern *Sarkārs*, contiguous with Jānoji's dominions, passed into the hands of the British in 1759 A.D., while their acquisition of the districts of Burdwan and Midnāpur in the following year brought them into still closer relations with the Nāgpur Bhonsle.

Marāthās
demand the
chauth of
Bengal.

23. I have referred in the preceding chapter to the treaty of 1751 A.D. between Raghoji Bhonsle and Allāhvardi Khān, the *Nawāb* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, by which the former obtained possession of Orissa and the promise of an annual payment of 12 *lākhs* of rupees as the *chauth* of Bengal and Bihār. The stipulated tribute had by 1761 A.D. fallen into arrears; and this gave Sheo Bhat, the Marāthā *Subahdār* in Orissa, an excuse for invading Bengal in that year. He withdrew his forces without coming into collision with the troops that were sent against him; but the incursion gave offence to Vansittart, the English Governor, who proposed to Mir Qāsim, the Bengal *Nawāb*, that they should combine to expel the Marāthās from Cuttack. It was only Mir Qāsim's unwillingness to incur the heavy cost of the expedition that prevented Vansittart from giving practical effect to his proposal.*

*Grant Duff, I, p. 650, and *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, III, p. ix.

24. The subsequent establishment of the British as *de facto* rulers of Bengal and Bihār made them still more anxious to bring Orissa under their control, as this would have given continuity to their possessions all along the coast from Bengal to Madras. Accordingly, soon after Clive had, by the acquisition of the office of *Diwān* in Bengal, Bihār and Orissa,* set the seal upon the growing sovereignty of the East India Company in the two major provinces, he made a definite attempt to secure possession of Orissa also—not by force but by negotiation. In 1766 A.D. he sent a Mr. Thomas Motte on a mission to Nāgpur, “to sound the officers of Jānoji’s Court whether he would not cede the province of Orissa for an annual tribute”, so as to “give a contiguity to the British dominions in India which would strengthen them greatly.” Motte himself has left a record of his negotiations; and the following extract therefrom explains the situation at the time. “During the last year Jānoji “had engaged himself in the pay of Nizām Ali to

Clive aims
at acquiring
Orissa.

*It is sometimes suggested that the British were justified in accepting the *diwāni* of Orissa in 1765 A.D., in spite of the transfer of that province to Raghoji by Allāhvardi Khān in 1751 A.D., because a portion of Orissa, comprising the whole of the Midnāpur and part of the Hooghly district, had remained in the hands of the Bengal Nawāb (Smith’s *Oxford History*, p. 488, f. n. 1 and Baden Powell’s *Land Systems of British India*, I, pp. 392 and 473.) But Midnāpur and Hooghly had ever since 1706 A.D. been definitely incorporated in Bengal (Stewart’s *History of Bengal*, p. 370). The whole of Orissa, as it stood in 1751 A.D., had been transferred to Raghoji; and the subsequent grant to the British of the *diwāni* in this province was a nominal concession, probably included because, under the Moguls, Bengal, Bihār and Orissa had long formed an administrative unit and the Emperor was unwilling, even by implication, to admit in favour of the Marāṭhās a diminution of his sovereign rights in any part of it.

"attack the *Peshwā*; but, at the conclusion of an
 "unsuccessful campaign in June last, his troops,
 "being considerably in arrears, were left in charge
 "of the Nizām's baggage while his ally crossed
 "the Kistnā, at that time swelled by the rains.
 "This was too tempting an opportunity for a
 "Marāthā to miss. He plundered the baggage,
 "paid his troops with the plunder and made
 "Nizām Ali his inveterate enemy, who instantly
 "clapped up a peace with Mādhav Rāo.* Jānoji,
 "thus left to the mercy of his rival, was attacked
 "at the opening of the present campaign in Nov-
 "ember. He was defeated in a general engage-
 "ment; his capital Nāgpur was taken and burnt in
 "February; and he was glad to accept of such terms
 "of peace as Mādhav Rāo would grant him.†
 "Bhawāni Pandit [the Marāthā Governor of
 "Orissa], therefore, wrote me his master must
 "give up all thoughts of an alliance with the
 "English at present The reverse of the
 "fortunes of Jānoji obliged me to make a total
 "alteration in my plan of operations and to give
 "up all thoughts of a journey to Nāgpur."‡ The
 terms, however, which Motte was authorized to
 offer Jānoji are disclosed by the account of his con-
 versations with Bhawāni Pandit, whom he met both
 on his outward and homeward journeys. When

Motte's
 negotiations.

*The episode of Jānoji's treachery occurred at the battle of Rākshasbhuwan on the banks of the Godāvari in 1763, not at the Kistnā in 1765 A.D. See p. 23 above.

†It was on this occasion that Jānoji had to surrender three-fourths of the territory which he had received as a reward for his defection at Rākshasbhuwan.

‡*Early European Travellers*, p. 29.

Bhawāni Pandit emphasized the just claim Jānoji, his master, had on the Company for the arrears of the tribute of Bengal and Bihār, "I seized this lucky opening", says Motte, "entered at once on the discussion of the point, and answered I understood the revenues of Orissa were made over to Jānoji in lieu of the tribute of the three provinces,* and that the best mode which could be adopted was to restore it to the Company, who should pay a stipulated sum and send a resident to the Court of Nāgpur as a hostage. I urged that by so doing a mutual confidence would be formed between that Court and the government of Calcutta for the advantage of both. Jānoji's situation was at that time extremely critical. A bitter inveteracy had arisen between him and Mādhav Rāo the *Peshwā*, in effect the sovereign of Poona, while he became detested by the Nizām of the Deccan, his only ally, for his treachery at the conclusion of the last campaign. The *Peshwā* resolved to make him feel the weight of his resentment. Bhawāni Pandit was too good a statesman not to comprehend the use which might be made of an alliance with the English. He caught the idea with the vivacity of a Marāthā, told me the interests of his Court and ours were the same, that he would write what he had said to Jānoji and desired me to write to Lord Clive."†

25. Proposals of a similar kind were placed before the Directors of the East India Company Clive's policy.

*See footnote to p. 31 below.

†*Early European Travellers*, pp. 17-18.

in a despatch written by Clive shortly before he left India in 1767 A.D. "I doubt not that the "peace of Bengal may be preserved many years, "especially if a firm alliance be established with "the *Subah* of the Deccan and if Jānoji, the Nāg-
 "pur Rājā, be satisfied with the *chauth* proposed
 "to which, I think, he is in justice and equity
 "strictly entitled. . . . With Jānoji it is our in-
 "terest to be upon terms of friendship, for which
 "purpose a *Vakil* has been despatched, as
 "appears upon the Committee's proceedings; and
 "I would recommend your settling of the *chauth*
 "with him agreeably to the plan I have proposed,
 "*viz.*, that we shall pay sixteen *lākhs* upon condi-
 "tion that he appoint the Company *Zamindār* of
 "the Balasore and Cuttack countries which, though
 "at present of little or no advantage to Jānoji,
 "would in our possession produce nearly sufficient
 "to pay the whole amount of the *chauth*. What-
 "ever the deficiency may be, it will be overbalanced
 "by the security and convenience we shall enjoy
 "of free and open passage by land to and from
 "Madras, all the countries between the two Presi-
 "dencies being under our influence; but I would
 "not by any means think of employing force to
 "possess ourselves of those districts; the grant
 "of them must come from him with his own con-
 "sent and, if that cannot be obtained, we must
 "settle the *chauth* upon the most moderate terms
 "we can."*

*Talboys Wheeler's *Early Records of British India*, pp. 346-7.

26. At first Clive's scheme, which was adopted by his successor, Verelst, seemed likely to succeed. Sheo Bhat, the *Subahdār* of Orissa, when ousted from his post by Jānoji's orders, had rebelled against his master; and Clive had despatched a force into Orissa to suppress him. Jānoji was encouraged by this conciliatory action on the part of the British and sent his *Vakil*, Udaipuri Gosāin, to Murshidābād to pursue negotiations in regard to the cession of Orissa. The Company's *Vakil* ingeniously argued in the course of the discussion that Allāhvardi Khān had agreed to pay 12 *lākhs* of rupees as *chauth* for all the three provinces and that, therefore, if the Marāthās wanted the stipulated *chauth*, it would only be logical for them to hand back possession of Orissa.* Verelst eventually offered 'three years' *chauth* in ready money if the Marāthās would vacate. Jānoji, of course, vehemently and very justly, challenged the British interpretation of the treaty of 1751 A.D., but eventually professed his readiness to accept Verelst's terms, provided that the agreement in which they were embodied was signed and sealed by the King of England himself. But, having got as far as this, Jānoji would go no further. He avoided coming to any definite agreement; and the

Failure of negotiations for Orissa.

*This explains Motte's remark (see p. 29 above) that he "understood the revenues of Orissa were made over to Jānoji in lieu of the tribute of the three provinces." But this was nonsense. Allāhvardi Khān agreed in 1751 A.D. to pay 12 *lākhs* (in addition to the assignment of Orissa) on condition that the Marāthās did not enter Bengal or Bihār. The terms of the treaty are quoted in Hunter's *Orissa*, II, p. 30.

negotiations were protracted to such a length that they had in the end to be abandoned. "I once flattered myself," Verelst wrote in a letter to the Council on the 16th of December 1769 A.D., "that Jānoji Bhonsle would have acceded to a treaty for the cession of Orissa; but. . . . after three years of negotiation, much trouble and some expense no progress has been made towards a conclusion; on the contrary, he has studiously avoided any declaration of his sentiments." When, therefore, the *Peshwā*, Mādhav Rāo, attacked Jānoji Bhonsle in 1769 A.D., as already mentioned, the British turned a deaf ear to Jānoji's appeals for help. The latter, in his resentment, refused afterwards to allow British troops to pass through Cuttack on their way from Madras to Bengal; but this was all the retaliation of which he was capable.* The upshot of the matter was that Jānoji retained possession of Orissa while the British continued to refuse the *chauth*. There was some solid justification for this refusal, in spite of Clive's admission that strict "justice and equity" were on Jānoji's side. The *chauth* was an imposition levied by the Marāthās as the price of their forbearance from ravaging Bengal and Bihār, as the treaty of 1751 A.D. quite clearly stated; and, obviously, if the British were strong enough to defend their territory against Marāthā inroads they were justified in withholding the *chauth*. They, did, in fact, refuse to pay it; and it is a significant indication of Jānoji's

British
refuse to
pay *chauth*.

**Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, III, pp. xix-xx.

weakness and of the strength of the British that this refusal never led to any active reprisals. The question of the *chauth* was raised later, as we shall see, in 1781 A.D.,* and again just after Warren Hastings had left the country in 1785 A.D.;† but the claim was never again seriously pressed except as an argument to embarrass the British government in the course of other negotiations.

27. Before closing this brief sketch of Jānoji's reign and of his relations with the British, I may refer to Motte's *Narrative of a Journey to the Diamond Mines of Sambalpur*. This contemporary description of the eastern provinces of Jānoji's dominions was written in 1766 A.D. and is of interest as providing a detailed account of the first visit of a British representative to the Nāgpur State.‡ Motte was a free merchant of Calcutta whom Clive, being then at a great loss for means of remitting money to England,§ despatched to Sambalpur to endeavour to open the diamond trade, to make enquiries into the state of the Marāthās and to

Motte's
Narrative.

*See p. 74 below.

†See p. 85 below.

‡Motte records that a Captain or Mr. Mallock had been to Sambalpur before him when Henry Vansittart was Governor of Bengal (1760—64). But this previous visit seems to have been exclusively concerned with the purchase of diamonds, for which Sambalpur was famous, and I know of no other mention of it. (See *Early European Travellers*, pp. 1 and 32.)

§Even down to a much later period "modern financial facilities did not exist. There was no paper money, no funded debt and no machinery of extensive credit. Each campaign had to be financed by chests full of coin." *Oxford History*, p. 560.

sound the officers of Jānoji's Court as to the possibility of negotiating the cession of Orissa. The following extracts give some idea of the adventurous nature of the expedition upon which, in company with a Mr. Raby, an English servant, named Charles Smith, and a small body of sepoys, Motte had the boldness to embark.*

"May 28th, 1766.—I halted this night at Jujum-sura, where I halted the 29th, next day, and sent the ambassador before me to the capital to signify my arrival to the Rājā [of Sambalpur]. He sent a person back to acquaint me that the Rājā was dead, but that his son, Abhai Singh, who had succeeded him, would be very glad to see me. He desired me to march the next day to Maneswar, within five miles of Sambalpur, whither the Rājā would send his brother to meet me.

Motte's
escort struck
by lightning.

"May 30th.—I did so and encamped, as he requested, in a very pleasant grove, for the day was intensely hot which was the signal for the change of the monsoon. In the evening about nine there came on a severe storm of thunder and rain. I had a large spare tent in which the baggage was

*Little is known of Motte. He is found living at Benares in 1773 A.D. (*Selections from the Foreign Department Papers*, I, 53.) Thence he moved to Hooghly where Warren Hastings and his wife used to visit Mrs. Motte, who was a great friend of Mrs. Hastings and accompanied her to England in 1784 A.D. For some time Motte held a Police appointment in Calcutta where his name is still preserved in "Mott's Lane." About 1781 A.D. he got into financial difficulties and in 1783 is found petitioning his creditors to consent to his release from prison. (*Echoes from old Calcutta*, third edition, p. 105, footnote.) He is last heard of in 1802 when he is described as "well and cheerful but breaking, and his faculties a little impaired." (Sydney Grier, *Letters of Warren Hastings to his wife*, p. 435.)

“put. The sepoys and servants retiring thither for
“shelter and fastening it down as close as possible,
“the lightning struck the iron pin at the top of the
“tent pole and the end of the bayonet of the sentry,
“whom it instantly killed. It was conducted by the
“pole to the spare ammunition at the foot of it
“which, by its explosion, struck every man sense-
“less who was on his legs but had little effect on
“those who were lying down. The lining of the
“tent being serge, the baggage took fire and burnt
“all such as were rendered senseless by the rarefac-
“tion of the air. The pain roused such as were
“not quite dead who ran into the tent where I was
“lying very ill in the dark, for the storm had extin-
“guished all the candles. It was with difficulty I
“got a light; but, when it came, never were my eyes
“struck with so terrible a scene! Conceive thirty
“poor wretches, on whose black skins the livid
“marks of the fire were most visible, standing stark-
“naked round my bed imploring, with the most
“horrid screams, something to relieve their intoler-
“able pains from a fellow-creature exhausted by a
“long fit of illness. Excess of agony had banished
“respect; two or three of them had even thrown
“themselves upon the bed. I rose; the tent was
“by this time over shoes in water. I had their
“burnings anointed with oil. I sat myself on my
“elbow chair and spent the most terrible night
“of my life among the shrieks and groans of
“those miserable men, of whom nine expired
“before morning and seven the next day.”*

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 31-2.

28. On May the 31st with the remnant of his escort Motte entered Sambalpur—his arrival being “rather like a funeral than the conclusion of a successful march”—only to find the town “in great confusion”. Three successive prime ministers had been murdered in the space of 18 months; and Motte had to wait until the last to seize office had stabilized his position before he could proceed to business. It was not till the 16th of July that he was able to visit the junction of the Ib and Mahānadi rivers, where the diamonds were said to be found, when he was soon convinced of the impossibility of procuring them in quantities sufficient for his purpose.* His narrative then continues: “*July 19th.*—On my return from this place, “I paid a visit to the Naik Bans [?Nāg bans], the “great snake worshipped by the mountainous “Rājās, which, they say, is coeval with the world “which at his decease will be at an end. His habitation was a cavern at the foot of a rock, at the “opening of which was a plain of 400 yards surrounded by a moat. I understood he generally “came out once a week, against which time such as “make religious vows carry kids or fowls and “picquet them on the plain. About nine in the “morning his appearance was announced to me; I “stood on the banks of the moat opposite the “plain. He was unwieldy, thicker in proportion

*There is a full account of the diamond workings in the Mahānadi near Sambalpur to be found on pages 30—37 of *A Manual of the Geology of India*, Part III, Economic Geology by V. Ball, published by Government in 1881.

“to his length than snakes usually are, and seemed
“of that species the Persians call *azhdahā*. There
“was a kid and some fowls picqueted for him. He
“took the kid in his mouth and was some time
“squeezing his throat, to force it down while he
“threw about his tail with much activity. He then
“rolled along to the moat where he drank and
“wallowed in the mud. He returned to his cavern.
“Mr. Raby and I crossed the water in the after-
“noon and supposed, from his print in the mud,
“his diameter to be upwards of two feet. A few
“days after I returned from this trip, Raby was
“seized with the fever of the country. We sat
“down to tea in the afternoon when he looked and
“talked very wildly. I took him by the hand, felt
“him in a strong fever and advised him to go to
“bed from whence he never rose but, to the hour
“of his death on the third day, continued light-
“headed. Charles Smith, my European servant,
“died with the same symptoms. When I read the
“funeral service over him I could not but seriously
“reflect there was no one left to perform the same
“duty over me.”* Motte eventually quitted Sam-
balpur on October the 2nd at the end of the rainy
season; and a month later crossed the Subanrekhā
river, “overjoyed at having once more set foot on
“English ground. I now contemplate that after so
“perilous a journey I had carried no one point I
“wished; but, having resided during the most un-
“wholesome season among a perfidious people;

**Early European Travellers*, p. 44.

“thought myself happy in having escaped with my
“life.”*

Motte's
account of
Marāthā ad-
ministration
of Orissa.

29. Motte's account of the condition of the countries through which he passed enables us to form some estimate of the character of the Nāgpur administration at this period. He observes that there were twelve *chaukis* or outposts, between the Subanrekḥā river and the town of Balasore (a distance of 26 miles), “at each of which money is extorted from the pilgrims going to the temple of Jagannāth, according to their means”—the most severe exactions being levied by the Rājā of Morbhanj, a convert to Islām.† The *zamindāri* of Morbhanj is described as being gradually dismembered. There were two rival claimants to the estate; and a body of 30 Marāthā horse and 500 Marāthā foot from Balasore was engaged in collecting the tribute due from it. Sheo Bhat, the former *Subahdār* of Orissa, was, at the time of Motte's visit, in open rebellion against Bhawāni Pandit, the officer appointed by Jānoji to take his place.‡ Military reinforcements, sent from Nāgpur to assist Bhawāni, appeared *en route* before Sambalpur but were refused supplies of forage and money by the local Rājā. They, therefore, attempted to force an entry into the town but were repulsed. When Motte enquired why people in general preferred

**Early European Travellers*, p. 49.

†“Besides the royal officers, who levied a tax at every few miles, each petty proprietor through whose estate the route lay lined the road with hungry myrmidons.” (Hunter's *Orissa*, II, p. 44.)

‡See p. 31 above.

Sheo Bhat to the new *Subahdār* the answer was epigrammatic, "Sheo Bhat supported the national troops with the plunder of foreign countries; Bhawāni Pandit with the plunder of his own." It was the custom, Motte records, for the Marāthā troops to loot as freely in estates tributary to them as in any enemy's territory. Parts of the country were rendered desolate by the oppressive methods employed; and professional plunderers carried on their activities even in times of peace. In the backward tracts only such crops were grown as would ripen in the rains, because at other seasons of the year "the inhabitants expect the Marāthās to overrun the country." Jānoji's military imbecility resulted in widespread disaffection among all the hill Chiefs, whose tribute "is so ill paid he is compelled to march his troops after the rains and extort what he can." Making every allowance for possible inaccuracies in Motte's information and for the different standards of these early days, it is still clear that civil administration in the ordinary sense was largely in abeyance over an extensive part of Jānoji's eastern dominions.* Jānoji is by tradition given credit for his internal civil arrangements. Jenkins states that he had the reputation of having settled what his father

*Sir W. Hunter (*Orissa*, II, p. 33) writes, "I have most carefully examined the records of this period but I can detect absolutely no trace of anything like a civil administration. The Marāthā cavalry harried the country at stated periods each year and departed with the spoil. The village communes alone stand out above the stormy waste of waters, and their internal organization formed the only sort of civil government during the 40 years which preceded our accession [in 1803]."

had only conquered and of having been the best of the Marāthā rulers of the Nāgpur family, "to whose reign the best days of the country and people are referred."* He, doubtless, deserved this reputation nearer home. But, so far as we can judge from the conditions which prevailed after eleven years of his rule in Orissa and Sambalpur, his military weakness, as one might have expected, was, in those outlying areas which came under Motte's observation, fatal to the stability of his administration.

**Decline of
power of
Nāgpur
State under
Jānoji.**

30. With Raghoji the Great the great days of the Nāgpur house had, in fact, departed. It is in Indian history no uncommon thing to find a dynasty of which one of the earliest representatives is alone an outstanding personality; and, just as the Mogul empire attained its greatest strength and almost its maximum extension in the lifetime of Akbar the Great, so the Nāgpur State reached the zenith of its political and military reputation under Raghoji. His vigorous personality consolidated the kingdom and drew from it a revenue which his sons, Jānoji and Mudhoji, could never raise.†

**Report of 1826*, pp. 58, 81 and 82. "It is observed that in this reign justice was well administered, crimes were few and the punishment seldom capital. The revenues were flourishing and the people in easy circumstances. The allowances of all officers, civil and military, and of the troops were regularly paid."

†Forster in his sketch of 1788, when estimating the current revenue of the State at 59 *lākhs*, remarks, "The revenues of Nāgpur were computed at a crore of rupees in the time of Raghoji who, being at the head of a large army and generally in the field, collected a tribute from all the territories intervening between his capital and Bengal." See footnote ‡ to p. 97 below.

Moreover he admitted no partner to his territorial control, while his successors were hampered by the semi-independent status which custom conferred on their near relations in important appanages such as Chāndā and Chhattisgarh. "There was always a division of the territories of the State among the brothers of the reigning prince after the first Raghoji In all these cases of division the elder brother, as the Rājā or sovereign, had a right to the allegiance of the others and to certain military services on account of their fiefs or appanages. But the latter managed their country entirely; and they had their separate Courts, households, ministers and armies, subject to no interference whatever on the part of the Rājā This division in the dominions of the State was always a source of weakness. It originated in the application of the Hindu law of private to political inheritance supported, in the original division between the sons of the first Raghoji, by the maxim of the Court of Poona to govern by dividing."*

31. But there was, quite apart from his personal character and family encumbrances, another new factor which proved a still greater obstacle to Jānoji's maintenance of his father's military and political position. This was the establishment of the British power. The Marāthā States were never content to be self-supporting; and Raghoji's greatness really rested on his far-flung military expeditions. A leader who carried his arms to Allāhābād

Jānoji's decline due to growth of British power.

*Jenkins' Report of 1826, pp. 76-7.

in the north, to Madras in the south and to Bengal in the east was a man worth following. His vigour in the field brought him wealth, made his service popular and won for it a reputation.* Jānoji at first was able to emulate his father's profitable enterprise. Soon after his investiture as *Senā Sāheb Subhā* in 1755 A.D. "he accepted an invitation from Jāfar Ali Khān, the dispossessed *Subah-dār* of Chicacole and Rajahmundry, to invade those districts, which he laid waste and, for a short time, plundered with impunity until troops were assembled to repel him. He then sent off an escort with his plunder and, to insure its safe retreat, maintained a partial engagement with Vijyārām Rāj, the *Zamindār* who rented Chicacole and Rajahmundry from M. Bussy. The *Zamindār* was supported by a body of French troops; but Jānoji secured the object for which he fought and the booty reached his own territories in safety."† But long before the close of Jānoji's reign the Northern *Sarkārs*, as well as Bihār and Bengal, had passed into the hands of the British; his claims to the *chauth* from Bengal and Bihār were disregarded and he dared do nothing to enforce them; his levies of *ghās-dānā* from the *Peshwā's* districts in Aurangābād were, as we have seen, wholly discontinued; and in lieu of those from other districts, belonging either to the *Peshwā* or

*"The cavalry of Berar since the period of the first Raghoji . . . were classed among the choicest troops of the Deccan."
(Forster's despatch of September the 13th, 1790 A.D.)

†Grant Duff, I, pp. 551-2.

to the Nizām, a cash payment was substituted.* The foundations of the British empire, laid along the seaboard from Bengal to Madras, hemmed in Jānoji's dominions on two sides; and his wars with the *Peshwā* his northern, and the Nizām his western neighbour were the inevitable result of this rigid curtailment of the field available for his military operations. When these two neighbours combined against him he was crushed between the upper and the nether mill-stone. Rājhoji, to use the language of Motte's informant, had been able to support his troops with the plunder of foreign countries. Jānoji had to be content with the resources of his own. This involved a radical change in the administration—a change directly attributable to the growth of the British dominions on the eastern side of the peninsula.

*The importance of *gāṇ-dānā* is illustrated by an observation made only a few years later by a British envoy at Nāgpur. "The people here complain that, since the compromise which "Diwākar Pandit [the famous *Diwān*, or Prime Minister, of the "Nāgpur State, who served under Jānoji, Sābaji and Mudhoji—"three brothers in succession] made with Nizām Ali to receive "four *lākh*s of rupees in lieu of the claim of the government "to *dānā-ghās* in Gangthari [the tract adjoining the Gangā or "Godāvari river], the Rājā's army, which was chiefly supported "by the annual plunder of that district, has entirely melted "away." (Letter from Charles Chapman, dated Nāgpur, the 5th of November 1782.) ‡

CHAPTER IV.

ELLIOT'S EMBASSY IN 1778 A.D.

Civil war
after Jāno-
ji's death.

32. On the death of Jānoji in 1772 A.D. without issue his adopted son, Raghoji II, succeeded him. But Raghoji was only twelve years of age; and a struggle for power at once ensued between his uncle, Sābāji, and his father, Mudhoji. On the death of Mādhav Rāo a similar struggle for the powers of the *Peshwā* had in the preceding year commenced between his uncle, Raghunāth Rāo, and the ministers surrounding his younger brother, Nārāyan Rāo, among whom the famous Nānā Pharnavis was soon to take the leading place. As Mudhoji favoured Raghunāth Rāo, Sābāji, on agreeing to the terms accepted by Jānoji in 1769 A.D., received acknowledgment as *Senā Sāheb Subhā* from the ministerial party on behalf of Nārāyan Rāo; when Nārāyan Rāo was murdered Mudhoji, in his turn, secured from Raghunāth Rāo the recognition of Raghoji; and subsequently, when Nārāyan Rāo's widow bore a posthumous son, the title of *Senā Sāheb Subhā* was withdrawn from Raghoji II and conferred once more on Sābāji. Eventually Mudhoji and Sābāji met in battle at Pānchgāon, a village twelve miles from Nāgpur on the road to Umrer; Sābāji was slain; and Mudhoji succeeded finally to the regency in 1775 A.D., securing from Poona the title of *Senā Dhurandhar* for himself while Raghoji II again

became *Senā Sāheb Subhā*.* These internal dissensions still further sapped the already dwindling strength of the Nāgpur kingdom, a state of affairs which the Nizām was quick to recognize. "Ibrāhim Beg (Dhonsā), the intimate friend of "Sābāji, was sent by Nizām Ali, as was pretended, "to avenge his fate but, in fact, to take advantage "of a strong party against Mudhoji who, conscious "of inability to oppose the force sent against him, "surrendered the forts of Gāwilgarh, Narnālā, "Mānikdrug and Chandrapur [Chāndā] as the "price of peace. Nizām Ali, however, restored "these forts shortly afterwards, on the occasion of "his coming to Ellichpur, when Mudhoji, accom- "panied by his son Raghoji *Senā Sāheb Subhā*, "manifested the humblest submission, entered into "an agreement of faithful co-operation and bound "himself to suppress the depredations of the Gonds "who were at that time troublesome in the districts "of Nizām Ali. A like submissive demeanour to- "wards the Poona *Darbār* and a bond for the pay- "ment of ten *lākhs* of rupees obtained a confirma- "tion of the regency through the favour of Nānā "Pharnavis."†

33. The direction of British affairs had, mean- while, passed into the hands of Warren Hastings who became Governor-General in 1774 A.D. His vigorous mind was soon engaged in formulating a

*Grant Duff, I, pp. 698, 705 and 715, and II, pp. 31 and 35. See also Jenkins' *Report of 1826*, pp. 58-9.

†Grant Duff, II, pp. 60-1. Ibrāhim Beg Dhonsā's subsequent relations with Mudhoji are noticed on pp. 101-2 below.

policy which included in its scope a permanent alliance with the Nāgpur State. This policy is disclosed in an interesting letter of January the 12th, 1777 A.D., addressed by Hastings to his Private Secretary, Alexander Elliot, then in England. "You are already well acquainted", he wrote, "with the general system which I wish to be empowered to establish in India, namely, to extend the influence of the British nation to every part of India not too remote from their possessions . . . and to accept of the allegiance of such of our neighbours as shall sue to be enlisted among the friends and allies of the King of Great Britain." He advocated a system of direct engagements with adjoining States, "made with the sanction of the King's name." "On this footing I would replace the *subah*-ship of Oudh. On this footing I would establish an alliance with Berar. These countries are of more importance to us than any others from their contiguity to ours and, therefore, it is of consequence to settle their connection with us before that of any other." Hastings records that Sābāji had sent an agent, named Benirām Pandit, to Calcutta with a letter containing professions of friendship and expressing a desire to be on terms of alliance with his government. The negotiations, however, were interrupted by Sābāji's death; and though Mudhoji, on coming into power, continued "a very friendly and in some sort confidential correspondence," he avoided any definite engagement.*

**Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy*, I, pp. 86—89.

34. Meanwhile the Bombay government had taken up arms in support of the claims of Raghunāth Rāo to the office of *Peshwā* in return for possession of the island of Salsette. The Supreme Government in Bengal under Hastings, offended at this independent action on the part of Bombay, refused to support its policy; and matters were still in the uncertain state engendered by these divided counsels when news of the declaration of war between England and France reached India in July 1778 A.D. Hastings immediately decided to make an alliance with Nāgpur the pivot of his defence against the combined attack of the French and the Poona Marāthās which he anticipated, so as to secure a strong central position menacing his enemies' lines of communication and at the same time interposing a buffer State between them and Bengal. He at once determined to despatch Elliot, his most trusted subordinate, to Nāgpur to prosecute negotiations to this end. He issued instructions to the Bombay government, prohibiting them from entering into any engagement hostile to the ministerial party at Poona and warning them of his projected alliance with Nāgpur; and he gave orders to an important detachment of troops, then operating in Bundelkand under Colonel Leslie, to move to a position on the borders of the Nāgpur State so as to give immediate effect to any decision in favour of joint military operations with the forces of Mudhoji to which that Chief might consent.

Hastings
seeks
alliance
with Nāg-
pur in
First Marā-
thā war.

Hastings'
Minute of
9th July
1778 A.D.

35. Hastings' reasons for this line of action can best be understood from the Secret Consultations of the Governor-General and Council held in July 1778 A.D. On the 6th of that month advices from Cairo induced the British to commence hostilities against the French in Bengal; and on the 9th the Governor-General wrote a Minute on the measures to be pursued in consequence of the war between France and Great Britain. Hastings was of opinion that the first attempt of the French would be made against Bombay or Fort St. George. "The Presidency of Fort St. George possesses in "itself the complete means of defence "Bombay requires everything It can only "defend itself against a direct invasion and to that "it is, perhaps, equal if it has to contend with the "French alone If it should be attacked, or "be in certain danger of being attacked, by the "French and Marāthās in alliance, an offensive "war must be undertaken in defence of Bombay. "The detachment under Colonel Leslie may be "employed in this service but it consists of "a force too inconsiderable to engage singly in "such contest, unless it can be assisted by an ally "equal in power or so nearly equal to that of "the *Peshwā* as to give our united strength a "degree of superiority over the combination to "which it would be opposed. Mudhoji "Bhonsle, the Chief of Berar, answers to this "description. His family has always borne a considerable rank among the powers of India. His "father, Raghoji, subjected the provinces of Bengal

“to the *chauth* under the government of the most
“able Chief that ever ruled them. His elder
“brother, Jānoji, attacked and burnt the city of
“Poona at a time when the power of the *Peshwā*
“far exceeded its present state and the Marāthā
“constitution, excepting Berar, was undivided.*
“His dominions extend from the sea coast
“of Orissa and from the western borders
“of Bengal to the neighbourhood of
“Aurangābād. His revenue, though not pro-
“portionate to their magnitude, is considerable;
“and his standing forces are numerous, exclusive
“of the militia which in all the Marāthā States is
“always ready to join their regular armies when
“they take the field.† While the contest prevailed
“between Raghunāth Rāo and the ministerial
“party, Mudhoji sided with the former, his brother
“with the latter. This conduct drew on him the
“resentment of the Ministers who, as soon as they
“were freed, by the interposition of this govern-
“ment, from the dread of their great competitor,
“encouraged and supported the *Nawāb*, Nizām Ali
“Khan, in an invasion of his [Mudhoji’s] country,
“which at that time had not yet recovered from the
“distractions occasioned by the contention between
“the two brothers. On this occasion he was glad
“to purchase a peace of Nizām Ali Khān with the
“loss of some forts of consequence, the remem-
“brance of which he still retains with a determina-
“tion to avail himself of the first opportunity to

*See p. 23 above. Berar, of course, was Hastings’ name for the Nāgpur State.

†See p. 189 below.

"reclaim them.* As the provinces which are now
 "united under the government of Berar are a con-
 "stitutional part of the Marāthā empire, a natural
 "enmity must ever subsist between those who
 "possess the sovereign authority and the rulers of
 "Berar; the former looking to the recovery of
 "their unalienable rights, the latter jealous of
 "their independency. Thus Mudhoji may be con-
 "sidered as a certain enemy of the *Peshwā*, into
 "whatever hands the fluctuating state of the parties
 "at Poona may throw his administration; but a
 "late event has given Mudhoji pretensions to a
 "rank even more elevated than that of the *Peshwā*.
 "I need not inform this Board that the power
 "which the *Peshwās* have possessed for about 40
 "years past is an usurpation on the sovereign
 "authority vested by the constitution in the Rājā.
 "Rājā Shāhu, the last who retained it, having no
 "children, adopted Mudhoji Bhonsle and, as I am
 "informed, designed him for his successor; but
 "Bālāji, the *Peshwā* or Prime Minister, had the art
 "to deprive Mudhoji of the benefit of this intention
 "and to transfer the inheritance to Rāmrajā, who
 "was also an adopted son of Rājā Shāhu and an
 "infant at his death. Raghoji, the father of
 "Mudhoji, instantly marched to Poona with a for-
 "midable army and, by a negotiation of a day,
 "obtained, for a surrender of his son's actual pre-
 "tensions, a large accession of territory and other
 "advantages, still reserving a future claim to the
 "Rājā-ship and refusing to commit himself by any

*See page 45 above.

“formal deed in an acknowledgment of the title
 “of Rāmrājā.* From that time the grandeur of
 “his family may be dated. Raghoji continued to
 “authenticate all his public acts by the name of
 “Shāhu Rājā; and on the seals which have been
 “affixed to all letters which I have received from
 “Sābāji Bhonsle and even, since his death, from his
 “brother, Mudhoji, they are styled the vassals of
 “Shāhu Rājā.† I know not with certainty what are
 “Mudhoji’s present views. Rāmrājā died in
 “December last and the succession is either still
 “vacant or but lately filled; Mudhoji’s rights are
 “still in force and unquestionably superior to any
 “other.‡ I must suspend the thread of this narra-
 “tive to relate a transaction which brings it nearer
 “to the concerns of this government. An alliance
 “with the Bhonsle family has been long its object;
 “and considerable advances were made to the
 “attainment of it in the administration of Lord
 “Clive. In the latter end of the year 1773 Sābāji
 “Bhonsle sent a *Vakil* to me with letters containing
 “general professions of attachment but expressed
 “with such warmth as induced me to aim at a
 “formal connection with him. Finding the *Vakil*
 “an intelligent man, I sent him back furnished with
 “a plan for that purpose. Unfortunately Sābāji

*For a more correct account of these transactions see page 14 above.

†The wording of the seal has been thus translated, “This is the seal of Raghoji the son of Bimbāji who flutters about the feet of the great Shāhu Rājā like the bee about the lotus.” See *Sketch of 1811*, p. 9.

‡This whole statement of Mudhoji’s position is inaccurate. Mudhoji’s agents, doubtless, were responsible for misleading Hastings. See in this connection Appendix B.

“fell by the hands of his brother a little before the
 “*Vakil*’s return and the negotiation dropped; but
 “Mudhoji, himself soon after adopting his
 “brother’s line, again deputed the same *Vakil* to
 “Calcutta; but many causes, which it is unnecessary
 “to enumerate, prevented me from improving the
 “disposition of this Chief. A constant intercourse
 “of letters, and in some degree confidential, has
 “been kept up between us. On a false rumour of
 “the death of Rāmrajā, foreseeing the use which
 “might be made of this diversion in the Marāthā
 “policy, I employed the agency of the *Vakil* to
 “excite the ambition of Mudhoji to aspire to the
 “sovereign authority which such an event, then
 “probable, at least, from the infirm state of the
 “Rājā and the distractions at Poona, seemed to
 “present to him; and I intimated the same advice
 “in a letter which I wrote at the same time to
 “Diwākar Pandit, the Minister of Mudhoji Bhonsle
 “and the man whose counsels have long guided the
 “affairs of that government.* While these letters
 “were on their way the Rājā died. No answers
 “were given, for the purport required none; but
 “every letter since received from Mudhoji and his
 “*Diwān* has repeatedly and urgently pressed the
 “dismissal of the *Vakil* for the purpose, as ex-
 “pressed, of communicating with him on some
 “affairs of the greatest importance. The *Vakil* is
 “at this time with Colonel Leslie. From these
 “facts it will appear that Mudhoji Bhonsle is by
 “interest and inclination likely to join an alliance

*See p. 65 below and footnote to p. 43 above.

“with this government and that two advantages
“may be offered to him as the inducements to it.
“The first is the support of his pretensions to the
“sovereign power, the second, the recovery of the
“captures made on his dominions by Nizām Ali.*
“On our part we shall possess a powerful barrier
“on our frontier, an alliance which may counter-
“balance and, if properly employed, may totally
“overthrow the present power of the Marāthā
“State, and give us a lasting ascendant in its opera-
“tions and for ever dissipate all the designs which
“the French have at this time so wisely, and hither-
“to successfully, concerted for their aggrandize-
“ment and our destruction. A more fortunate
“concurrence of circumstances could scarcely have
“been conceived than those which appear of them-
“selves to draw the two States of Berar and Bengal
“into a decided and lasting union by the powerful
“bonds of common interest and common danger.
“The Poona government is a natural enemy of
“Mudhoji. It is ours by their connection with our
“natural and declared enemy the French. Nizām
“Ali, for the same reason, is a decided adversary
“of both; and the contiguity of our respective
“territories in the wildest and least valuable parts
“of both, and of course the least subject to com-
“petition and encroachment, renders their union
“important and essential to the strength of both.
“On these grounds I recommend that a Company’s
“civil servant be immediately deputed to Mudhoji

*The “pretensions” were of the flimsiest. The “captures” had already been restored by the Nizām. See page 45 above.

"Bhonsle with full powers to form a treaty of alliance between that Chief and the Company on the terms hereinabove stated."* On the 11th of July 1778 A.D. it was "resolved that negotiations be undertaken for a treaty of alliance with Mudhoji Bhonsle, the Rājā of Berar," and the Governor-General recommended that Mr. Alexander Kynynmound Elliot be employed in the negotiation. Accordingly it was "resolved that Mr. Elliot be appointed the Minister and Public Agent of this Government at the Court of Mudhoji Bhonsle, Rājā of Berar, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of alliance with that Chief."†

**Elliot sent
on mission
to Nāgpur.**

36. The embassy was despatched post-haste to Nāgpur. Though it failed in attaining its object and was indeed, as we shall see, foredoomed to failure, it is of interest to trace the fortunes of the expedition to which, as the first official British mission to the capital of the Nāgpur State, a certain dramatic interest attaches. The British envoy or "Minister and Public Agent" of the government, Alexander Kynynmound Elliot, was a brother of that Sir Gilbert Elliot who later took a prominent part in organizing the impeachment of Hastings and eventually, as Lord Minto, became Governor-General of India in 1807 A.D. Alexander Elliot is first heard of in 1775 A.D. when, at the age of 20, he acted as interpreter at the trial of Nandkumār,

* *Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy*, App. 68.

† *Ibid.*, App. 69. Elliot's allowances were fixed at Rs. 40,759 or £4,076 sterling *per annum*.

being "eminently skilled in the Persian and Hindustani languages." He soon became an intimate friend of Hastings, represented his interests, as we have seen, when in England in 1777 A.D. and was his Private Secretary on his return to India in the same year. Hastings felt a warm personal affection for the young man and had formed a high estimate of his abilities; and Elliot's selection for the embassy to Nāgpur indicates the importance which Hastings attached to that mission. "He is a gentleman of my own house," Hastings wrote to Mudhoji on the 27th July, "and particularly attached to me "and of great abilities. He possesses my entire "confidence and is invested with the fullest powers "from this government, which has the control of "all the English possessions and forces in India, "to conclude a firm treaty with you in our name "and on our behalf; and whatever he shall so conclude we will confirm and ratify."*

37. Elliot was accompanied by Robert Farquhar as his Assistant, by Captain William Campbell, presumably in charge of his escort, and by Lieutenant James Anderson whose position I do not find recorded.† His credentials were dated the 20th of July 1778; and he left Calcutta at once, reaching Cuttack, some 290 miles along the road, by the 10th of August. Curiously enough, from Cuttack onwards the log of the expedition has been preserved and is entitled "Journal of the road from Cuttack to Nāgpur commenced August 11th, 1778."

Log of the expedition.

**Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy*, App. 73.

†James Anderson was the brother of David Anderson mentioned in Chapter V below.

It is in some ways a very disappointing document, recording little more than topographical detail, but it gives some idea of the difficulties the party had to face. They were travelling, it must be remembered, when the monsoon was at its height through country which, even to-day, includes some of the wildest tracts in the Peninsula. There was a temporary lull in the rains when they started from Cuttack and in twelve days they covered 160 miles, making but one halt. Following Motte's line of march as far as Baud, they reached Sonpur, the capital of the State of that name, on the 23rd of August and halted there for two days. "Sonpur", the log tells us, "is a large village with a fort "defended by a bamboo hedge and mud wall, both "situated along the bank of the Mahānadi. . . . "The Tel river divides, on this side, the Berar Rājā "Mudhoji's dominions from those of his brother "Bimbāji, Rājā of Chhattisgarh—the district of "Baud (belonging to the former) being to the "eastward of that river and that of Sonpur, in the "country of the latter, to the westward. Sonpur "is immediately under the Rājā of Sambalpur who "is tributary to Bimbāji, though but nominally, "he being of equal power and consequence with "his master. Mudhoji resides at his capital at "Nāgpur, Bimbāji at Ratanpur."

east of
liot.

38. On leaving Sonpur the weather turned against the travellers. The log records laconically, "afternoon heavy rain" on the 26th of August; "afternoon hard rain and thunder" on the 28th; "hard rain for two or three hours" on the 29th;

"very heavy rain the most part of the night" on September the 2nd, culminating in "exceeding heavy rain with much thunder and lightning from 10 a.m. all the rest of the day and night" on September the 3rd. This brought them to a standstill. The storms continued on the 4th and 5th but abated somewhat on the 6th, whereupon the party struggled forward on the 7th to a village named Semrā on the banks of a stream called Lāth some seven miles from Sārangarh, the headquarters of a Rāj-Gond Chieftain. By this time exposure had told upon their health. "As it must be of the utmost importance to public affairs", wrote Farquhar on September the 9th in a letter to the Governor-General, "that you should be made acquainted "with Mr. Elliot's situation, I think it necessary "to inform you by an express *cossid* [messenger] "that he was seized on the 4th instant with a "severe bilious disorder attended with an inflammation of the liver. His fever since that time "has rather increased than diminished; and in this "situation, deprived, as he is, of all medical assistance and without any other shelter than that of a "very bad tent from the great rains and excessive "heats which succeed, it is impossible to say what "will be the event In this disturbed situation Mr. Anderson and I have done everything "in our power Captain Campbell, our "other fellow traveller, is also very ill of a complaint much of the same nature with that of "Mr. Elliot." Three days later Elliot died. "From the time I wrote you on the 9th", Farquhar

reports on the 13th, "there was no room for hope; "and last night he expired after a severe and painful illness. On the 8th instant he desired that "your orders and instructions to him should be "sealed up immediately after his death, which has "already been done in the presence of "Mr. Anderson."*

Elliot's
tomb.

39. Elliot's death was, both politically and privately, a great blow to Warren Hastings. He caused a monument to be erected, at the spot where Elliot died in the Sārangarh State, bearing the following inscription, "To the memory of "Alexander Elliot, Esquire, who, having been "selected at a very early period of life for the "execution of an important commission at the "Court of Nāgpur, died of fever at this place on "the 12th September 1778, aged 23 years, this monument, which covers his remains, was erected, in "testimony of his virtues and of the loss which the "State has sustained in his death, by order of the "Governor-General of Bengal."† Vishwanāth Sāi, the then Rājā of Sārangarh, undertook to protect the tomb and was presented with an elephant by Warren Hastings—an attention which

**Sixth Report of Committee of Secrecy*, App. 143.

†Hastings "also commemorated his early genius and attainments and no less early death in some lines which make part "of an imitation of an ode of Horace.

'An early death was Elliot's doom.

'I saw his op'ning virtues bloom

'And manly sense unfold

'Too soon to fade! I bade the stone

'Record his name 'midst hordes unknown

'Unknowing what it told.'"

(Rennell's *Memoir of a Map of Hindostan*, 1793, p. 240.)

These lines were written by Hastings on his way home from Bengal in 1785.

turned some of the neighbouring Rājās against him. The tomb is still in existence and is maintained at the cost of the present Rājā of Sārangarh who is the great-great-grandson of Vishwanāth Sāi.*

40. The rest of the embassy now left the Sambal-^{His party} pur Rājā's territory and entered that of Bimbāji.^{proceeds to} They had advanced some 50 miles from Sārangarh^{Hoshang-} ābād.

**Chhattisgarh Feudatory States Gazetteer*, p. 204. This publication says, "The neighbouring Rājās refused to grant a burial place; but Vishwanāth Sāi agreed to give a plot of land for the grave and Elliot was buried at Sāler." This is incorrect. The season of the year rendered any discussion of a burial place impossible; and Elliot's remains were buried where he died on the banks of the Lāth river near the village of Semrā (not Sāler, which is on the other side of the Lāth). The opposition of the neighbouring Rājās refers, probably, to their subsequent hostility to the Sārangarh Rājā because he received favours from the British in return for his maintenance of the tomb. Sydney Grier says that Elliot's death was hastened by his swimming a river to arrest Monsieur Chevalier, the Swiss Governor of the French settlement of Chandranagore, who had taken refuge in the Nāgpur territories (*The Great Proconsul*, p. 112); that Elliot had in his last letter entreated Hastings to supersede him lest his plans should suffer from delay; and that he died "thinking of nothing but the public business in his delirium." (*Letters of Warren Hastings to his wife*, p. 25.) I have been unable to find authority for these statements. Diwākar Rāo simply speaks of "the delivery of M. Chevalier to Mr. Elliot [at Cuttack] by Rājārām Pandit," Mudhoji's *Subahdār* in Orissa (*Sixth Report of Committee of Secrecy*, App. 152); and this must have happened more than a month prior to Elliot's death. Sydney Grier also writes of Elliot "dying in the swamps near Cuttack;" and states that David Anderson "was sent to Cuttack in 1778 to take up the negotiations with Mudhoji which were broken off by Elliot's death" (*Letters*, pp. 25 and 201). But Elliot died 200 miles from Cuttack; it was James Anderson who travelled with Elliot before the latter's death and subsequently proceeded to Nāgpur; and Hastings did not immediately renew through any other channel the negotiations interrupted by Elliot's death. They remained in abeyance for two months until entrusted to Colonel Goddard on the 16th of November.

and had just crossed the Mahānadi river, where it is joined by the Sheonāth, when they were met on the 29th of September by a party sent to summon them to attend on Bimbāji at Ratanpur. By the 7th of October they had reached the village of Mohrā where they halted for eight days in a mango grove beside the Khārun river. Nothing but the weather conditions are recorded in the "log", but on the 15th there is the brief entry "Departed this life Mr. Robert Farquhar"; and we may presume that the long halt was due to his precarious condition.* Ratanpur was reached on October the 17th and ceremonial visits were interchanged with Bimbāji. Campbell and Anderson arrived at Māro on October the 26th; and on November the 1st were "genteelly received by Muhammad Ali who had been waiting for above a month with an escort of cavalry to conduct us to Nāgpur."† Lānji was reached on November

*Mr. C. F. Waterfall, I.C.S., who very kindly visited Mohrā on the 4th February 1926 at my request, writes, "I walked over to Mohrā this morning. The mango grove you refer to was quite easy to find. It is on the bank of the Khārun river about 200 yards north of the *basti*. To the east runs the road to Ratanpur. Most of the mango tope is relatively young, but there are three or four veterans which must be several hundred years old. There is no trace of any tomb except one of a *Bairāgi* put up about 25 years ago. Local tradition does, however, tell of a *Sāhib* who died and was buried in the tope many years before. The location of this grave was shown to be close to an old mango tree almost on the edge of the river. I regret I could get no further information."

†This same officer came out to escort Colebrooke into Nāgpur 21 years later. "It was", he told Colebrooke, "his privilege to welcome British ministers to the Court of Berar." Colebrooke gives a very pleasing description of this venerable old gentleman (*Early European Travellers*, pp. 206-7). Muhammad Ali is also mentioned by Forster—see page 95 below.

the 6th, Tirorā on the 9th and Thārsā on the 12th. The same day the party crossed the Kanhān river. "Here we met Benirām Pandit, the Rājā's *Vakil* at Calcutta, who came out to receive us with 'accounts' that Pondicherry was taken, Colonel Leslie dead and Colonel Goddard ready to march "from Chhattarpur [in Bundelkhand] to Berar by "the last advices from him." Nāgpur was reached on the 14th and there the party, though unable to transact official business, stayed till December the 12th when they proceeded through Sāoner, Pāndhurnā, Multai, Betul and Shāhpur to the English camp which had meanwhile been established by Colonel Goddard (Colonel Leslie's successor) at Hoshangābād.*

41. I have already mentioned the detachment of troops despatched by Hastings under Colonel Leslie to give military support to Elliot's mission. Leslie died on the 3rd of October; and it was to his successor, Colonel Goddard, that Hastings eventually decided on the 16th of November to entrust the negotiations with Mudhoji interrupted by Elliot's untimely death. Colonel Goddard deputed Lieutenant Daniel Watherston to make preliminary

Watherston's negotiations.

*A Mr. Thomas who passed through Sārangarh in 1782 notes in his diary that Elliot's party consisted of five gentlemen, "the only Englishmen who went this road before me, and only one reached General Goddard's army alive." This may be correct [of Captain Campbell's fate I know nothing for certain, though his illness is recorded. He reached Nāgpur. Elliot and Farquhar died. James Anderson came through safely]; but I think the party consisted of four Englishmen, not five, since Farquhar in his letter of the 9th of September, after mentioning Elliot, Anderson and himself, speaks of "Captain Campbell, our other fellow traveller." Thomas' diary is referred to in para. 52 below.

pourparlers; and that officer arrived at Nāgpur on the 19th of December 1778 A.D. His despatches showed at once that Hastings' proposals to support by force the Nāgpur Rājā's pretensions to the sovereignty of all the Marāthās had not the slightest chance of proving acceptable to the Rājā. "I can assure you," Watherston writes, "as you will plainly perceive by their letters now writing you on the subject, that they are determined not to take any active part whatever with our armies. They have a thousand arguments to oppose to those I urged in favour of the plan for assuming the dignity of Rājā of Sātārā They say they have sworn an alliance of friendship with the present *Peshwā*, Pandit Pradhān Mādhav Rāo,* which they cannot violate; and add that their asserting their pretensions to the sovereignty will meet with numberless oppositions." The Rājā's Minister "declared it contrary to every consideration of prudence and policy for his master at this time to adopt the scheme proposed In short, let what will be the motive for detracting from the ambitious projects the Rājā once meditated, it is now obvious that he has altered his views altogether or, at least, that he has deferred them till a further opportunity." The explanation of the deadlock was simple enough. In spite of Hastings intimating to Bombay in August his intention of forming an alliance with Mudhoji, in spite of his forbidding that government to enter into any engagement hostile to the actual administration at Poona and in spite of the complete

collapse of Raghunāth Rāo's own party, the Bombay Council, on receiving news of the declaration of war between France and England, had decided on their own authority once more to declare for Raghunāth Rāo and to support by force his claims to the regency on behalf of the minor *Peshwā*. An expedition against Poona, furnished by them, had started from Bombay on the 22nd of November 1778 A.D. and news of its departure had already reached Nāgpur. "The *Diwān*", writes Watherston, "did not fail to mention the motion of the "Bombay troops towards Poona, which he asserts to "be an absolute fact and communicated to him by "undoubted authority. Raghunāth Rāo's adopted "son accompanies them with a body of his father's "troops, so that there is no doubt of the intentions "at least of that government in favour of that "Chief. . . . This circumstance seems an effectual "bar to the Rājā's concurrence with the plan projected for his advancement by the supreme government at Calcutta; besides a firm persuasion, I "am certain it will be impossible to divest him of, "that, however we may profess to favour his views, "our principal and ultimate end is to favour those "of Raghunāth Rāo." In a subsequent interview with Mudhoji "Raghunāth Rāo was not at all introduced into the subject of this day's conversation; "but, after all, I am led to believe that the present "apparent revolution in his favour is the principal "bar to our negotiations." It was hardly to be wondered at that the independent support by Calcutta and Bombay of rival candidates for the

practical headship of the Marāthā confederacy should have roused the Nāgpur Rājā's thorough distrust of the British. He was, of course, unable to believe that the conflict in the views of the two governments was a genuine conflict and, doubtless, regarded Hastings' advances as mere political deception.

42. Unfortunately Hastings' whole policy in relation to Mudhoji was based on gravely defective information.* He describes the Nāgpur Rājā in one of his despatches of 1778 A.D. as "at this time "the most powerful of the Chiefs who bear the "Marāthā name, who holds his possessions in his "own right and independent of the government of "the *Peshwā* even by the confession of the members "of that administration." But neither Mudhoji's wealth nor his military strength was in any way considerable. Ten years later his gross revenue receipts amounted to no more than 60 or 70 *lākhs* of rupees *per annum* and his whole army to no more than 10,800 horse and foot.† And there is no reason to suppose that his resources were any more extensive in 1778 A.D. During Watherston's visit it was suggested that Colonel Goddard "should reduce to the subjection and authority of the Rājā the districts of Hoshangābād and Mandla," over both of which the Rājā's Ministers "advance a legal claim of sovereignty and which they assert are unjustly withheld from them by the present possessors." Hoshangābād was in

*Grant Duff, II, pp. 61 and 100.

†See pp. 96-8 below.

the hands of the *Nawābs* of Bhopāl. Garha-Mandlā had been attacked by Mudhoji in 1776 A.D. "but, his force being inadequate to the service "and the season of the rains setting in, he made, "to save his reputation, an hasty ill-secured agree- "ment with the Garha-Mandlā Chief for the pay- "ment of three *lākhs* of rupees, which Mudhoji "never received."* It is obvious that a power that could cope neither with the *Nawāb* of Bhopāl nor with the Rāj-Gond *Zamindār* of Garha-Mandlā had no claim to be regarded as "the most powerful of the Chiefs who bear the Marāthā name." Hastings likewise failed to take into account the series of engagements into which Jānoji, Sābāji and Mudhoji had successively entered, recognizing their dependence on the *Peshwā*; and he failed sufficiently to appreciate the strength of the Brāhman party at Nāgpur. Watherston notes the dominating influence of the *Diwān*, Pandit Diwākar Rāo. "All "business is managed by the *Diwān*, a man of great "prudence and abilities, whose influence directs "everything here. Nor does he seem inclined to "suffer his master to enter upon the business of "aspiring to the throne of Sātārā or risk the safety "of his own dominions by new projects till he con- "ceives every possibility of disappointment is "effectually obviated In short I am, from "circumstances occurring in the course of conver- "sation, well persuaded that, however desirous the "Rājā himself may be, the *Diwān* is himself more "lukewarm There is even room to believe

*See p. 99 below.

“he may have entered into negotiations of a very
 “secret nature with the ministry at Poona, who are
 “Brāhmans like himself; nor do I imagine it can
 “be his wish to see the power of the Brāhmans
 “totally annihilated, which would be the inevitable
 “consequence of placing a Rājput of the authority
 “of Mudhoji on the throne of Sātārā.” Lastly,
 Warren Hastings was mistaken both in supposing
 Mudhoji to be a descendant of Shivāji the Great
 and in believing that he had, since Rāmrajā’s
 death, valid claims by adoption to the exalted rank
 of Rājā of Sātārā. For all these reasons, quite
 apart from the delay in the negotiations which
 resulted from Elliot’s death and quite apart from
 the impediment caused by the Bombay govern-
 ment’s independent support of another candidate
 for power in the Marāthā confederacy, Hastings’
 schemes for the advancement of Mudhoji were, as
 I have said, foredoomed to failure. Watherston’s
 negotiations came to nought; and, on the 1st of
 January 1779, he took leave of the Rājā and started
 on his return journey to Hoshangābād, taking with
 him an elephant, a hunting leopard, a hawk and a
huqqā as presents for Colonel Goddard. That
 officer, having now no further purpose to serve by
 stopping at Hoshangābād, proceeded, on an urgent
 summons from Bombay, by forced marches to
 Surat, which he reached on the 26th of February
 1779 A.D., while Benirām Pandit, the Nāgpur *Vakil*
 at the British capital, set out on his return journey
 to Calcutta.*

*Watherston’s despatches are quoted at length in the
Sixth Report, App. 170.

CHAPTER V.

DAVID ANDERSON'S NEGOTIATIONS IN 1781 A.D.

43. The operations of the Bombay government in support of Raghunāth Rāo, to which a reference was made in the preceding chapter, resulted in a grave disaster to the British arms at Wargāon on the 17th of January 1779 A.D. and in Raghunāth Rāo's surrender of his person to Mahādji Sindia. It was to retrieve the situation created by the misguided efforts of the subordinate Presidency that Colonel Goddard was compelled to hasten to Surat. The negotiations at Nāgpur had resulted in no decisive rejection by Mudhoji of Hastings' proffered assistance in furthering his family ambitions but only in the postponement of the scheme to a more convenient season. The collapse of the Bombay plans in favour of Raghunāth Rāo might, therefore, have been expected to give Mudhoji greater confidence in Hastings' offer of support to his pretensions. But the prestige of the British had been lowered by their defeat at Wargāon; and Mudhoji's distrust of their policy was not easily allayed. Hence, even after Raghunāth Rāo's disappearance from the field, Hastings' schemes in relation to Nāgpur made no advance. He addressed Mudhoji in February 1779 A.D. "in terms of concern and regret, bordering upon complaint, at

**Suspension
of British
negotiations
with Nāg-
pur.**

his present reluctance to act up to his former pretensions." But that Chief's temporizing policy still continued until, at last, in September 1779 A.D. Colonel Goddard wrote that Mudhoji's attitude seemed to warrant his considering the negotiations at Nāgpur suspended.*

Hastings' account of Chimnaji's expedition to Bengal.

44. On the 30th of the same month Colonel Goddard informed the Bombay government that "the Ministers [at Poona] and Sindia in conjunction with Haidar, Nizām Ali and Mudhoji Bhonsle mean to make a general attack upon the English at their several settlements and have entered into, and sealed, written agreements for the purpose."† The report was soon confirmed. "It was at this time known", Hastings wrote in a subsequent despatch, "that Mudhoji Bhonsle, the Rājā of the Marāthā State of Berar, and Nizām Ali Khān, the *Subah* of the Deccan, had united in a plan of confederacy against the English with Haidar Ali, the *Nawāb* of Mysore, and the Ministers of the *Peshwā's* government at Poona. Mudhoji was to invade Bengal and the Nizām was to enter the Company's *sarkār* of Chicacole, whilst Haidar was to pass the *ghāts* and lay waste the Carnatic. The government of Poona, pressed in their own territories [by Colonel Goddard], could only contribute to this plan of offensive war by grants of land to its allies. The Rājā of Berar had, nevertheless, on many occasions, given the most evincing proofs of

**Sixth Report*, pp. 108 and 147.

†*Ibid.* p. 151.

"his pacific disposition towards the English and
 "had even given early information of this con-
 "federacy, alleging that he had been compelled to
 "enter into it from a dread of the resentment of
 "his associates and assuring us that, whatever ap-
 "pearances he might be constrained to assume, he
 "would not involve the Berar government in a
 "decided enmity with the English. In conformity
 "to this plan of policy Mudhoji had sent from
 "30 to 40,000 horse under the command of his
 "second son, Chimnāji Bāpu; they received their
 "dismissal on the day of the *Dasahra*, or the 11th
 "of August, 1779.* The plan of operations pre-
 "scribed to them by the Confederates was to march
 "into Bihār, which they might have reached in two
 "months; but, instead of following this plan, they
 "took a different road and by studied delays had
 "only reached Cuttack in the month of May follow-
 "ing, being about the time when the periodical
 "rains usually set in in that province which, of
 "course, served them as a pretext for deferring the
 "prosecution of their professed design; and they
 "were at this time still laying at Cuttack. The
 "Nizām had committed no open hostilities against
 "us, though there is every reason to suppose (and
 "he has even himself avowed it) that he was the
 "projector of the confederacy and had secretly
 "supplied the other powers with money to carry

*A mistake for the 11th of October. See Grant Duff, II, p. 154. *Dasahra*, the tenth day of the month of *Kuār* or *Asvin* (September-October), marked, according to Indian custom, the commencement of the season for military operations in the field. The readiness of the British to campaign in the rainy season gave them a great advantage—see p. 169 below.

“on their operations against us.* The advices
 “from Madras proved but too fully the activity
 “and spirit with which Haidar had begun to per-
 “form his part in this alarming confederacy.
 “Such was the posture in which we stood with
 “respect to the powers of this country. Our ad-
 “vices regarding our European enemies were un-
 “certain. It was, however, firmly believed that an
 “expedition would be attempted by the French in
 “the course of the season against some of the
 “Company’s settlements in India, though it was
 “impossible to foresee whether it would fall on
 “Bengal, Madras or Bombay, though the latter
 “was most probable.”

45. “Under these circumstances it became ex-
 “pedient to contract, as much as possible, the sphere
 “of our military operations so that, without endan-
 “gering the safety of our own possessions in Ben-
 “gal, we might be able to act with more force and
 “efficacy in our endeavours to recover the Carnatic
 “and to revenge the injury which the English had
 “sustained from Haidar Ali Khān. The govern-
 “ment at Poona had long borne an inveterate and
 “avowed enmity against Haidar; and, though tem-
 “porary policy had now united them in one cause,
 “yet his great and unexpected successes might
 “naturally revive their former jealousy and alarm
 “the Ministers of Poona with apprehensions for

*The Nizām had been antagonized by the British partiality for his neighbour and rival, the Rājā of Nāgpur. It had been urged by Hastings’ critics in the Supreme Council in 1778 A.D. that an alliance with Mudhoji was impolitic as amounting to a declaration of war with the Nizām. *Sixth Report*, App. 153.

"the future safety of their own territories. The
 "opportunity, therefore, seemed favourable for
 "proposing to them terms of reconciliation from
 "this government; and, as Mudhoji Bhonsle had
 "always professed the strongest desire of effecting
 "a pacification betwixt us and the Marāthā States,
 "it was thought necessary to engage him as a me-
 "diator in the intended negotiation. With these
 "views a treaty was drawn out by us and sent to
 "Nāgpur; and Mudhoji was desired to get it
 "executed by the *Peshwā* and his Ministers and to
 "sign it himself as the guarantee for the punctual
 "observance of it on both sides. Whilst this
 "negotiation was in suspense, it was agreed to post-
 "pone the march of the detachment destined by
 "land for Madras, because its route lay through the
 "territories of Mudhoji Bhonsle and it must neces-
 "sarily pass by that part of his army which was
 "laying at Cuttack under the command of Chim-
 "nāji,—circumstances which, without having
 "obtained the previous concurrence of Mudhoji,
 "might, in the unsettled state of our connection
 "with that prince, not only expose the detachment
 "to difficulties and opposition in its march but lead
 "it into operations very different from the intention
 "of its equipment and draw on us the decided en-
 "mity of Mudhoji, whose power, when exerted
 "against us, would prove an important acquisition
 "to the strength of Haidar and the Ministers of
 "Pōona. The great exertions which had
 "already been made by this government
 "required also some time before the necessary

“arrangements could be made for fitting
“out a new detachment which was to perform
“so long a march and be employed in service of
“so much importance. On the 9th of January 1781
“answers were at length received from the Rājā
“of Berar and his Ministers which contained, how-
“ever, so many objections to the proposed treaty
“that little room was left to hope for an imme-
“diate accommodation with the government of
“Poona; and, besides the points which came into
“discussion from their immediate connection with
“the treaty, these letters contained a variety of
“claims and propositions asserted by Mudhoji on
“his own account which, though they were not
“wholly new, were recapitulated in a style that im-
“pressed us with doubts regarding the sincerity of
“Mudhoji’s former professions and assurances.
“The season for action was now far advanced,
“Colonel Pearse’s* detachment was almost
“ready and the state of our affairs on the coast
“would not admit of longer delay; it was evident
“also from the answers which had been received
“from Mudhoji that he conceived that our affairs
“were reduced to a state more desperate than they
“really were. To remove, therefore, this impres-
“sion, as well as to afford the most speedy assistance
“to the Presidency of Madras, it was resolved that
“the detachment should immediately proceed and
“make its way through the province of Orissa
“against all opposition. To reconcile Mudhoji,

*Col. Pearse had been Hastings’ second in his duel with Francis in the preceding August (*Echoes from Old Calcutta*, no. 99—106).

“however, to this measure by every mark of attention in our power and to prevent, if possible, a rupture from the meeting of the two armies, it was agreed to depute a gentleman from this government to Chimnāji Bāpu at Cuttack. Mr. Anderson was selected for this service.”*

46. The record of David Anderson's negotiations constitutes “the first representative specimen of the State papers, written by the Governors-General, illustrating the diplomatic policy by which the States of India were brought under British supremacy;”† and a brief account of what occurred will not be out of place. David Anderson arrived at Balasore on the 22nd of January 1781 A.D. to find that Chimnāji had marched most of his army into the hills to reduce the fort of Dhenkanāl. He then proceeded to Cuttack, where he learned that the Rājā of Sambalpur, on the Marāthās' line of communication with Nāgpur, was insubordinate towards them and that “the distresses and importunities of Chimnāji's army were well known.” He first opened negotiations with Mānoji Rām (Mudhoji's *Pharnavis*) and Hirderām, the *Diwān* of Cuttack, acting on behalf of Rājārām Pandit, the *Subahdār*. They expressed some apprehension of the Poona government's resentment if Colonel Pearse's force were allowed to pass

Negotiations at
Cuttack.

*Forrest's *Selections from State Papers* (1910), II, pp. 200-4. This “Mr. Anderson” was David Anderson “one of Hastings' most trusted subordinates” (Sydney Grier's *Letters of Warren Hastings to his wife*, p. 200). He was the brother of Lieutenant James Anderson mentioned on p. 55 above.

†Forrest's *Selections from State Papers* (1910), Introduction I, p. xvi.

through Orissa, enlarged on the Nāgpur Rājā's steady attachment to the English and even pretended that his entanglement in Dhenkanāl was a tactful move on Chimnāji's part so as to let the British troops pass more easily—"a proof of friendship which", as Anderson notes, "had not occurred to them at our first interview." But in the end they promised to assist the British force with provisions along its route, whereupon Anderson returned to Calcutta.

Hastings'
instructions
to his envoy.

47. Meanwhile Chimnāji had made his way back to the open country. He permitted Colonel Pearse's force to enter the Marāthā territories unmolested and, indeed, helped him in every way with supplies. Anderson, therefore, was again sent to Orissa to pursue negotiations further. In the instructions which Warren Hastings then issued to Anderson on the 28th of February 1781 A.D. the previous occurrences in connection with Chimnāji's expedition were recapitulated and the motives, which had so far induced the Nāgpur Marāthās to adopt a friendly attitude, were discussed. "The object", he says, "of this temporizing system is to obtain the acknowledgment of the claim of the government of Berar to the *chauth* of Bengal;* "and I have no doubt that this concession alone "would instantly purchase their alliance and their "decided and open declaration in our favour. I "know that this is their object, although it has "never yet been declared in form." Hastings,

*The old demand based on the treaty of 1751 A.D. See pp. 15 and 26 *et seq*: above.

of course, had not the least intention of yielding on the point; but Anderson was directed to flirt with the topic, without committing himself in any way, and to "endeavour to lead them to the information "you may want by questions of explanation and "by such observations or even misapprehensions "as may be most likely to produce the discovery "of their real sentiments and expectations." "In "the meantime", Hastings continues, "it is possible "that some advantage may be made of the parti- "cular and personal views of the young Rājā him- "self [Chimnāji]. As the immediate heir of his "father he has pretensions to the succession of the "sovereign authority of the Marāthā State [*i.e.*, the "whole Marāthā confederacy]; and it seems to be "the only provision which can be made for him to "secure his future independency. Without this "his father's death will leave him at the mercy of "his brother and without a resource, for it is not "likely that his brother should expend the wealth, "or hazard the power, of his own State to promote "his interest and raise him to a dignity superior "to his own."* Hastings was aware that even Chimnāji's officers "would take alarm at any "suggestion of a separate interest of Chimnāji; "and on this account you will cautiously avoid "touching on any subject tending to it with them.

*For indications of the hostility between Chimnāji and his brother Raghoji, which was at the back of Hastings' suggestion, see pp. 92 and 106 below. Hastings seems to have thought that, since Raghoji had been adopted into Jānoji's family, Chimnāji might, as the next eldest son of Mudhoji, claim to inherit Mudhoji's supposed rights by adoption to the throne of Sātārā.

“But I recommend that you seek an opportunity
 “to sound Chimnāji himself upon it.
 “Avail yourself of it to inspire him with hopes of
 “the *rāj*.”* Such a revival, in favour of the son,
 of a scheme already discredited by the father
 was, doubtless, a mere attempt to sow dis-
 sensions in the Nāgpur family. The intrigue, of
 course, came to nothing. Chimnāji was a mere
 boy of 17 and there was no approaching him ex-
 cept through his Ministers. Hastings then pro-
 ceeds to suggest the arguments which might be
 used to induce the Nāgpur State to abandon
 the confederacy. He urged that Haidar Ali was
 the common enemy of the English and of the
 Marāthās, that his success in the war would prove
 fatal to his associates and that already he had ac-
 quired a territory yielding a revenue of 80 *lākhs*
 of rupees from the Poona government. “Mudhoji
 “has frequently declared that he will not suffer
 “the *rāj*, which is his patrimony, to be ruined. Let
 “him now stand forth to save it and assert his own
 “right to the possession of it.” The terms
 Hastings offered were a payment of twelve *lākhs* of
 rupees, in addition to three *lākhs* already given
 secretly, in return for which Chimnāji was to pro-
 mise solemnly either to return with his army to
 Nāgpur or not to employ it against the British.
 Anderson was to make it clear that the payment
 was not the purchase-price of forbearance
 from the Marāthās but merely compensation for

*Forrest's *Selections from State Papers* (1910), II, pp. 217—219.

the losses they had already sustained on the British account.

48. Anderson's negotiations at the Marāthā Agreement- camp then commenced. After lengthy preliminaries the discussion centred, as was to be expected, between British and Chimnaji round the cash payment to be made. The offer of twelve *lākhs* was received with "much surprise"; and two crores was mentioned as the cost of the expedition. The argument then passed to other matters, including the *chauth*, but eventually veered round again to the question of a cash payment. "The article of the expenses served to engross the whole of their thoughts", but no concession was made on either side. Discussion continued throughout the following day; and the Marāthās were urged "to join us, when circumstances would admit, either in carrying on the war against Haidar Ali or in prosecuting the object, which I pointed out to them, of acquiring the *rāj* of the Marāthā State for the Bhonsle family." The reply was that "supplies were necessary" and that "the sum tendered was scarcely a mouthful." It was hinted that, if no sufficient payment was made, the troops might get out of hand and seek to obtain by the plunder of Bengal what they failed to secure from these negotiations. After further parleying, "Bisambhar Pandit said that the Rājā's expectations were about 50 *lākhs*. He has since talked of 30 or 25." Anderson now, for the first time, mentioned that he could take it on himself to "make presents to the amount of about a *lakh* or 1½ or thereabout" to the Rājā's Ministers. He

was informed that "in such a negotiation such presents could have no place"; whereupon Anderson apologized but reminded Rājārām Pandit that it was he who had first suggested the idea the evening before, "when he had insinuated to me that, "if my object was to obtain anything for myself, the "house of Bhonsle could easily give it." A personal interview with Hastings was then suggested; and Anderson acquiesced, as the further delay and advance of the hot season would place Chimnāji's army at a growing disadvantage. The Nāgpur envoys accordingly met the Governor-General at Calcutta on the 26th of March 1781 A.D. Here the arguments were renewed, the envoys still pressing for a payment of 50 *lākhs* of rupees, which was gradually reduced to a demand for twelve *lākhs* and a loan of 25 *lākhs*. Finally on the 6th of March, after conversations extending over a month, a preliminary agreement was reached on the following terms—the British to pay thirteen *lākhs* to Chimnāji and assist him in obtaining a further loan of ten *lākhs* in Bengal; the latter's army to quit Orissa at once; a body of 2,000 effective Marāthā horse to accompany Colonel Pearse's force at the expense of the British; and the British to assist Nāgpur in an expedition for establishing the Rājā in possession of Garha-Mandlā.*

Hastings' satisfaction. 49. Hastings comments as follows upon the negotiations thus brought to a successful termination. "By acceding to Rājārām Pandit's propositions we

*The formal terms of this agreement are given in Appendix D.

"have effectually detached one of the most power-
 "ful States from the general confederacy against
 "us. . . . The mere fame of an alliance betwixt the
 "English and the government of Berar will have a
 "great effect. We shall no longer be considered
 "as sinking under the united weight of every State
 "in Hindostān; the scale of power evidently turned
 "in our favour; and this is of more importance
 "than could well be imagined in Europe, where
 "the policy of nations is regulated by principles the
 "very reverse of those which prevail in Asia.
 "There, in contests betwixt nations, the
 "weaker is held up by the support of its
 "neighbours who know how much their
 "own safety depends on the preservation of
 "a proper balance. But in Asia the desire of par-
 "taking of the spoils of a falling nation and the
 "dread of incurring the resentment of the stronger
 "party are the immediate motives of policy; and
 "every State wishes to associate itself with that
 "power which has a decided superiority.
 "Nor need we apprehend that the supply [of
 "money] which they have received will ever tempt
 "them to return to these provinces. They best
 "know the extreme distresses which they have
 "suffered, the heavy expenses which they have in-
 "curred and the misery which they entailed by this
 "expedition on their province of Orissa. And it
 "is not to be supposed that they will ever again
 "attempt to fit out an army of 30,000 horse, at an
 "unavoidable expense of more than a crore of
 "rupees, to march 1,000 miles through a hilly

“country in the expectation of acquiring a supply
“of twelve *lākhs* of rupees.”*

Chapman
sent to
Nāgpur.

50. This agreement of March 1781 A.D. was intended to be preliminary to a regular treaty to be drawn up by a Nāgpur envoy at Calcutta or by an English envoy at Nāgpur. But no credentials from Mudhoji himself had been given or demanded; and when, shortly afterwards, Mudhoji received letters from Nānā Pharnavis threatening him with the utmost vengeance of the *Peshwā*'s government for seceding from the confederacy and his allegiance to his prince he found it inconvenient to avow the agreement to its full extent. He wished, however, to mediate a peace and to engage with the English in a general confederacy against Haider and, for this purpose, intended sending Diwākar Pant to Poona. But circumstances rendered it

*Forrest's *Selections from State Papers* (1910), II, pp. 257-8 and 261-2. Grant Duff (Vol. II, p. 157) comments on these proceedings as follows:—"Thus, by an objectionable policy, justifiable only by the peculiarity of the circumstances, Mr. Hastings temporarily detached the Eastern Marāthās from the confederacy and turned them against both Haider and the *Peshwā* at a moment when it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras." This criticism seems to reflect the old prejudice against Hastings which has not yet wholly disappeared. The treaty of 1781, of which a copy is included in Appendix D, was the product of open negotiation with a declared enemy. The sum of thirteen *lākhs* of rupees and the loan of ten *lākhs* were given to Chimnaji as an inducement to him to desert the *Peshwā*. But the payment, from Hastings' point of view, was legitimate enough. The whole transaction was approved by the Governor-General and Council and was fully reported to the Court of Directors. Grant Duff's mention of Point Palmyras is another, but a minor, inaccuracy. It lies a long way down the coast of Orissa and was, in 1781, some eighty miles from the nearest British territory.

desirable that this Minister should first meet Hastings. An interview was arranged for Benares; but Diwākar Pant died before the meeting could take place. Meanwhile, in October 1781 A.D., overtures for peace were made by Mahādji Sindia, who "perceived that he had everything to lose by maintaining a contest in the heart of his own dominions which would, probably, end in his being driven a fugitive across the Nerbudda without lands or friends and, probably, to the secret satisfaction of his rivals at Poona. Mr. Hastings was particularly pleased at the opening of this channel to a general pacification, as the plan of a mediation through Mudhoji was obstructed by the death of Diwākar Pant, who did not live to meet the Governor-General at Benares as had been agreed upon. Mudhoji, however, afterwards wrote to General Goddard assuring him of his readiness to interpose his best endeavours for the attainment of peace and even to repair in person to Poona for that purpose."* Hastings encouraged these overtures from Mudhoji and deputed an envoy, by name Charles Chapman,† to Nāgpur, "judging it necessary to provide for a new channel of

*Grant Duff, II, pp. 159-60.

†"Charles Chapman was another of the young civil servants who attached themselves to Hastings with an affection that bordered on idolatry. At the beginning of his service he appears to have acted for a time as Private Secretary. . . . In 1778 Hastings employed him to explore the coast of Cochin China and penetrate as far inland as he could. At the end of 1781 he was sent to Nāgpur as Agent at the Berar *Darbār*—a difficult post since Mudhoji. . . . was very angry to find himself superseded by Sindia as mediator of the treaty with the Marāthās."—Sydney Grier's *Letters of Warren Hastings*, pp. 223-4.

“correspondence with that government itself, “having lost that on which I placed a confident “effectual reliance in the *Diwān*, Diwākar Pandit. “But my principal hope from this deputation is “that it may prove the means of quickening the “conclusion of the peace with the Marāthā State “by making it an object of competition to two “most powerful members of it.”* As Hastings himself said, Chapman’s mission was “more ostensible than real.”

**Treaty of
Sālbaī.**

51. Chapman reached Nāgpur on the 22nd of January 1782 A.D. but nothing of importance transpired. His despatches terminate abruptly after a letter, dated the 14th of March, in which he reports that he has “great reason to believe that the Rājā has at length determined on making a visit to Poona.” The journey, if Mudhoji made it, was of no avail. Negotiations had already been opened through Mahādji Sindia which resulted in the treaty of Sālbaī, drawn up on the 17th of May 1782 A.D.

**Thomas’
Diary.**

52. There is an old diary of a journey from Nāgpur to Cuttack, written in 1782 A.D. and preserved in the office of the Surveyor-General in Calcutta, of which, by the courtesy of that officer, I have been permitted to obtain a copy. The journey was performed by a gentleman named Thomas who left Nāgpur on the 28th of January 1782 A.D., six days after Chapman’s arrival. It appears that

*Forrest’s *Selections from State Papers* (1890), Vol. III, p. 821.

he had come to Nāgpur from Benares. As Chapman records that a farewell entertainment was given to Thomas by the Rājā in a garden belonging to his eldest son Raghoji, who was present with his brothers, Chimnāji and Vyankoji, it seems probable that Thomas held some official position; but what it was I have been unable to discover. The diary is of interest as presenting, in brief, a sample of the documents from which much of the information about the interior of the country in these early days is derived. Thomas had recently recovered from a serious illness but travelled at great speed, covering 294 *kos*, or roughly 588 miles, in 31 days with but a single day's halt. His mention of Elliot's grave and of the unpopularity of the Rājā of Sārangarh because of his attention to it; of the failure of the crops in Chhattisgarh and the widespread migration which resulted; of an attack on his camp and theft of his property throw sidelights on the condition of the country.*

*This diary is referred to by Rennell, *vide Memoir of a Map of Hindostan* (Third edition, 1793), pp. 236—40.

CHAPTER VI.

FORSTER'S ACCOUNT OF NĀGPUR IN 1788 A.D.

**After the
First Marā-
thā War.**

53. After the peace of Sālbaī, which terminated what is known as the First Marāthā War, there was a delay of several months before the Ministers at Poona would consent to ratify the treaty; and some isolated despatches from Chapman, written at Nāgpur in November 1782 A.D., show that Mudhoji still hoped to regain his political prestige by discrediting the negotiations concluded through Sindia and offering himself as a more suitable medium for the final settlement. But his belated efforts were in vain.

**Mudhoji
demands the
chauth of
Bengal.**

54. In 1785 A.D. Mudhoji's political weakness induced him to pay a long visit to Poona, where he made a full submission to Nānā Pharnavis. In the name of his son, Raghoji, he entered into a fresh agreement, promising to adhere strictly to the terms which had been settled between Mādhav Rāo Peshwā and Jānoji in 1769 A.D.* He pledged himself, in particular, never to assist the English against the Peshwā's government and to co-operate in the expected war between the Marāthās and Tipu Sultān of Mysore.† A minor incident which

*See p. 24 above.

†Grant Duff, II, pp. 192-3.

occurred during Mudhoji's stay in Poona was significant of his subordination to the political influence of that *Darbār*. Warren Hastings had left India on the 8th of February, 1785 A.D.; and, encouraged probably by this event, Sindia made a bold demand, under the Emperor's authority, for the Mogul tribute from the British provinces in Bengal. At the same time it was decided at Poona that Mudhoji should prefer the obsolete Marāthā claim to the *chauth* of Bengal—on the presumption that the money given to Chimnāji after Anderson's negotiations in 1781 A.D. would not be openly acknowledged as the price offered to the Nāgpur Rājā to secure his desertion of the *Peshwā* and could, therefore, be safely put forward as a precedent for further payments to the Nāgpur State. The Governor-General, Macpherson, received these demands with considerable indignation. Mudhoji was roundly told that, if he persisted in his claim or engaged in any hostilities against the Company, an army would be sent into his country to lay it waste according to the Marāthā mode of warfare. In answer the Governor-General received a letter from Mudhoji saying that his business in Poona was directed to an object that must prove agreeable to the English, namely, the chastisement and humiliation of their implacable enemy, Tipu *Sultān*.* The demand for the *chauth* was not repeated; and the Bombay government, by Macpherson's desire, paid Mudhoji "extraordinary attention, through Mr. Malet their Poona agent,

*Notes in the India Office.

which had the effect of gratifying Mudhoji and alarming Sindia.”*

Forster
deputed to
Nāgpur.

55. Mudhoji Bhonsle returned to Nāgpur before the rains of 1786 A.D.; and in the following September Lord Cornwallis arrived in India. The new Governor-General was soon convinced of the desirability of conciliating Mudhoji with a view to frustrate the designs of Tipu, whose attitude, after he had concluded peace with the Marāthās and the Nizām in May 1787 A.D., was so offensive in threatening the frontiers of the Company and of Travancore with invasion that the British were forced into an expenditure on defensive preparations nearly as great as though they were at war. Cornwallis, therefore, asked permission of the Company to enter into defensive alliances with the Marāthās and the Nizām; and, preparatory thereto, made overtures to the Poona *Darbār*, to Sindia and to the Nāgpur Rājā, all of whom were dissatisfied with the inglorious peace they had recently concluded with the Mysore *Sultān*. It was in conformity with this scheme of negotiations that the Governor-General towards the close of 1787 A.D. deputed George Forster, a Civil Servant on the Madras establishment, to Nāgpur. The real object of Forster's mission was to induce Mudhoji to become a party to a defensive alliance in the event of Tipu commencing hostilities, but its ostensible purpose was merely

*Grant Duff, II, p. 184. He seems, however, to confuse the Mogul tribute with the Marāthā *chauth*.

to convey a declaration of the Governor-General's esteem and friendship.

56. Forster arrived at Nāgpur on the 15th of January 1788 A.D. He was immediately impressed by the feebleness of the administration. "The low state of the finances of this government", he writes in one of his first despatches, dated the 29th of January 1788 A.D., "and the weak condition of its army daily appear conspicuous—the whole amount of the revenue, I understand, not exceeding 60 *lākhs* and the present military force consisting of about 6,000 cavalry, an irregular body of Hindostāni troops for interior service and about 400 men who are clothed in ill-shaped red coats and armed with musquets chiefly of French manufacture From the poverty and apparent weakness of Berar [*i.e.*, the Nāgpur State] I do not perceive much benefit can accrue to the Company from any new connection with Mudhoji, especially during the continuance of a Mysore peace." Again, writing on the 11th of March, he says, "The Rājā hitherto has made no explicit mention of business; nor at this juncture does it appear that any advantage would arise to the Company from new engagements with him. His army, which since the Marāthā war with Mysore [1786-87 A.D.] has been weak and ill-attended to, is within these last two months further reduced by the discharge of six or seven thousand men. Mudhoji's influence at the Darbār of Poona and Hyderabad at the present day is not discernible and his connection with

His low estimate of the Nāgpur administration.

“them is very slender; and with Tipu, I am told, “he maintains no correspondence. This State, in “any point of view which I have yet been enabled “to place it in, shews but little marks of power or “importance. It possesses small revenues with an “army, in the present condition, wholly unfit for “service; and in its domestic concerns it wants “unanimity.”

57. On the 11th of April 1788 A.D. Forster submitted an interesting “account of the territories, revenue, force and policy of the present Rājā, Mudhoji Bhonsle,” which, as the earliest description of the Nāgpur State written on the spot, merits reproduction *in extenso*. “The present executive Chief “of this country, Mudhoji Bhonsle, who is between “50 and 60 years of age, is allowed to possess unquestioned courage, which is esteemed almost the “only quality necessary to form an Asiatic soldier. “He is of short stature but well formed, is active “and he yet enjoys a vigorous health.* Mudhoji “is said to treat with moderation the different “classes of merchants who are established in his “country and to commit no violent oppression on “the farmers, or husbandmen. He is, at the same “time, accused of being occasionally cruel, of being “treacherous and deceitful in the attainment of “public purposes, and that he is notoriously deficient in his military payments—in so much that “he has been more than once personally assaulted “and wounded by parties of the discontented

*[Mudhoji, as it happened, died on the 9th of May, only a few weeks after this was written.]

“soldiery.* He is said also to be equally profuse, “as regardless, of his promises and that he levies “with a strong arm contributions on such of his “officers as are wealthy and stand accused of incur- “ring his displeasure.† Here, in honour of the “character of Mudhoji, it is to be especially noticed

*“A large arrear was forced from him in the march to join “the Marāthā army.”

†“An occurrence that happened at Nāgpur, about seven or “eight years ago, disclosed a trait in his character that deserves “mention in this place. A Gosāin, named Udaipuri, possessed “of much wealth, had by advancing large loans to Mudhoji “become a necessary support of the government in which he “acquired much influence. Mudhoji, from the respect shewn “by the Hindus to the sect of Gosāins and from the situation “in which Udaipuri stood, at length experienced a strong “embarrassment in satisfying his claims, which were stated “at fifty *lākhs* of rupees and peremptorily urged. Incapable, “or not disposed, to discharge the debt, Mudhoji, it is asserted, “resolved by concealed instruments to effect the Gosāin’s “ruin. Udaipuri had two adopted sons, one of whom was “connected with a woman of the town to whom he was much “attached. This young man, coming late one night to his “apartment, found his mistress lying murdered in the bed. “The Rājā, who was formally apprised of the event by a “crowd of complainants, demanded of Udaipuri the surrender “of his son that he might be brought to immediate punishment. “The young Gosāin, loudly accusing the Rājā of having com- “mitted this act of perfidy, refused to appear; and, on an “assault being made on the house, he with his brother were “slain in defending it. A bond of fifty *lākhs* of rupees, which “had been given to Udaipuri by government, was forced from “him and he, in a short time, quitted the country in an “impoverished condition. It is the common belief of the “people that Mudhoji concerted the death of the woman to “exercise the semblance of justice on these Gosāins. When “Bisambhar Pandit attended Mr. Chapman to Nāgpur, the “Rājā made a pressing requisition of a loan from the family, “knowing it to be opulent. The Pandit, aware of the disposi- “tion of Mudhoji, was full of alarms and earnestly solicited “leave to visit Benares that he might communicate on the “subject with his brother, Benirām. After purchasing the “good offices of the *Darbār Munshi*, Bhawāni Pandit, and “making use of Mr. Chapman’s influence, he was permitted, “without experiencing any farther exaction, to proceed to

“that his treatment of Burhān Shāh* is indulgent
 “and respectful—a liberality rarely seen in princes
 “and, I believe, has no parallel in India. It tends
 “likewise to shew that Mudhoji, when not in the
 “immediate pursuit of objects of ambition, is not
 “wanting in the offices of humanity and that he
 “holds in remembrance the favours conferred on
 “his father by the family of Burhān Shāh. This
 “Prince is under no constraint, he enjoys a pension
 “of three *lākhs* of rupees and has the entire dis-
 “position of a fort situated in the interior part of
 “Nāgpur in which his family, which is numerous,
 “resides. This person is upwards of 60 years of
 “age and has the reputation of being endowed with
 “much sagacity and discretion, which seems exem-
 “plified in the general tenor of his conduct.†
 “Mudhoji always addresses him by the title of the
 “Rājā and, on the commencement of the new year,
 “proceeds with certain ceremony to the fort of
 “Burhān Shāh, where he presents him with an
 “offering indicative of the supremacy of his birth
 “and rank.”

**Mudhoji's
 relations
 with his
 sons.**

58. “Mudhoji has three sons, all grown up to
 “manhood,—Raghoji, the titular prince of the
 “country, Chinnāji [*alias* Khandoji] and Maniyā

“Bengal.” [Udaipuri Gosāin is mentioned in 1778 A.D. in App. 152 to the *Sixth Report*. He had been sent to Bengal as Jānoji's Agent or *Vakil* in 1767 A.D.—see p. 31 above.]

“The son of Chānd Sultān [the Rāj-Gond Chief of Deo-
 “garh] whom Raghoji, as has been mentioned [see p. 228 below],
 “placed at the head of the Deogarh government and after-
 “wards reduced to the state of a pensionary.”

† “He has given scope to a great activity of mind as well
 “as body by an uncommon attachment to the sports of the
 “field.”

"Bāpu [*alias* Vyankoji] who nominally officiates in
 "the capacity of *Diwān*. Mudhoji, it is clearly
 "seen, takes a leading efficient part in the manage-
 "ment of his affairs, though from certain domestic
 "embarrassments he has been induced to lay a
 "restraint on his opinions and to exercise a for-
 "bearance that is not natural to him. Raghoji, in
 "whom the rights of government have been
 "formally invested, is admitted into a com-
 "mon participation of the business of the
 "State, in every department of which he
 "has established an avowed and secret in-
 "fluence which often essentially militates against
 "the purposes of his father. It is said that Mudhoji
 "is fully aware of the operations and views of his
 "son but, fearing the effects of a declared rupture,
 "fully temporises with him; yielding in points of
 "no material import and checking, though with
 "address, acts that he deems pernicious to the
 "government. Raghoji, if a right judgment can
 "be formed of a young man who has never been
 "placed in any independent or active station,
 "would seem to have but a small share of military
 "ability and not much ambition in his character.
 "His ruling passion is said to be avarice, mixed with
 "a mean parsimony, and his favoured servants
 "those who in secret can demonstrate to him the
 "most successful modes of acquiring wealth, which
 "he amasses as he sees occasion and without
 "reserve, often incapacitating the officers of govern-
 "ment from performing their engagements by his
 "exactions. Chinnāji, the second son, is wholly

“of a military disposition and is esteemed intrepid
 “and enterprising. He had been adopted by his
 “uncle Bimbāji, the Chief of Ratanpur [Chhattis-
 “garh] who, having no sons, nominated him the
 “successor of his territory; and, at the death of
 “Bimbāji, the widow desired that Chinnāji might
 “take possession of the Ratanpur districts. It does
 “not appear that Mudhoji has shewn any pointed
 “objection to the measure, but that Raghoji, fear-
 “ing the adventurous spirit of his brother, is averse
 “to it and earnestly urges his father to withhold
 “his assent to the proposed succession. But it is
 “believed that the obstacles now impeding the in-
 “vestiture of Chinnāji will be removed. Maniyā
 “Bāpu [*alias* Vyankoji], the third son of Mudhoji,
 “who is not marked with any particular trait of
 “character, holds the seal of the *Diwān*’s office.
 “He derives a certain revenue from this department
 “for which purpose only it seems to have been
 “conferred on him, for he is seldom called on to
 “perform any duties.”

**Mudhoji's
 chief offi-
 cers.**

59. “The principal public officers at this time
 “composing the *Darbār* of Mudhoji are the *Bakshi*,
 “who is entrusted with the general disposition of
 “the army; a *Munshi*, for conducting the Persian
 “correspondence; an officer, denominated the
 “*Chitnavis*, who transacts the literary business that
 “is negotiated in the Marāthā language; and a
 “Treasurer. Since the death of the late *Diwān*,
 “*Diwākar* Pandit, which happened about seven
 “years ago, no person has regularly filled his
 “office—it being executed by the Rājā, his sons and

"such others as he is disposed occasionally to
 "nominate.* The *Bakshu*, Bhawāni Kālu, about
 "70 years of age, is an ancient servant of the
 "Bhonsle government under which he has acquired
 "reputation and wealth. He has been employed
 "chiefly in the army; but, subsequently to the
 "death of Diwākar, he is known in the country
 "by the name of *Diwān*, an appellation by which
 "the Rājā himself distinguishes him. Bhawāni
 "Kālu is confidentially consulted by Mudhoji on
 "the subject of foreign affairs and military
 "motions; and he is also much respected by him
 "for his wealth and numerous connections† on
 "whom Mudhoji, on any State emergency, will
 "naturally look for a personal aid. Raghoji, who
 "is inimical to the interests of Bhawāni Kālu, has,
 "it is mentioned, urged his dismissal from office
 "to which he is desirous of advancing Mahādji
 "Lashkari, said to be his private conveyancer of
 "intelligence and the agent employed by him to
 "point out the proper objects for the gratification
 "of his avarice. But Mudhoji has wholly rejected
 "this proposition and has advanced such sub-
 "stantial arguments for the refusal that there is
 "little probability of Raghoji's design being ac-
 "complished. A principal cause of the dislike of
 "Raghoji to Bhawāni Kālu is supposed to arise
 "from this officer's attachment to Chimnāji, whose
 "interest he espouses with warmth and has strenu-
 "ously advised the Rājā to establish this young

*[Diwākar Rāo's death in 1781 A.D. is noted on p. 81 above.]

†"Many of whom fill the secondary offices."

“man in the Ratanpur territories. Mudhoji, it is
 “said, sees the propriety of the counsel; for in such
 “an event Chimnāji, by his activity and courage,
 “would be enabled to reduce the petty Chiefs hold-
 “ing the country towards the Balasore side who,
 “not being subject to Berar,* interrupt the com-
 “munication of the Gondwāna with Cuttack. But,
 “whether from a doubt of Chimnāji’s future attach-
 “ment to the Nāgpur government or averse from
 “undertaking a measure of such importance with-
 “out the approbation of Raghoji, the Rājā has not
 “hitherto promoted this view. The *Munshi*,
 “Bhawāni Nāgnāth, who is near eighty years of
 “age and very infirm, is principally employed in
 “conducting the business that is transacted with
 “the Mahomedan *Darbārs* and our government.
 “Excepting the official qualifications he has acquir-
 “ed, his abilities are not extensive and it does not
 “appear that he is much consulted in matters
 “foreign to his department. The *Chitnavis* and
 “Treasurer,† confined to the immediate duties of
 “their station, seem to have little influence in the
 “councils of Mudhoji. At the death of the *Diwān*,
 “Diwākar Pandit, who had amassed a valuable
 “property, the Rājā seized on the whole amount
 “of his estate which was fully discovered to him by
 “Jān Rāo, a person who had been brought up in
 “the family of the *Diwān*. Jān Rāo has, since the
 “performance of this service, been pre-eminently
 “distinguished by the favour of Mudhoji who,

*[See footnote † to p. 96 below.]

†“Bābāji and Chimnāji Āpā.”

“apparently, places much trust in him* having, it
 “is said, found him a ready, diligent agent in the
 “execution of all affairs that require secrecy and
 “address. Shaikh Muhammad Ali, an old de-
 “pendent of the family, occupies a domestic station
 “about the person of the Rājā and has become the
 “companion of his amusements. Being versed in
 “the Persian language and possessed of courtly
 “manners, he has been employed in conveying
 “complimentary communications between the
 “English gentlemen that have occasionally resided
 “at this place and the *Darbār*. Muhammad Ali
 “superintends also the Court of Justice of the town
 “of Nāḡpur; but his powers are very limited, all
 “causes of any importance being ultimately re-
 “ferred to the decision of the Rājā.”†

60. “In closing this sketch of the Bhonsle history
 “it may be said on a substantial ground that
 “Mudhoji, though he has adopted a temporizing
 “conduct with his eldest son and listens with a
 “good-humoured temper to the solicitations of
 “Chimnāji and to the occasional counsels of his
 “officers, yet in matters of moment acts with a
 “vigour and decision that make him respected as
 “well as feared. If any representation sways him
 “it is, perhaps, that of Jān Rāo who, by an un-
 “reserved application in gratifying his master’s
 “wishes, has rendered himself an useful important
 “servant; and he has likewise been successful in
 “acquiring the favourable opinion of Raghoji.”

*“Jān Rāo keeps the seal of the Rājā.”

†[For a further notice of Shaikh Muhammad Ali, see p. 60
 above.]

Mudhoji's territories.

61. "The territories of Mudhoji Bhonsle are "bounded on the north by the Sher, a small river "running about eight miles to the northward of "the village of Lakhnādon, which divides them "from the possessions of Bālāji, the Chief of Kālpi.* "On the east they extend to, and include, the "districts of Ratanpur. On the south-east, Sambal- "pur and other independent petty Hindu States† "separate them from the province of Cuttack, "which holds of Nāgpur. On the south, a space "of about twenty miles lies between them and the "river Godāvari and which is a part of the Nizām's "dominions. On the south-west they extend to the "*subah* of Nānder. On the west, including Berar,‡ "they are skirted by the Godāvari which forms the "western boundary of the Berar province; and on "the north they reach to the Nerbudda."

His Revenues.

62. "The revenues of this country, according to "the statement which I procured, are calculated at "the sum of fifty-two *lākhs* of rupees—
 "The City of Nāgpur with its depen- ... 18 *lākhs*.
 "Berar, from which Mudhoji by the
 servants of his government collects
 a computed half amount, produces 10 ,,
 "The Gangthari district§ produces ... 2 ,,"

*[See footnote † to p. 100 below.]

†[The independence of these petty States is a significant indication of Mudhoji's military weakness.]

‡"Ellichpur, the capital of the province, is wholly in the "possession of the Nizām who collects jointly with Mudhoji "the Berar revenues. Fulād Jang, a son of the Nizām, is "lately nominated to the Ellichpur government."

§"Situated in the western frontier, near the course of the "Godāvari."

"The Cuttack province produces	...	17 <i>lākhs</i> .
"Ratanpur* produces	...	3 "
"The <i>pargana</i> hs of Multa† produce	..	2 "
"The supposed amount of extraordinary imposts, such as are denominated in India <i>masaudera</i> , <i>tāwān</i> , etc., together with the occasional donations of the inhabitants	..	7 "
Total	...	59 ,,+

"From this sum, previously to its being lodged in the treasury, the following deductions are made

"A pension of Burhān Shāh	...	3 <i>lākhs</i> .
"A grant to the <i>Jāgirdār</i> of Seoni‡	..	3 "
"The military expenses of Berar	.	3 "
"The military expenses of Cuttack	...	7 "
Total	...	16 ,,

"It yielded formerly eight *lākhs* of rupees. This diminution of revenue was caused by the oppression and rapacity of Bimbāji."

†"Multā, lying 120 miles to the north-west of Nāgpur, is the source of the Tāpi or Tāpti river."

‡"The revenues of Nāgpur were computed at a crore of rupees in the time of Raghoji who, being at the head of a large army and generally in the field, collected a tribute from all the territories intervening between his capital and Bengal." [Rennell (*Memoir of a Map of Hindostan*, pp. cxxix—cxxx) writing in 1793 A.D. says "The sum of his (Mudhoji's) revenue is variously stated. Some have reckoned his part of Berar [the Nāgpur territories] at 84 *lākhs* of rupees per annum and Cuttack at 24; while others have allowed only 60 for his whole revenue." Forster's figures were probably too low and the higher figures quoted by Rennell too high.]

§"Muhammad Amin Khān, a Pathān, whose family have been long employed in the Bhonsle's service. This *Jāgirdār* holds possession of the country from Lakhnādon to near Rāmtek. This tract of country, though extensive, produces but a small revenue, being mountainous and woody. For a geographical explanation, *vide* Rennell's Map."

His Army.

63. "The number of forces now employed in
 "the service of Mudhoji—
 "2,000 cavalry, the horses being the property of
 government [*Bārgir*].
 "4,700 cavalry, stationed in Nāgpur and the neigh-
 bourhood, the horses private property
 [*Silāhdār*].
 "300 sepoys, awkwardly clothed and ill-disciplined..
 "300 cavalry, attached to the *Jāgirdār* of Seoni.
 "2,000 cavalry, stationed in Cuttack.
 "1,500 cavalry, stationed in the Gangthari districts.
-
- "10,800 troops.*

"The irregular infantry, the number of which I
 "cannot ascertain, are chiefly employed in forts and
 "are not esteemed of any note. The field artillery
 "of Mudhoji, ill-conditioned and ill-served, does
 "not exceed fifteen pieces of different calibres and
 "have been manufactured in the Nāgpur arsenal
 "under the inspection of native artists. These
 "guns, on service, are given to the charge of a
 "small party of Europeans, who have emigrated
 "hither from various quarters.† From the state-
 "ment which has been given of the revenue and
 "force of Mudhoji Bhonsle he is seen to occupy
 "but a secondary station amongst the powers of
 "India. Having obtained a secure possession of
 "his country, which is not bounded by any en-
 "croaching State, and having, it may be said,
 "shaken off all dependence on the Poona govern-

*"Mudhoji is possessed of two hundred elephants."

†"Two English and a Frenchman. The rest are Portu-
 guese."

“ment,* he looks with unconcern at the conduct
 “and operations of the Chiefs and Princes who take
 “the lead in the hostile and political motions of the
 “present day; and his intercourse with them is
 “slender and uninteresting.”

64. “The *Peshwā*’s promise of investing him in
 “the possession of the Garha-Mandlā territories
 “principally induced him to take a part in the late
 “Marāthā war against Tipu *Sultān*; and the want of
 “ability or inclination to perform the engagement
 “has disgusted and, in a great measure, determined
 “him against entering into any of the *Peshwā*’s
 “views. To elucidate this subject it is necessary to
 “mention that, about forty or fifty years ago, a
 “Marāthā *chauth* was first collected in Garha-
 “Mandlā and that Mudhoji, in the second year of
 “his government [1776 A.D.], marched an army
 “thither for the purpose of subduing the whole
 “country. But, his force being inadequate to the
 “service and the season of the rains setting in,
 “he made, to save his reputation, an hasty ill-
 “secured agreement with the Garha-Mandlā Chief
 “for the payment of three *lākhs* of rupees, which
 “Mudhoji never received. When the *Diwān*,
 “*Diwākar Pandit*, was employed at Poona [1779
 “A.D.] on the part of Berar in concerting the com-
 “bined war against the English nation in India, the
 “*Peshwā*, to stimulate Mudhoji to take an active
 “part in the junction, agreed to confer the investi-
 “ture of Garha-Mandlā on his second son, Chim-
 “nāji, in whose name the grant was actually issued

His claims
to Garha-
Mandlā.

*[But see paras. 54 above and 66 below.]

“and a sword and horse bestowed on him with the
 “title of Khande Rāo in token of the donation.*
 “From the temporizing operations of Mudhoji’s
 “army during the Cuttack campaign, when an attack
 “was meditated from that quarter on Bengal, the
 “*Peshwā* saw his want of zeal in conducting the
 “service and acceded to the overtures of the Kālpi
 “Chief, to whom a permission was given to seize
 “on the possessions of Garha-Mandlā which, after
 “a term of three years’ war and intrigue, were
 “reduced by the forces of Bālāji† who remits to
 “Poona a certain amount of the revenue.‡
 “Mudhoji, being accompanied by Chimnāji, his
 “second son, joined the Poona army with about
 “ten thousand horse and a few guns and, after
 “remaining with it for the space of eleven months,
 “he returned to Nāgpur, leaving 4,000 horse under
 “the command of Chimnāji who continued in the
 “field about a year longer.§ In the course of the
 “war Mudhoji repeatedly urged the subject of
 “Garha-Mandlā which territory, after a tedious
 “process of correspondence, the Poona govern-
 “ment required Bālāji to evacuate. This Chief re-
 “presented that, having incurred an expense of
 “forty *lākhs* of rupees in the reduction of the
 “country, he expected, previously to the delivery,

*[See footnote ‡ to p. 22 above and Jenkins, p. 60.]

†[Bālāji Govind Bundeale was the *Peshwā*’s representative who ruled on his behalf over a considerable portion of Bundelkhand. Bālāji’s estate included the Saugor territory, which was at this time allotted as an appanage to Bālāji Govind’s son, by name Raghunāth Rāo or Ābā Sāheb. See *European Travellers*, p. 82. For the family history see Kincaid and Parasnis, II, p. 225.]

‡“Six *lākhs* of rupees.”

§[This was in 1786 A.D.—see Grant Duff, II, p. 195.]

“a reimbursement of the charge, which was ultimately stipulated at thirty *lākhs*. This sum Mudhoji desired might be accounted for in the subsidiary debt due to him from the *Peshwā*, who had engaged to allow sixty thousand rupees *per* month for the expenses of the Berar army, and only two *lākhs* and forty thousand rupees had been paid. At the end of the war, objections having been made to this mode of adjustment, the negotiation was wholly frustrated and hitherto has assumed no other form.”

65. “His disgust at this disappointment, with a contempt he professes for the character of Nānā Pharnavis and his remote situation from the general scene of action, have made Mudhoji extremely inattentive to the interests of the Poona Court; nor does it appear that he has been called on, or consulted by, that State to make head at this juncture against the supposed meditated invasion of the Mysore Prince. Mudhoji formerly possessed an influence at the Nizām’s Court, a power which he acquired by having formed, on a mutually interested basis, an union with Ibrāhim Bēg Dhonsā who, from an ordinary station, had risen to a rank, and had established an authority, little less than supreme in the Nizām’s dominions. The confederacy of these Chiefs, which had a conspicuous effect in consolidating their joint strength, in intimidating the Nizām and forming his measures, continued to exist until the death of Dhonsā, which happened in the year 1782, when Mudhoji, on a promise of having the *jāgir* of

Mudhoji's
relations
with neigh-
bouring
Country
Powers.

"Dārwhā conferred on him, which had been grant-
 "ed by the Nizāmat to his brother Sābāji* and at
 "the death of that Chief resumed, sent a body of
 "horse to aid the Nizām in reducing Ibrāhim Beg's
 "son, which service was completely effected. But
 "the Rājā did not receive the stipulated donation.
 "Nizām Ali, ultimately refusing to give up the
 "Dārwhā districts, offered him some woody waste
 "lands near the Godāvari, which Mudhoji rejected.
 "Though it does not appear that the political pur-
 "suits of the Nizām and Mudhoji are guided by
 "any united impulse of interest, yet from the vici-
 "nity of the two States and their connected pro-
 "perty in the Berar province, an intimacy and
 "frequent correspondence is maintained between
 "them. Previously to the capture of Badāmi, dur-
 "ing the late combined native war against Mysore,
 "the Nizām took offence at the conduct of Nānā
 "Pharnavis† and detached his army from the
 "Marāthā camp. Mudhoji was deputed as the
 "fittest agent to soothe the *Subah* who, after much
 "earnest solicitation, consented to hold an inter-
 "view with Nānā and to leave a body of his troops
 "to act with the Marāthā forces. Mudhoji holds
 "no intercourse with Tipu *Sultān*, nor is he in-
 "formed of the designs or operations of that Prince.
 "At the close of the war, when negotiations were
 "set on foot to effect a peace between Tipu and

*[See p. 22 above.]

†"He had induced the Nizām to enter into the war by the
 "promise of giving him a certain part of the Viziāpur terri-
 "tory and ultimately refused to comply with the engagement."

"the *Peshwā*, Mudhoji sent an agent to Seringapa-
 "tam for the purpose of establishing a mediation
 "between these powers, but the proposal was re-
 "ceived with a contemptuous insult by Tipu and
 "haughtily rejected. It is not probable that
 "Mudhoji will now promptly adopt any directly
 "hostile measure. He has grown old and, though
 "still personally active, he is much given up to
 "domestic amusements and the superstitions of his
 "religion. The expensive buildings he is at this
 "time erecting in Nāgpur* and the environs, which
 "make large deductions from his revenue, would
 "wholly prevent him from engaging in any present
 "military scheme which, indeed, from the situation
 "in which his dominions are now generally placed,
 "he sees are not necessary. The English, friendly
 "disposed to him, are on one side and, on other
 "quarters, inconsiderable States with the Nizām
 "of the Deccan from whose deficiency of military
 "spirit and ability he apprehends no danger."†

* [Leckie, writing on the 20th of August 1790, says, "The
 "only good building [in Nāgpur] is the palace, begun by the
 "late Mudhoji and now ~~finishing~~ ^{being} by his son, the present Rājā.
 "It is built of a blue stone dug out of a quarry in large blocks
 "on the western skirts of the town. The present Rājā, however,
 "has destroyed the grand effect which would have been produced
 "by the stone alone by intermixing brick-work in the build-
 "ing."—*Early European Travellers*, p. 72.]

† The earlier portion of Forster's account of Nāgpur is given
 in Appendix C below.

CHAPTER VII.

LECKIE'S JOURNAL AND FORSTER'S DESPATCHES OF 1790 A.D.

**Accession of
Raghoji II.
Recall of
Forster.**

66. Bimbāji of Chhattisgarh, Mudhoji's younger brother, died in 1787 A.D. On the 9th of May 1788 A.D. Mudhoji himself expired; and the reins of government passed without disturbance to his son, Raghoji, on whose behalf he had ruled as regent for so many years. Chimnāji, Mudhoji's second son (his full name was Khandoji Chimnā Bāpu), received Chhattisgarh as his appanage, while Vyankoji (or Manyā Bāpu), Mudhoji's third son, was given Chāndā. The accession of Raghoji to real, as well as nominal, authority in the State did not affect political relations with the British. Forster's report had dispelled the illusion as to the wealth and strength of Nāgpur under which Warren Hastings had laboured. Cornwallis realized that "no advantage would be obtained from a connection with that government; and, so far from becoming formidable to the Company, it would always be to the interest of the Bhonsle to avoid giving them the slightest offence, as the province of Cuttack which belonged to him could, from its situation, be seized and possessed at any time with the utmost facility by the Company's troops

“of the Bengal establishment. . . . Lord Cornwallis considered it to be impossible ever to obtain Cuttack directly from the Bhonsle family by any other means than force—for they would not be content with any reasonable sum of money in payment for it; nor had the Company any equivalent whatever in land to offer, nor did his lordship see a prospect of the Company ever being in possession of territory that they could offer, in exchange for it. The Rājā of Berar was, besides, so dependent on the *Peshwā*'s government that he could not make any exchange or alienation of his territory without their consent; and Poona would never agree to any bargain unless they were themselves to get some substantial advantage from it. The strength and political circumstances of the Rājā of Berar were, according to Mr. Forster's account, truly contemptible, so that the Company could derive no benefit from any further alliance or connection with him than the convenience that might arise from the intercourse of the common offices of good neighbourhood and mutual civility.”* Accordingly Cornwallis ordered Forster to return to Calcutta and he left Nāgpur on the 10th of February 1789 A.D.

67. Raghoji, at the same time, proceeded by slow marches towards Poona and arrived there on the 23rd of March. This visit was in conformity with a peremptory summons from Nānā Pharnavis, who insisted on his taking an active part in the confederacy which had been formed between the

Raghoji's
relations
with Nānā
Pharnavis.

*Notes in the India office.

Peshwā, Sindia, Holkar and the Nizām against Tipu.* Raghoji objected to being ordered on an expedition which the *Peshwā* was not to command in person† and offered many other ineffectual excuses. At length he explained privately to Nānā Pharnavis his apprehensions that Chimnāji might usurp the Nāgpur sovereignty in his absence.‡ His attendance was then dispensed with, on his promising to contribute ten *lākhs* of rupees towards the expenses of the war. He left Poona on the 7th of May 1789 A.D., after obtaining confirmation of his titles and territorial possessions and binding himself to furnish, like his predecessors, a force of 10,000 men for the service of the *Peshwā* when called upon to do so. Soon after Raghoji's return to Nāgpur the death of Chimnāji relieved him of his apprehensions from that quarter. The province of Chhattisgarh was, thereupon, added to Vyankoji's appanage.§

Forster's
second
deputation
to Nāgpur.

68. At last in December 1789 A.D. the long-expected war broke out between the English and Tipu. The former on the 1st of June 1790 A.D. concluded at Poona a triple alliance with the Nizām

*Grant Duff (II, p. 266) says that Raghoji repaired on this occasion to Poona "at the time when the confederacy was formed against Tipu". He seems to confuse Raghoji's visit of 1789 with that of Mudhoji in 1785 A.D. The confederacy was formed in 1785 A.D.—*vide* Grant Duff, II, p. 193, and p. 84 above.

†"Raghoji has intimated to me that, by the usage of the Marāthā State at large, his troops are only summoned to join the personal standard of the *Peshwā*." (Forster's despatch of the 6th of October 1790 A.D.)

‡See footnote to p. 75 above.

§Grant Duff, II, pp. 266-7, and Jenkins' *Report of 1826*, pp. 61-2. See also p. 215 below.

and the Poona *Darbār* against their common enemy; and, to support this combination, Forster was despatched once more to Nāgpur. Lord Cornwallis' minute suggesting this course is dated the 26th of February 1790 A.D.; and Forster left Calcutta on the 7th of March. His party, which included a certain Mr. Leckie who kept a journal of the expedition, reached Balasore on the 22nd and Cuttack on the 31st of the same month.

69. Of Cuttack Leckie writes as follows :—"The *Subahdār*, as he is styled, Rājārām Pandit, is now at Nāgpur whither he is generally summoned once in two or three years to give in his accounts. His tenure is on the footing of that of a farm : he pays the Rājā of Nāgpur ten *lākhs* of rupees out of the collections which are estimated at 22 *lākhs*, including what is sent from Balasore : the remainder the *Subahdār* applies to his own use, the pay of the soldiers, *etc.*, *etc.* He generally returns from Nāgpur well fleeced; for he is obliged to make considerable presents to retain his office; when, to make up his own private losses and to realize the usual revenue, the blow falls with redoubled weight on the wretched inhabitants of his districts*. There is very little specie in gold and silver in circulation and the rents are paid in cowries [shells]. I imagine the greatest branches of the revenue are the customs and tax upon pilgrims going to Jagannāth. A bullock-load of silk is taxed at six rupees; and so on in proportion to the bulk and

Leckie's
account of
Cuttack.

*See also Hunter's *Orissa*, Vol. II, pp. 32-3.

"value of the load. Pilgrims from the Deccan pay "six rupees; those from Bengal, who are generally "richer, ten rupees. They, however, are not "severe in the exaction when they think the party "really poor; and they make up their loss occa- "sioned by this lenity when they find out a "wealthy subject in disguise, which is frequently "the case."*

His descrip-
tion of the
journey.

70. Forster's party followed the usual route along the Mahānadi, reaching the famous pass of Barmul on the 26th of April 1790 A.D. "The road "lay through a thick forest, and the hills to the "right and left were nearer than they were yester- "day. The people say tigers are numerous. We "encamped in a mango grove at the entrance into "the village of Barmul. The situation of this place "is very romantic: the hills, on either side approx- "imating, leave only a small space, through which "the Mahānadi flows in a winding course, and "form the pass of the Barmul which they justly "style the western gate of the country dependent "on Cuttack. This village and the adjacent coun- "try, called Daspallā, for about fourteen kos, be- "long to a *Zamindār* whose strong situation has "rendered him almost independent of the Marā- "thās; and the present Rājā of Nāgpur, Raghoji, "has given up the consideration of his *peshkash*, "or tribute, and conferred upon him the *nishān* "and *marātib*, colours and arms, on condition that "he will grant free egress and regress to his sub- "jects over his side of the Barmul pass."†

*Early European Travellers, pp. 55-6.

†Ibid., p. 59.

71. Under the date Monday, May the 3rd, Leckie makes the following entry :—"The Rājā [of "Sonpur], Pirit Singh, a boy of about ten years of "age, came and paid us a visit in the evening. The "management of all the business is in the hands of "the *Diwān*, an Orissa Brāhman. They complain "much of the licentiousness of a Marāthā army "under the command of Bāndhuji, the nephew of "Mahipat Rāo the governor of Raipur; and the "*Diwān* entreated Mr. Forster to represent their "situation at Nāgpur and procure redress. The "inhabitants of the countries which we have hither- "to passed through style themselves Uriyas, or "natives of Orissa. They are a fierce people and "possess a considerable degree of personal cour- "age: they are commonly armed with bows and "arrows or swords: the latter are generally carried "naked and are broad at the end and narrow in "the middle. They have a rooted antipathy against "the Marāthās and frequently boast of the num- "bers they have slain. The latter are too strong "for them in the plain but they can make them- "selves very formidable to cavalry in the woods."*

72. On Tuesday, May the 18th, the party halted at Raipur, which Leckie tells us "is a large town, "and numbers of merchants and wealthy people "reside there. There is a fort, the lower part of "the walls of which is of stone, the upper of mud; "it has five doors and several bastions. There is "a fine-looking tank built round with masonry but

Raipur and
Chhattis-
garh.

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 61-2.

"the water is bad. Ratanpur [*i.e.*, Chhattisgarh] "is, in general, a very fertile, fine country and may "be styled, from its plentiful produce of rice, the "Burdwan of these parts. The widow of Bim- "bāji, Mudhoji's brother, is still alive and all osten- "sible respect is shown to her; but the executive "part of the government is in the hands of Mahipat "Rāo, a Brāhman from Nāgpur. The collections "of Raipur, including the toll upon loaded cattle, "are only 70,000 rupees, and those of all Ratanpur "not above Rs. 1,50,000. During the government "of Bimbāji the revenue amounted to five or six "lākhs of rupees; but I was unable to learn the "cause of this astonishing decrease. The people "were remarkably civil; for it seems the Rājā had "given orders that we should be supplied with "everything we wanted."* Nāgpur was reached on the 3rd of June after, as Forster describes it in his first despatch, "a journey of one month and fourteen days through one of the most generally inhospitable countries I have seen in India."

Account of
Raghoji's
administra-
tion.

73. Of Raghoji's administration Leckie, writing on the 20th of August 1790 A.D., gives the following account. "The present Rājā, Raghoji Bhonsle, the "grandson of the Conqueror. does not "seem to be either adapted to civil or military "business; he is generally dressed plainly in white

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 66-7. "Our hours of travel- "ling until the 23rd of May were", Leckie writes, "from two "o'clock in the morning to seven, eight, or nine, according "to the length of the stage: from the 23rd of May we used "to march half an hour before sunset and encamp at nine "or ten o'clock."

"but wears costly diamonds and pearls: his be-
 "haviour is courteous to strangers. His great
 "penchant is for elephants and mares. He has
 "about 200 of the former, the finest I ever beheld;
 "and they are fed so sumptuously with sugarcane,
 "treacle, ghee, etc., and not unfrequently fowl
 "pulāo, that they become almost mad with lust,
 "breaking their chains and doing great mischief,
 "which is considered by the Marāthās as fine sport.
 "The principal people about the Rājā are his bro-
 "ther, Maniyā Bāpu [Vyankoji], a very quiet
 "young man; Bhawāni Kālu, the *Diwān*, a shrewd
 "old fellow; and his nephew Pāndurang, the com-
 "mander and paymaster of the army; Shridhar, the
 "Munshi; and Mahādji Lashkari, the Rājā's con-
 "fidant, who is consulted on all occasions. The
 "Rājā does not keep up above 10,000 horse the pay
 "of which, as is the custom among all native
 "princes, is irregularly distributed. He has two
 "battalions of sepoy, armed and clothed like ours;
 "and, although they have been drilled by
 "black officers formerly belonging either to the
 "Nawāb of Lucknow or our service, yet they go
 "through their exercises very badly and I do not
 "think they will be able to make a stand against
 "any body of native sepoy disciplined by
 "European officers. I have heard that the
 "total collections of the Rājā's dominions,
 "including Ratanpur and Cuttack, only amount to
 "seventy lākhs of rupees *per annum*. I will not,
 "however, pretend to affirm that this is exact,
 "though I do not think it can much exceed that

“sum; for the Rājā’s country, notwithstanding the
 “great extent of it, does not contain a proportion-
 “ate quantity of cultivated land to that which is
 “waste and occupied by forests.”*

Forster’s
 despatches.

74. Though Forster arrived at Nāgpur on the 3rd of June 1790 A.D., it was not till the 15th of that month that he secured an interview with the Rājā. But, as soon as business was introduced, Raghoji’s temporizing policy made itself apparent. “He informs me”, writes Forster, “that the Courts of “Poona and Hyderabad have also invited him to “take up arms against Mysore, but that he waits “until some joint plan shall be brought forward to “ascertain the part his government can take.” Raghoji was disposed to assist the Company with a body of cavalry, 8,000 strong, to be ready to march in September on payment of Rs. 400 *per annum* for each man, but pointedly premised that any agreement with him for such assistance should be quite independent of any approval from the Poona *Darbār*. Forster objected to the terms as being very high; and the British government rejected them, but at the same time observed that they “entertained a high sense of the goodwill manifested by the Rājā of Berar in the voluntary offer “of 8,000 horse.” Forster was further instructed, on every proper occasion when the war should be mentioned, to express his surprise at the Rājā having hitherto appeared rather backward in a cause in which so many of his friends were earnestly engaged. “But I found him”, Forster observes, “wholly averse to this system which, he says, from

**Early European Travellers*, p. 73.

“the remote distance of his country to the scene
 “of action promises no adequate benefit. Should
 “Raghoji obtain possession of Garha-Mandlā,
 “which the *Peshwā* has hitherto long held out as
 “a deceitful lure, he will, doubtless, be induced
 “to assume an active part in the alliance. And
 “should we, in the course of the war, be in urgent
 “need of the Bhonsle’s assistance, it will probably
 “be obtained in the most easy manner by some
 “plan of negotiation which shall, through our
 “medium, transfer this territory to him.” But no
 such necessity arose; nothing came of the negotia-
 tions; and Forster’s despatches, which are very
 brief, soon turn to other topics.

75. Writing on September the 13th, 1790 A.D., Forster gives the following account of the Rājā’s mounted forces. Raghoji’s Cavalry.
 “The cavalry of Berar is com-
 “posed of Marāthās, Mahomedans and Rājputs,
 “perhaps in an equal proportion; and, since the
 “period of the first Raghoji to the death of
 “Mudhoji Bhonsle, they were classed among the
 “choicest troops of the Deccan. But, as the
 “soldiery of India solely derive importance and
 “strength from their leader and as the ruling Chiefs
 “of this country indicated a small portion of mili-
 “tary or active abilities, we must infer a positive
 “decline in his army. Yet, as the other States
 “have also experienced a sensible diminution of
 “vigour, I am induced to suppose that the forces
 “of Berar are still equal to those of Hyderabad or
 “Poona and sufficiently capacitated to perform the
 “usual service of country cavalry.”

**Trouble on
the Bengal-
Orissa
border.**

76. On the 6th of October 1790 A.D., with reference to "the predatory conduct which the Cuttack borderers have for a length of time exercised towards certain of the inhabitants of [the British "district of] Midnāpur,"* Forster writes, "I will "presume to say, my lord, that this State possesses "but few principles of good government; and its "existence largely rests on a like faulty disposition "of the other native States of India. Their grand "rule of action is to immediately accumulate a "dormant treasure, without the foresight of a day "or being checked by the objects of destruction "which it causes. Impressed with this idea, I do "not entertain much sanguine hope of seeing the "outrage, which has been committed on Midnāpur, "vigorously redressed, especially when the Marāthās are in the habit of experiencing the lenity "and moderation of our government; and, as Raghaji Bhonsle probably takes no concern in the "interior administration of Cuttack so long as he "draws a substantial revenue from it, I am emboldened to mention to your lordship that, in the "event of the failure of the present remonstrance "which has been made, if some severe punishment

*Sir W. Hunter writes (*Orissa*, II, pp. 48-9), "On the north-west lay our district of Midnāpur studded with English factories, the chief of which was at Jaleshwar just beyond the "boundary of modern Orissa. On the Commercial Resident of "this place devolved the duty of holding the British frontier "against the Marāthā horse. In 1785 I find him writing "urgently for more sepoys; and four years later a long list of "acts of violence had to be submitted to the Governor-General. "They devastated the country to the banks of the Hugli itself; "and a rich tract on that river [Birkul], now teeming with "population and then a favourite summer retreat of Warren Hastings, had become an absolute waste in 1789."

"is inflicted on the rabble who are accustomed to infest our frontier, the remedy would be complete and lasting. Nor is there an apprehension of such a mode of redress involving any embarrassing consequences, as this government is aware that it wholly maintains Cuttack on the tenure of our general good faith and a respect to the national treaties." The Rājā made a show of meeting the British remonstrance by deputing one Mahādji Hari* to Cuttack to settle the trouble; but, Forster writes, "the chief purpose of Mahādji's appointment is to inspect, or control, the conduct of Rājārām Pandit who, though he had stipulated to give a larger sum for the Cuttack province than it has yielded to the Bhonsle for many years, yet the Rājā is not satisfied and has deputed Mahādji to extort a further amount. As Cuttack is already groaning under a serious oppression and calamity, it is to be apprehended that this two-fold power, having equally the object of rapacity in view, will complete the desolation of the province. Nor do I expect that Mahādji Hari will put in execution any equitable or vigorous plan for eradicating the disorders which are complained of to the government."

77. Forster's last recorded letter from Nāgpur is dated the 1st of January 1791 A.D. Four days later, as his tombstone records, "he died a natural death at the age of 39." He was buried close to the Nāg river from whence, owing to the erosion of

*Mahādji Hari had himself been *Subahdār* of Cuttack in 1773 and 1775 A.D., see *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. IV, Nos. 516 and 1813.

Forster's
Travels.

the bank, his tomb was moved on the 6th of March 1915 A.D. to the Protestant cemetery, where it now stands.* George Forster was a more interesting personality than the record of his service at Nāgpur would lead one to suppose. Though the fame of his achievement has now been forgotten, he enjoys the distinction of having been "the first English traveller who made the overland route from India to Europe."† The story of this exploit is told in *Forster's Travels*, a two-volume work entitled "A journey from Bengal to England through "the northern part of India, Kashmir, Afghanistan "and Persia into Russia by the Caspian Sea", by George Forster in the Civil Service of the Honourable East India Company. It would be out of place, to give an account of his adventures here. It must suffice to say that he left Benares on the 12th of December 1782 A.D., having "assumed the name of a Georgian‡ for the sake of travelling with more safety." He journeyed through Oudh "clad

*The Persian inscription runs as follows:—"God is free from "want. This is the tomb of George Forster, the strengthener "of the Empire, preserver of the country, possessed of intre- "pidity, *Sardār* of the old British Company who had come to "this country as an agent from Calcutta. He died a natural "death at the age of 39. His death occurred on the 5th Jan- "uary 1791 A.D. corresponding with the 28th *Rabi-us-sām* 1204 "*Hijri*." The tomb was erected by Lieutenant James Davidson (the officer commanding the Resident's escort) as is shown by the words "Fœcit Lieutenant Davidson" cut on the tomb itself. The officer who superintended the removal of Forster's remains in 1915 tells me that the skeleton was found intact with the arms crossed upon the breast.

†Lord Curzon's *Persia and the Persian Question* (1892), Vol. I, p. 187.

‡i.e., an inhabitant of Georgia, a Christian country lying between Armenia and the Caucasus mountains.

in the Mahometan habit"; and his disguise was sufficient to prevent him securing admission to the quarters of an officer with whom he had business in the English camp at Lucknow. "This occurrence, however productive of temporary inconvenience, gave me a satisfactory proof of the efficacy of my disguise and the fluency of my "Mahometan language." He subsequently described himself as "a Turk going to Kashmir to purchase shawls—the Turkish language being in these parts wholly unknown"; and in this character reached Jammu on the 13th of April and Srinagar on the 7th of May 1783 A.D. The Afghan ruler of Kashmir proposed to impress Forster for service in his army; but he bribed his way out of the country and reached Peshawar on the 14th of July. Observing on his arrival at Kabul, on the 2nd of August, "a common toleration of religion", Forster now called himself a Spaniard; but he soon experienced "a taste of those ills which are attached to the profession of the Christian faith in "Mahometan countries. . . . I was treated on all sides with such a brutal contempt that I grievously lamented the dismissal of my Mahometan "coverings." Ghizni was reached on the 26th of September, Kandahar on the 5th of October and Herat on the 2nd of November. On leaving Herat he once more assumed the dress of a Mahomedan, saying he was on a pilgrimage to Meshed. He was then treated with the utmost respect, addressed as *Hāji* and "much courted by all the passengers." He arrived at Mashhad-i-Sar on the Caspian sea

at the end of January 1784. He then threw off his disguise, sailed *via* Baku to Astrakan, reached Moscow on the 20th of May and arrived in England towards the end of July 1784 A.D.

CHAPTER VIII.

BLUNT'S NARRATIVE OF 1795 A.D.

78. After Forster's death in January 1791 A.D. ^{Blunt sent to explore the Nāgpur Territories.} no British envoy was sent to Nāgpur to take his place. There was little likelihood of collision between the Calcutta and Nāgpur governments. Moreover the treaty of Poona had stabilized British relations with Nānā Pharnavis and the Nizām of Hyderabad. But in 1794 A.D. the Bengal government, stimulated by the success which had attended Major Rennell's systematic efforts to complete a geographical survey of India, decided, with Raghoji's permission, to despatch a small expedition "to explore a route through that part of India which lies between Berar, Orissa and the Northern *Sarkārs*."* Captain J. T. Blunt, who was deputed for this service, left Chunārgarh on the 28th of January 1795 A.D. with a party consisting of a *Jamadār* and 30 sepoys. His course lay through the Korea State, across Chhattisgarh, and thence through Kānker and the outlying parts of the Chāndā district (Wairāgarh and Sironchā) into the Nizām's dominions.

79. The following extracts from Blunt's narrative of his journey indicate the relations subsisting at the time between the Marāthā government and ^{Korea State.}

**Early European Travellers*, p. 91. This area is marked "Tract unexplored by Europeans" in Rennell's Map of 1788 A.D.

some of its remoter feudatories and dependants. The Rājā of Korea was being "besieged in a little mud fort at his capital, Sonhat." On enquiring the reason for this, Captain Blunt was informed "that, since the Marāthās had established their "government in Ratanpur and Baghelkhand, they "had demanded a tribute from the Chauhān Rājā "of Korea which, after much contention, was settled "at 200 rupees : but that Rām Garib had demurred "paying anything for the last five years. Gulāb "Khān had, in consequence, been deputed by the "*Subahdār* of Chhattisgarh, with about 200 match- "lockmen and 30 horse, to levy the tribute due to "the Rājā of Berar; and had been joined by the "Rājā of Sargujā with about 80 horse and foot. "Garib Singh, on his side, had been supported by "the Rājā of Nigwāni Kothi with 7 matchlocks and "3 horsemen : and his own forces amounted only to "10 matchlockmen, 3 horsemen and about 100 of "the Chauhān mountaineers armed with hatchets, "bows and arrows. . . . The Marāthās "entered Korea and took possession of Mirzāpur, "the ancient capital of the country. Upon this "the Chauhāns fled; the Rājā took refuge in his "fort; and the mountaineers obscured themselves, "with their families and as much of their property "as they had time to carry off, in the most "impenetrable parts of the woods and in "caves among the hills and rocks. The enemy "then ravaged the country and burnt the villages, "which very much distressed the Rājā's subjects; "whereupon they supplicated him to make peace,

"A treaty was begun and concluded on his stipulating to pay the Marāthās 2,000 rupees; and the Marāthās agreed to return some cattle which they had taken. I was well informed that this sum was considered merely in the light of a nominal tribute or acknowledgment of submission; for the Rājā had it not in his power to pay one rupee; and the Marāthās had agreed to let him off on his giving them five small horses, three bullocks and a female buffalo."*

80. The Gonds in the neighbourhood of the Lormi Hills were also in open rebellion. At Pondi, in the Uprorā *zamindāri* of the Bilāspur district, Blunt found a Bairāgi's dwelling in ruins. "On asking him the cause of it, he informed me that, about two months before, the Gonds had come in the night, had carried off all his property and, after killing as many of the inhabitants as came in their way, had set fire to the village; since which the inhabitants had only been able to bind a few reeds and straw together to shelter themselves from the weather. Upon asking him the cause of these depredations, he informed me that, ever since the Marāthās had attempted to subdue the Partābgarh† Gonds who inhabit the hills to the westward of Ratanpur, there had been a continual

The Gonds
of Partāb-
garh and
Lormi.

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 110-1. Writing on the 16th of January 1819 A.D., the first English Commissioner at Jubbulpore observes, "The *Zamindārs* of Korea and Chāng have, I believe, generally paid their revenue in horses and *tattus* but I hope it be found practicable to obtain it in a more convenient shape."

†Partābgarh was a former name of the estate held by the *Zamindār* of Pandariā—see Bilāspur District Gazetteer, p. 332.

“warfare between them. He added that the Gonds “were frequently moving about in large bodies “and never failed to commit depredations and to “plunder when opportunities offered; and he concluded by advising me to proceed on my journey “with caution. I inquired of him if it was practicable to proceed by any route from Pondi to “Amarkantak; to which he replied in the negative; “and expressed much surprise at my wishing to go “into a country which, he said, was the abode only “of wild beasts, demons and the savage Gonds.”* The Gonds, it is said, “were at this juncture more powerful than ever”; and no pilgrims had attempted to go to Amarkantak for some time.

Bastar.

81. In Bastar also conditions were very unsettled. Blunt, in conversation with Vithal Pandit, the Marāthā *Subahdār* of Ratanpur, “asked him if “the Marāthā government was not efficient there; “to which he replied that, for the last four or five “years, the Rājā [of Bastar] had paid no tribute: “that they had never had the entire possession of “the country; but, by continuing to pillage and “harass the Gonds, they had brought the Rājā to “acknowledge the Marāthā government and to “promise the payment of an annual tribute. That, “a few days before, a *Vakil* had arrived from Bastar “with 5,000 rupees which, at least, shewed an inclination to be on good terms.”† Blunt received

**Early European Travellers*, p. 119. Amarkantak, the reputed source of three rivers (the Nerbudda, the Son and the Johalā), was, and still is, a celebrated place of Hindu pilgrimage.

†*Ibid.* p. 121.

an even less favourable account of conditions in Bastar from the Rājā of Kānker. The Bastar Rājā, Daryāo Deo, and his son, Pirkishan Deo, were, according to this informant, "very treacherous and "powerful; having possession of a great extent of "country, divided into forty-eight *parganahs*. "Daryāo Deo, at the time of the decease of his "father, had three brothers, on two of whom he "had seized and, having put out their eyes, he still "kept them in confinement; but the third had "made his escape to Nāgpur. Many acts of the "most horrid treachery, which he had been guilty "of towards his own people, were then detailed to "me; and his only remaining relative who had "been subservient to his views, having lately been "plundered by him, had fled to avoid more dread- "ful consequences. Daryāo Deo had removed his "residence from Jagdalpur to a neighbouring hill "fort about five *kos* distant, called Keshlur, on "which he had secured himself against the "Marāthās, and paid them no more tribute than "he felt himself inclined to; on which account they "plundered his country and encouraged all the "*Zamindārs* in the neighbourhood of Bastar to do "the same and to wrest from him as much of his "territory as they could. Shām Singh [the Kānker "Rājā] next stated to me that, under such circum- "stances, I could not expect that Daryāo Deo "would pay much attention to my Marāthā *par-
wanah* and he was convinced that, if he did not "attack me openly, he would do it underhand by "means of the Jaipur Rājā."*

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 133-4.

**Pānābāras
and Māle-
wārā.**

82. Deterred by these unfavourable reports from his original intention of passing straight through Bastar to the sea coast, Captain Blunt decided to strike westward from Kānker towards Wairāgarh. The reception he got from the Gond Chiefs of Pānābāras (now in the Drug district) and of Mālewārā (now in the Palāsgarh *samindāri* of the Chāndā district) is thus described: "*April 12th* "[1795 A.D.].—We reached the Kānker Rājā's "frontier; and I had scarcely gone beyond it when "intelligence was brought me of a large body of "men being perceived posted in the jungle on our "left. On reconnoitering them, I found that they "had taken possession of a defile through which "the road led; that many of them had matchlocks "with their matches ready lighted; and the rest "were armed with spears, bows and arrows. Find- "ing us aware of them they did not advance; but "a man on horseback came forward and said that "he was deputed by the Rājā of Pānābāras to as- "certain who we were; but, on my showing him "the Kānker Rājā's paper, he returned to his party "who made way for us to pass them and, proceed- "ing, we soon reached Pānābāras. Here I per- "ceived the Rājā, seated on a rising ground gazing "at us, and immediately sent the Marāthā pass for "his inspection, to which although he shewed some "respect, he would not afford us grain nor provi- "sions of any kind; and in the most sullen manner "rejected all communication whatever. It was not "until our utmost entreaties had been made that "we could get guides from him; in which at length

“succeeding, I departed with much satisfaction
“from the inhospitable mansion of this Gond
“Chief. A march of 50 miles more in
“three days brought us to Mālewārā, the residence
“of another Gond Chief*. . . . Durug Shāh, the
“Rājā of Mālewārā, supplied us with a little rice;
“but, until I had sent the Marāthā pass for his
“inspection on the following day and demanded
“guides, he seemed to concern himself but little
“about us. The man whom I had deputed upon
“this service returned to inform me that, on his
“presenting the *parwānah*, the Gond Chief had
“thrown it down and spit upon it; and, when he
“remonstrated with him on this disrespectful con-
“duct towards the Rājā of Berar, he replied that
“he was not in Nāgpur and that he apprehended
“nothing from him. Of this unaccountable con-
“duct I took little notice at the time; but ordered
“my people to prepare for marching. Durug
“Shāh, perceiving our measures, came towards
“our encampment with a large retinue; when,
“everything being ready to move off the ground,
“I sent my *Munshī* [writer] to him, escorted by a
“*Naik* and six sepoy, with directions to shew him
“the pass once more and to caution him against any
“disrespect to it; for, notwithstanding the Rājā
“was absent from his capital, I should, on my
“arrival at Wairāgarh, lose no time in transmitting
“an account of the insult to the Marāthā officers
“who were in charge of the government. He

*Mālewārā was formerly a separate estate held by a branch of the Palāsgarh *Zamindār*'s family. *Vide Jenkins' Report of 1826*, p. 138, and *Temple's Report of 1863*, p. 47.

“seemed to be startled at the sight of the sepoys
 “and, as soon as the message was delivered to him,
 “he sent to request a conference with me to which
 “I assented. A man, called his *Diwān*, who spoke
 “a little bad Hindi, was the interpreter between
 “us. The result of our interview was that Durug
 “Shāh wanted a present from me: I told him
 “his inhospitable treatment did not merit it and
 “that I should give him none. At this he appeared
 “much offended; but, finding that his importunities
 “availed him nothing, he ordered three of his
 “Gonds to attend us as guides with whom we
 “immediately departed, leaving him no time to
 “waver or to countermand his orders.”*

**Bhopālpāt-
nam.**

83. Turning south again from Wairāgarh, Capt. Blunt attempted to penetrate into Bhopālpātnam (in the Bastar State) but was openly opposed by force and compelled to return. The country was described to him as “being very mountainous and “full of passes which are exceedingly steep: that “the only travellers who ever venture through “it are a few Banjārās, who experience the greatest “difficulties in their progress through these wild “regions: that the inhabitants are of a more savage “nature than any other of the Gond tribes, both “sexes going naked and living entirely upon the “produce of their woods: that even the people “in his [the informant’s] country, who by com- “munication with the Marāthās had become in “some degree civilized, eat grain only during “three months of the year and subsist on roots and

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 136—8.

“fruits during the remaining nine months
 “Even the Banjārās, who never ventured among
 “these Gonds until the most solemn protestations
 “of security were given, had in many instances
 “been plundered. The Berar Rājā, however, was
 “much indebted to these travelling merchants for
 “having conciliated and, in some degree, civilized
 “a number of those wild people: for the traffic
 “which they carry on among them, particularly
 “in salt and sugar, had introduced a taste for
 “luxuries which many of them now could not
 “easily dispense with. This had also induced them
 “to be more industrious in collecting the pro-
 “duce of their jungles such as lac, iron ore and
 “other articles for barter; and had necessitated
 “their affording protection to the Banjārās. In
 “the course of this traffic, which had now lasted
 “about twenty-five years, the desire of the Gonds
 “for salt and sugar had considerably increased
 “and tended more to their civilization than any
 “other means: for, before they had tasted or ac-
 “quired a relish for those articles, no man could
 “venture among them; and he assured me that
 “it had a more powerful effect than the whole
 “force of the Marāthā arms in rendering them
 “obedient to their government.”*

84. The preceding extracts will have conveyed some impression of the conditions prevailing in the outlying portions of the Nāgpur Rājā's dominions. I may now quote Blunt's description of the more open parts of the country which he

Open
country of
Chhat-
tisgarh.

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 151 and 153.

visited. Of Chhattisgarh he gives the following interesting account: "*March the 18th [1795 A.D.]*.—Having now rested five days at "Ratanpur, our journey was renewed with "fresh spirit through a champaign country, "abundantly watered with little rivers, full of vil- "lages and beautifully ornamented with groves "and tanks. After the difficulties we had encount- "ered the change of scene was truly gratifying; "and, the Marāthā government being well estab- "lished and the country highly cultivated,* we "met with civil treatment and abundance of every "species of grain. We travelled 100 miles "through it in little more than thirteen days which "brought us on the 31st March to Raipur, the next "principal town in Chhattisgarh but which, from "its population and commerce, might justly be "ranked the first. I computed about 3,000 huts "in it: there is also a large stone fort on the north- "east side of the town the walls of which are de- "cayed but the ditch is deep and wide. The soil "in this country is a rich black mould, but no- "where more than three feet in depth. It "produces large quantities of wheat and vegetable

*Colebrooke qualifies this generalization. He writes in 1799 A.D., "The whole province of Chhattisgarh is mountainous; "and, though some tracts are well cultivated, it is too remote "from great markets for its produce to find a profitable vent." And of the country on his line of march from Ratanpur through Takhtpur to Deokar he says, "The country is open "and, by comparison with other tracts which we traversed, "may be termed populous and well cultivated. But the waste "ground covered with grass and, in some places, with stunted "trees much exceeds the arable land." (*Early European Travellers*, pp. 200-1.)

"oil, such as the linseed and *palma christi*, and
 "various kinds of pulse. Rice is not abundant,*
 "it being only cultivated behind large reservoirs
 "of water collected in the rainy season in situations
 "where the declivity of the surface is suitable, and
 "through the dykes or embankments of which the
 "water is occasionally let out to supply the vegeta-
 "tion when the fall of rain from the atmosphere no
 "longer favours it.† Large quantities of grain
 "are exported from Chhattisgarh all over the
 "Nizām's dominions and even to the *Sarkārs* when
 "the scarcity in those provinces requires it.‡
 "From the latter they import salt, which is re-
 "tailed at such an extravagant price that it is some-
 "times sold for its weight in silver. The villages
 "are very numerous but poor; and the country

*But see p. 111 above where Leckie remarks that Chhattisgarh "may be styled, from its plentiful produce of rice, the Burdwan of these parts."

†Colebrooke adds in February 1799 A.D., "The industry of the peasant is employed in cultivating wheat, linseed, chiches, pigeon-peas, kidney-beans and tares. All these were now on the ground. Rice had been reaped in its season; and also maize, panic, Indian millet, and other sorts of grain. Some sugarcane, tobacco and safflowers were noticed near the villages. We here remarked with pleasure that the harvest is transported on carts from the field to the village. The same practice prevails near Nāgpur. It is unaccountable that it should be universally neglected in Bengal and in Hindostān. Scarcely a single plant of cotton was seen." (*Early European Travellers*, pp. 201-2.)

‡Colebrooke adds in 1799 A.D., "Chhattisgarh exports to Nāgpur rice and wheat by land and carriage . . . The other exports besides grain are oil, clarified butter, starch of *tikhor*, gum, lac, resin, wax and honey. We met carriers returning with unloaded cattle which, as they informed us, had conveyed resin and lac from Chhuri to Nāgpur. Another and more numerous party was returning with unloaded oxen to Mirzāpur. They had conveyed a very valuable adventure of silk." (*Early European Travellers* pp. 202-3.)

“abounds in cattle and brood mares of the *tattu*
“species. The population of Chhattisgarh is not
“great; nor does the system of government to which
“it is subject at all tend to increase it. The *subah*
“of Chhattisgarh with its dependencies was, at
“this time, rented by the Berar government to
“Vithal Pandit for a specific sum which was pay-
“able annually in Nāgpur; and who, in considera-
“tion of the rank of *Subahdār* and his appoint-
“ment, had likewise paid a considerable sum.
“Upon further inquiry as to the means by which
“the *Subahdār* managed the country, I was in-
“formed that he farmed different portions of it
“to his tenants [*i.e.* lessees of groups of villages]
“for a certain period and for specific sums; nearly
“upon the same terms as the whole was rented to
“him. The revenue is collected by his tenantry
“which, in those parts of the country where the
“government is well established, gives them little
“trouble. The attention of the *Subahdār* is chiefly
“directed to levying tribute from the *Zamindārs*
“in the mountainous parts of the country who,
“being always refractory and never paying anything
“until much time has been spent in warfare, the
“result is often precarious and tribute consequently
“trivial. I was next led to inquire what method
“was adopted by the tenantry in collecting the
“revenue from the peasants. They informed me
“that it invariably consisted in taxing the ploughs
“and was always delivered in the produce of the
“lands; as grain, oil or cotton, according to the
“species of cultivation for which the implements

“had been used.* This consequently occasions a
 “vast accumulation of the produce of the country
 “to the tenant; and some expedient becomes
 “immediately necessary to convert it into specie
 “to enable him to pay his rent. The insecurity
 “attending the traveller in his property and person
 “throughout most of the native governments of
 “India and the privilege, allowed to the *Zamindārs*,
 “of taxing the merchants who pass through their
 “districts are so discouraging to foreign traders that
 “they are rarely seen in the Marāthā territory
 “employed in any other line of traffic than that of
 “bringing for sale a few horses, elephants, camels
 “and shawls. All other branches of trade, both
 “in exports and imports, are under the immediate
 “management of subjects to the empire, under
 “whose protection likewise a numerous class of

*Colebrooke writing in 1799 A.D. gives this further information. “Grain is very cheap in this part of the province. “But the exactions of rent, if the peasants may be believed, “are exorbitant. According to information received from them “at Nawāgarh, Mungeli and other places, confirmed too by “subsequent inquiries at Nāgpur, the rents are here regulated “by the number of ploughs: and no land measure of any kind “is employed or even known. Four oxen are allowed for “each plough; and a tax is levied at rates varying between “ten and sixteen rupees for the plough. Near Nāgpur the “rate of the tax is more considerable but is regulated in the “same manner. . . . In answer to enquiries concerning the “produce of land tilled by one plough the peasants at Nawā- “garh stated the quantity of seed sown at 4 measures and the “produce at 60. The measure contains about 100 avoirdupois “pounds.” (*Early European Travellers*, pp. 202-3.) If the seed sown were rice at 60 lbs. per acre the rent at Rs. 10 per 400 lbs. of seed sown would fall at the rate of Rs. 1-8-0 per acre. The passage in the text is of special interest as proving beyond doubt the ubiquitous existence of a *raiyyatwāri* assessment in Chhattisgarh in pre-British days. See the present writer's *Bilāspur Zamindāri Settlement Report* (1912), para 29

“people, called Banjārās, carry on a continual
“traffic in grain and every other necessary of life.
“By these the largest armies are frequently sup-
“plied: but, although much inland commerce is
“carried on in this way, it derives very little en-
“couragement from any regulations of the Marāthā
“government as to the improvement of roads or
“anything to animate it; and it is chiefly upheld
“by the necessity they are under of converting the
“produce of the lands into specie; the Banjārās
“purchasing the grain at a moderate rate from the
“*Zamindārs* and retailing it again in those parts of
“the country where the poverty of the soil or a
“temporary scarcity may offer a ready market.
“Accordingly we find the Banjārā persevering
“through roads which nothing but the most in-
“defatigable spirit of industry could induce him to
“attempt and where the straitness of the paths
“and defiles barely affords a passage for himself
“and his bullocks. The Marāthās keep their
“peasantry in the most abject state of dependence,
“by which means, they allege, the ryots are less
“liable to be turbulent or offensive to the govern-
“ment. Coin is but sparingly circulated among
“them; and they derive their habitations and sub-
“sistence from the labour of their own hands.
“Their troops, who are chiefly composed of emi-
“grants from the northern and western parts of
“Hindostān, are quartered upon the tenantry who,
“in return for the accommodation and subsistence
“they afford them, require their assistance, when-
“ever it may be necessary, for collecting the

“revenues. Such was the state of the country and
 “government of Chhattisgarh; the exports of which,
 “in seasons of plenty, are said to employ 100,000
 “bullocks; and it is accordingly one of the most
 “productive provinces under the Berar Rājā.”*

85. Of Wairāgarh Captain Blunt writes as follows.—“April 17th [1795 A.D.].—Our journey was
 “continued, without any remarkable occurrence,
 “through the hills and jungles to within nine miles
 “of Wairāgarh, where we arrived this day. This
 “place was formerly annexed to Chāndā; and the
 “country still bears that name though they are now
 “separate *subahdāris*. Bishan Pandit was, at this
 “time, *Subahdār* of Wairāgarh and had rented the
 “country for a specific period by contract. The
 “government was much of the same nature as that
 “I had met with in Chhattisgarh. Wairāgarh is
 “considered by the Marāthās as a large town and
 “may consist of about three hundred tiled and
 “thatched houses. It has a stone fort on the north-
 “west side, close under the east face of which runs
 “the Kobrāgarhi which winds round the south-
 “west side of the town and, being joined by another
 “small river, takes a north-westerly course and falls
 “into the Wain or Bān Gangā. Wairāgarh appear-
 “ed to be a place of some traffic. I found here
 “large bodies of Banjārās from all parts of Chhattis-
 “garh and some from the *Sarkhārs*. The trade
 “seemed to consist chiefly of cotton, which is
 “brought from the north-west parts of Berar and

Wairāgarh
 and Chāndā.

“Chhattisgarh. This is taken up by traders from
“the *Sarkārs* who, in exchange for it, give salt,
“betel, and cocoanuts : and I understood that from
“this cotton the most beautiful cloths in the North-
“ern *Sarkārs* are manufactured. The long
“marches we had made through the hills
“and jungles from Kānker having harassed us a
“good deal, I resolved to rest a day at this place ;
“as well with a view to gain information of the
“country before us as to recover from our fatigues.
“I found the Kānker Rājā’s information concerning
“the Bastar country, and that at this place I should
“fall in with a high road leading from Nāgpur to
“Masulipatam, very accurate. The Marāthā gov-
“ernment being also well established at Wairāgarh,
“the greatest attention was paid to my pass and I
“received every civility and attention in conse-
“quence of it. . . . General alarm seemed to
“have pervaded the whole of the Berar Rājā’s sub-
“jects throughout Chāndā in consequence of the
“Marāthā war with the Nizām;* and, the armies
“being upon the point of coming to battle, a multi-
“tude of apprehensions had been excited ; and
“various reports were already circulated as to the
“issue of it. Immense quantities of grain had been
“sent from Chāndā to supply the Marāthā army ;
“and I found it was increased in price near 200 per
“cent dearer than it had been in Chhattisgarh, rice
“being sold here at sixteen seers for a rupee.
“Nāgpur is not more than seventy miles from
“Wairāgarh in a north-westerly direction. . . .

"The soil in Chanda appears sandy and the produce
"is chiefly rice with small quantities of pulse and
"sugarcane. Numerous herds of the finest goats
"and sheep are bred in this part of the country."*

86. After some further adventures Captain Blunt reached Rajahmundry in safety on the 24th of May 1795 A.D. He thus concludes his narrative—"The due southing in this journey was little
"more than eight degrees; but the circuitous wind-
"ings we were obliged to take to penetrate through
"the country had increased the whole distance to
"1,125 British miles. The hard service which the
"cattle had endured had reduced them so low
"that a fourth part were now too much exhausted
"to recover and perished. Two of my *Harkārās*
"[peons] had been cut off by the Gonds; which,
"with four followers attached to the sepoys, was
"the whole loss our party had sustained; and, con-
"sidering the difficult nature of the service, it was
"as little as could be expected. Indeed, the utter
"impossibility of any individual escaping who
"might leave the party had necessitated the utmost
"precaution and indefatigable exertions of the
"whole for our mutual preservation; and in many
"situations of difficulty I was infinitely obliged to
"them for that zealous support and attachment
"which were productive of so fortunate and success-
"ful a termination to our toils."†

End of
Blunt's
journey.

**Early European Travellers*, pp. 139—141.

†*Ibid.*, pp. 173-4.

CHAPTER IX.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE NĀGPUR STATE IN 1800 A.D.

**Raghoji's
early policy.**

87. The closing years of the 18th century witnessed a considerable expansion of Raghoji's dominions towards the north; and, before sketching the geography of his kingdom, the circumstances which led to this expansion may be explained. The weak position which Raghoji inherited from his father, Mudhoji, rendered him of secondary political consequence compared with Mahādji Sindia and kept him, in the early years of his reign, in a condition of unwilling dependence upon Nānā Pharnavis. As a result, jealousy of these other Marāthā powers was, at first, the chief motive which inspired his policy. He evaded, as we have seen, taking any serious part in the confederacies against Tipu;* he deliberately encouraged the appearance of friendly relations with the British; and he even entered into a treaty with the Nizām to assist him in the event of Hyderabad being attacked by the central Marāthā power at Poona.

**He profits
from the
Marāthā
combina-
tion against
the Nizām.**

88. But the death of Mahādji Sindia in 1794 A.D. left Nānā Pharnavis without a rival; and Raghoji, impelled, no doubt, by that common instinct in Indian politics which Hastings had noticed, whereby "every State wishes to associate itself with that

*See paras. 67 and 74.

power which has a decided superiority,"* was at once inclined to return to a more natural allegiance. When, therefore, he was called upon by Nānā Pharnavis to furnish his contingent of troops in operations which were now preparing against the Nizām, he had no hesitation in disregarding his treaty obligations to the weaker party. In February 1795 A.D. he joined the *Peshwā's* army at Ahmadnagar with about 12,000 cavalry, 6,000 infantry and 15 guns;† and, at the battle of Khardā on the 11th of March, Raghoji Bhonsle's rockets and Daulat Rāo Sindia's artillery mainly contributed to the Nizām's defeat. Raghoji obtained his full share of the fruits of victory. By a separate agreement the Nizām ceded him territory yielding three *lākhs* of rupees in lieu of Raghoji's claims for *ghās dānā* in Gangāhari, estimated at 3½ *lākhs* annually.‡ He also promised to pay arrears due to Raghoji amounting to 29 *lākhs* of rupees and to respect the ancient usage in collecting his share of the revenues of Berar.§ From the Nānā too Raghoji received his reward. He accompanied that Minister to Poona where, completely secured in his interest, he remained throughout the rains.

*See p. 79 above.

†Grant Duff (II, p. 283) says 15,000 horse and foot.

‡See pp. 24 and 43 above. Lyall (*Gazetteer of Berar*, p. 170) writes "After the memorable battle of Khardā, fought in 1795 A.D. between the Nizām and the *Peshwā*, the *parganah* of Lonār along with Sindkher and others was ceded by the Nizām to the *Peshwā* and made over to the Bhonsle as *ghās dānā*."

§Grant Duff, II, p. 287.

He was then dismissed with great honour, obtaining permission to occupy Hoshangābād and receiving new *sanads* for further territory, also south of the Nerbudda, comprising among other places Chaurāgarh, Bachai and Palohā in the modern Narsinghpur district.* During his stay at Poona Raghoji II raised some infantry and procured muskets of inferior quality from Bombay. On the 17th of October 1795 A.D. he marched from Poona viā Koregāon and Bāsim for Nāgpur.

Raghoji is
granted
Garha-
Mandlā.

89. Eight days after Raghoji's departure Mādhav Rāo, the young *Peshwā*, was killed, accidentally it is supposed, by a fall from a balcony in his house at Poona. His death had far-reaching consequences for Nānā Pharnavis who had been Mādhav Rāo's Minister for the whole of that young man's life. In the prolonged and confusing intrigues which followed Nānā Pharnavis retained Raghoji's support and, when he emerged triumphant, handsomely rewarded the Marāthā for his assistance. Raghoji received 15 *lākhs* of rupees for his immediate expenses and, what was far more, obtained sanction to occupy the long-coveted province of Garha-Mandlā. Three thousand horse, which by treaty Raghoji was bound to furnish when required, were now only to be called up in an emergency. These articles of agreement were duly fulfilled in July 1797 A.D.†

Extension
of Raghoji's
possessions

90. During the following two years Raghoji obtained possession of Garha-Mandlā and of the

*See p. 143 below.

†Grant Duff, II, pp. 310 and 314.

southern bank of the Nerbudda as far west as the Ganjāl river. Chaurāgarh was occupied in February 1799 A.D. The forts of Tezgarh and Mandlā were surrendered by the Chief of Saugor in November of the same year, in recompense for aid afforded him by the Nāgpur troops against an invasion of the famous freebooter, Amir Khān. Dhāmoni, a strong fort detached from the Garha-Mandlā territories and now in the Saugor district, was obtained by cession from a Lodhi Rājput who had taken it from the Bundelās. Hoshangābād had previously been taken from the *Nawāb* of Bhopāl in 1796 A.D. At the close of the 18th century it only remained for Raghoji to settle these newly acquired districts.*

91. Raghoji was at this time at the zenith of his prosperity; and a brief survey of the Nāgpur territories, which had now reached their maximum extension, will not be out of place. The kingdom consisted in 1800 A.D. of the following subdivisions:—

along the
Nerbudda.

Detail of
the Nāgpur
territories
in 1800 A. D.

I.—The province of Deogarh, revenue about ...	30	<i>lākhs</i>
II.—The province of Garha-Mandlā, revenue about ...	14	„
III.—The districts of Hoshangābād (with Seoni-Mālwa) and Chaurāgarh, revenue about ...	7	„
IV.—The district of Multai, revenue about ...	2	„
V.—The forts of Gāwilgarh and Narnālā, revenue, including receipts from all the rest of Berar, about ...	30	„
VI.—The province of Orissa and its dependencies, revenue about ...	17	„
VII.—The province of Chāndā, revenue about ...	5	„
VIII.—The province of Chhattisgarh and its dependencies including Sargujā, Sambalpur, Bastar, Kānkār and Kālāhandī, revenue about ...	6	„

*Jenkins, pp. 62-3. Grant's Gazetteer of the C. P. says Dhāmoni was acquired in 1802. For Hoshangābād see p. 142 below.

The total revenue was thus about 111 *lākhs* of rupees.*

Deogarh.

92. I. *The province of Deogarh*.—This area corresponded with the territories formerly held by the Rāj-Gond ruler whom the Marāthās retained as a pensioner. Attached to Deogarh were the petty chiefships, too numerous to detail, now known as the *jāgirs* of Chhindwārā and the *zamindāris* of Bhandārā and Bālāghāt. The most important of the former class was Harrai and of the latter Kāmthā. Other Chiefs attached to Deogarh were the *Jāgirdār* of Seoni and those known as the *khalauti Zamindārs* (Khairāgarh, Nāndgaon, Chhuikhadān, etc.). The former was a feudatory directly under the Nāgpur Rājā.† The *khalauti Zamindārs*, on the other hand, were controlled by an officer (*Āmil*) whose headquarters were at Lānji.

Garha-Mandlā.

93. II. *Garha-Mandlā*.—This old Rāj-Gond kingdom had been occupied by the Chief of Saugor about 1781 A.D.‡ “Twenty-five or thirty years have

* These revenue figures are, for the most part, taken from a despatch written by Jenkins on the 18th of July 1816 A.D. Assessments were heavily increased in the latter half of Raghoji's reign; but there were many indirect methods of raising revenue (e.g., by *nazarānās*); and the recognized assessment of 1816 A.D. may, in the absence of other information, be accepted as indicating the Raja's total receipts about 1800 A.D. Jenkins (*Report of 1826*, p. 64) himself says “Raghoji's territories before the war yielded a revenue of about one crore”, but he does not say whether this figure included the receipts from Vyankoji's appanage or not.

† Colebrooke writes of him, “This nobleman, the head of a numerous clan of Pathāns settled on his *jāgir*, maintains the princely state of a grand feudatory and, like an ancient baron in the feudal days of Europe, renders military service to the paramount.” (*Early European Travellers*, p. 212.)

‡ See p. 100 above.

elapsed," writes Colebrooke in 1801 A.D., "since
 "this conquest; and the provinces of Garha and
 "Mandlā continued dependent on Saugor, paying
 "hōwever a quit-rent to the Bhonsle, until the
 "present Raghoji obtained from the court of Poona
 "a recognition of his right to take possession of the
 "province. The Chieftain of Saugor did not readi-
 "ly acquiesce in the *Peshwā's* award; but Ragho-
 "ji's forces found little difficulty in wresting from
 "him the open country and in reducing
 "some petty posts. Two years ago, being
 "oppressed by an army of marauders which
 "was headed by Amir Khān, a famous par-
 "tisan, the Chief of Saugor yielded the fort of
 "Mandlā as the price of the aid which he solicited
 "from the Bhonsle. The whole province is now
 "completely reduced; a brigade of ill-disciplined
 "infantry and another of horse remain to protect,
 "or to oppress, the country; and the whole
 "authority, civil and military, is entrusted to a
 "*Subahdār* who is invested with the highest
 "honours of the State, the privilege of a flag made
 "of gold brocade [*sari patkā*]. The office is
 "now held by a venerable old gentleman whose
 "grave demeanour and mild countenance are the
 "promise of a gentle administration."* As ex-
 "plained in Chapter II, Garha-Mandlā, originally
 "conquered by Raghoji I, was wrested from him by
 "the *Peshwā* in 1742 A.D. It was the unceasing am-
 "bition of the Nāgpur Rājās to recover possession of
 "this adjoining tract, which they only succeeded in
 "securing just before the close of the century.

**Early European Travellers*, p. 216.

Hoshang-
ābād and
Chaurāgarh.

94. III. *Hoshangābād (with Seoni-Mālhwā) and Chaurāgarh.*—Of Hoshangābād Jenkins wrote as follows in 1811 A.D., “This fort had been built “by the Pathāns of Bhopāl on a territory “which was granted them by the Gond Rājās “of Deogarh as a military *jāgir*. On this “ground, as a pretence of right and from “its being of so much importance as a frontier “fortress, Raghoji and his successors, Jānoji and “Mudhoji, made many unsuccessful efforts to wrest “it from the Bhopāl *Nawāhs*; but it was reserved “for the present Rājā [Raghoji II] to obtain possession of so valuable a station. This was accomplished in 1799 by a capitulation and a treaty, “never ratified by the Rājā, fixing the Nerbudda “as the future boundary of the respective States “of Nāgpur and Bhopāl.”* Though this agreement was subsequently violated—Hoshangābād changing hands several times in consequence—it will suffice for our present purpose to treat the Nerbudda as the northern boundary of the Nāgpur dominions in this quarter. The tract attached to Hoshangābād and Seoni-Mālhwā was bounded on the west by the Ganjāl river.

Chaurāgarh and its neighbourhood passed into Raghoji II's possession about the same time. In October 1796 A.D., when at Poona, he was dismissed with great honour, Grant Duff tells us, “receiving new *sanads* for a portion of territory, lying on

*Despatch to the Government at Fort William, dated the 9th of December 1811. In his *Report of 1826* (p. 62) Jenkins says Hoshangābād was taken by storm in 1796 and this is confirmed by Elphinstone. See p. 258 below.

“the south side of the Nerbudda, which had been originally assigned to his grandfather by Bālāji Bāji Rāo in 1750; but twelve of the districts [Chaurāgarh, Bachai, Palohā, Rāmgārh, etc.,] had not yet been conquered from the Chiefs who in the confusion that followed the decline of the Mogul empire had become independent.”* This area seems to have roughly corresponded with the modern Narsinghpur district. The revenue of the whole of Raghoji’s possessions along the south bank of the Nerbudda, exclusive of Garha-Mandlā, was about seven *lākhs* of rupees.

95. IV. *Multai*.—The district of Multai roughly corresponded with the present Betul district *plus* a portion of the present Hoshangābād district. The details of the fiscal history of this tract are preserved in an old record in the Nāgpur Secretariat.† It was held by a *Subahdār* of the name of Sen Bālā Hazāri from 1776 to 1780 A.D. and the country flourished and paid a revenue of two *lākhs* of rupees. It continued as a single administrative unit, but in different hands, till 1792 A.D. when it was divided up among a number of holders.

*Grant Duff, II, p. 290. Jenkins (*Report of 1826*, p. 62) states that these districts had been withheld from Nāgpur through the influence of Sindia. This is a much more probable explanation of their exclusion from the Nāgpur State than that given by Grant Duff.

†*Sketch of the history of the Bhonsle family* (1811), pp. 30–33. The district consisted of 21 *mahāls*, viz., Multai, Pattan, Aṣṭā, Sālbardi, Māsod, Sainkherā, Pauni, Māndwi, Atnair, Sātnair, Betul, Dhaul, Āmlā, Bhāwargarh, Zamāni, Nandarwārā, Jāmgārh, Seoni, Bābai, Bordhā and Bhainsdehi.

There were no chiefships in this neighbourhood. The only important estate formerly of this character was Sāoligarh which was reduced by Jānoji in 1768 A.D.

**Gāwilgarh
and Nar-
nālā.**

96. *V. Gāwilgarh and Narnālā.*—These two famous fortresses and the districts immediately dependent on them were occupied by Raghoji I in 1751 A.D. Thereafter Gāwilgarh was his and his successors' chief stronghold. This retention by the Nāgpur State of a narrow strip of country between the Nizām's territory of Berar and Sindia's possessions in Nimār is explained by the character of the inhabitants. In 1775 A.D. the Nizām succeeded in compelling Mudhoji Bhonsle to surrender Gāwilgarh and Narnālā. Nevertheless these forts were subsequently restored to Mudhoji when the Nizām came to Ellichpur on the condition that he kept in order the wild tribes of the Sātpurā hills.* It would appear from the arrangements made after the peace of Deogāon in 1803 A.D. that a certain tract of country below, and around, these forts was attached to them for their maintenance. This remained under the Nāgpur Rājā's undivided authority and was not included in the *do-amli* area of Berar.† We have no record of the separate revenue derived from the country round Gāwilgarh and Narnālā. But Raghoji's whole revenue from Berar may have been about 30 *lāks* of rupees.

*See p. 45 above and also p. 244 below.

†This tract is nowhere defined till after 1803 A.D.—see footnote ¶ to p. 184 below.

97. VI. *Orissa and its dependencies*.—Orissa Orissa. proper consisted of the three modern districts of Balasore, Cuttack and Puri, lying on the sea coast between the Subanrekḥā river, dividing Orissa from Bengal, and the Chilkā lake, dividing Orissa from the Northern *Sarkārs*. Away from the coast stretched a wild tract of country, known to the early British administrators as the tributary *mahāls* of Orissa. These were at this time (1800 A.D.) feudatory States subordinate to the Nāgpur government—the most important among them being Morbhanj, Keunjhar, Dhenkanāl, Angul and Daspallā. On the Mahānadi between the two last-mentioned estates lay the famous Barmul pass—the key of Orissa.* This province was administered by the Nāgpur Rājā through an officer described as Governor by Motte but properly called *Subahdār*. The character of his tenure has been noticed already in a quotation from Leckie's journal.† Orissa yielded, according to Forster, a revenue of 17 *lākhs* of rupees.‡

The six areas so far mentioned—namely, I. Deogarh, II. Garha-Mandlā, III. Hoshangābād and Chaurāgarh, IV. Multai, V. Gāwilgarh and Narnālā and VI. Orissa—comprised the territories directly under the Nāgpur Rājā. They yielded him a revenue of about 70 *lākhs* of rupees; besides which he drew, probably, 30 *lākhs* as his share of

*See p. 108 above.

†See p. 107 above.

‡See p. 97 above. Leckie says 10 *lākhs* (see p. 107 above).

**Vyankoji's
appanage**

the revenue of Berar. The remaining areas now to be noticed, consisting of VII. Chāndā and VIII. Chhattisgarh with Sargujā, Sambalpur, Bastar, Kānker and Kālāhandi, formed the appanage of Vyankoji, the Rājā's brother, and yielded him a revenue of about 11 *lākhs* of rupees.

Chāndā.

98. VII. *The province of Chāndā.*—This province roughly corresponded with the Chāndā district of the present day with the addition of the chiefships of Aundhi, Korāchā, Pānābāras and Ambāgarh Chauki, now included in the Drug district, and of the fort and district of Mānikdrug now in the Nizām's dominions. Chāndā was, on the death of Raghoji I, allotted as an appanage to Mudhoji, under whom it remained until his death in 1788 A.D. except for a brief interval, in 1775 A.D., when Chāndā and Mānikdrug with Gāwilgarh and Narnālā were surrendered to the Nizām.* It was then given with Chhattisgarh to Vyankoji, the youngest brother of Raghoji II. But, as Vyankoji did not, or was not allowed to, enter upon separate possession of either of these territories, they were administered by *Subahdārs* on his behalf. Jenkins writes of Chandā, "Before the Marāthā war of 1803 "the country was in a flourishing state. The trade "with the coast was a considerable source of "revenue. Great quantities of salt and cocoanuts "were imported and cotton exported. Coarse "cloths, called *khādi*, were sent in great quantities "to Berar and found their way even to Bombay and

*See p. 45 above.

“Arabia In 1213 (1803-4) the town of “Chāndā had 5,000 houses.”* Wairāgarh is described by Captain Blunt as a separate *subahdāri* from that of Chāndā but was usually regarded as forming a part of it. The revenue which Vyankoji drew from Chāndā was about five *lākhs* of rupees.

99. VIII. *The province of Chhattisgarh.*—^{Chhattisgarh.} Chhattisgarh or “the 36 forts” included, properly speaking, only the open country around and between the two chief towns of Ratanpur and Raipur, together with a number of minor adjacent chiefships (Pendṛā, Kendā, Lāphā, Mātin, Uprorā, Chhuri and Korbā in the north, known collectively as the Sātgarh, and Sonākhān, Bhatgāon, Bilaigarh, Katgi, Kauriā, Birkoni, Suarmār and Narrā in the south, known collectively as the Khondwān *zamindāris*.)† The major dependencies of Chhattisgarh were (1) Sargujā, (2) Sambalpur, (3) Bastar, Kānker and Kālāhandi, each under its own feudatory Chief. After the death of Raghoji I Chhattisgarh and its dependencies were recognized as the appanage of his youngest son Bimbāji. Though nominally subordinate to the Rājā at Nāgpur, Bimbāji was to a large extent independent, with a separate Court and household at Ratanpur, separate ministers and a separate army.‡ On his death without issue in 1787 A.D. he was succeeded in the appanage by Chinnāji, the younger brother

*Jenkins' Report, p. 108.

†Ibid., p. 134.

‡See p. 41 above.

of Raghoji II, whom Bimbāji had adopted. But Chimnāji never seems to have taken up the duties of his station at Ratanpur.* When he died in 1789 A.D. Chhattisgarh was conferred on Vyankoji, the youngest of the brothers of Raghoji II. Vyankoji too never entered regularly on the government of Chhattisgarh; and the country was, in consequence, farmed out on his behalf to a succession of Governors or Agents, known as *Subahdārs*. It is this system of administration through a *Subahdār* of which Blunt has given an account in his narrative of 1795 A.D. already quoted.† The revenue of Chhattisgarh, excluding the major dependencies now to be noticed, was about five *lākhs* of rupees.

Sargujā. 100. *Sargujā*.—The territory of Sargujā consisted at this time of the three estates of Sargujā proper, Udaipur and Jāshpur. About 1760 A.D. it was overrun by a Marāthā army and the Chief was compelled to acknowledge himself a tributary of the Nāgpur State. “That government, however, “cannot be said to have ever taken actual possession of, or obtained efficient authority over, the “wild tract in question. A general acknowledgment of its sovereignty, the payment of a tribute “of Rs. 3,000 and the maintenance of the security “of the high road from Mirzāpur, Benares and “Gaya to the capital of Nāgpur were the only “proofs of obedience and submission expected from “the Rājā of Sargujā; and his punctuality in the

*See p. 94 above.

†See p. 130 above.

“fulfilment of these obligations appears to have secured him against all interference in the internal management of his estate.”* Colebrooke wrote in 1799 A.D. “Sargujā, situated in the midst of mountains, is naturally strong. It could not indeed resist the power of the government of Berar; but the inhabitants of Sargujā, without facing the Marāthā troops, would abandon their huts and seek refuge, as they had formerly done on similar occasions, in the recesses of the forest. The complete subjugation of the country might be ultimately effected but at a greater cost than the conquest is worth. Annual tribute and the acknowledgment of subjection, but with imperfect obedience, are for this reason accepted by the Rājā of Berar, or rather by his brother on whose principality it is dependent.”† Udaipur and Jāshpur were separate large estates subordinate, and each paying Rs. 1,000 as tribute, to the Rājā of Sargujā. The latter maintained a small army of some 500 horse and 700 or 800 foot, composed of immigrant troops from Hindostān. I have not mentioned Korea and Chāng Bhakhār. These estates at one time acknowledged the suzerainty of the Rājā of Sargujā; but in the first clear reference to them, in 1819 A.D., they are found attached to Sohāgpur (a district of the Riwā State) which was only made liable to the Marāthā *chauth* in 1801 A.D. and occupied by Raghoji II’s officers in 1808 A.D.

*Major Roughsedge’s *Report on the State of Sargujā and its dependencies in 1818*, paras. 3 and 4. This report throws much light on the conditions prevailing in these remote estates a century ago.

†*Early European Travellers*, p. 195.

In Bimbāji's time demands for *ghās dānā* from Sohāḡpur were unsuccessful; but Korea was compelled to pay tribute to the *Subahdār* of Chhattisgarh.* I would therefore, include Korea in the Nāḡpur dominions as they stood in 1800 A.D. but would exclude Chāḡ Bhakhār.

ambalpur. 101. *Sambalpur*.—East of Chhattisgarh lay the territory of Sambalpur which consisted of the following chiefships:—(1) Sambalpur, (2) Sonpur, (3) Sārāḡarh, (4) Raigārh, (5) Bargarh, (6) Sakti, (7) Rehrākhol, (8) Bāmra, (9) Bonai, (10) Gāḡpur, (11) Patnā, (12) Bindrā-Nawāḡarh, (13) Khariār, (14) Phuljhar and (15) Borāsāmbār. These at one time had formed a loose confederacy—the first ten estates being grouped under Sambalpur and the remaining five under Patnā. Under the Marāthās they all formed part of the appanage of the relative of the Nāḡpur Rājā to whom Chhattisgarh was allotted. Marāthā control was, however, more nominal than real. Sambalpur was ready to defy Jānoji's troops in 1766 A.D., was insubordinate in 1781 A.D.† and was altogether independent in 1788 A.D.‡ But, Raghoji was more fortunate than his predecessors. Writing on the 6th of April 1800 A.D. Colebrooke says, "Intelligence was yesterday received that the fort of Sambalpur has been surprised by the Rājā of Berar's troops and taken with little resistance. This occurrence has been deemed of sufficient magnitude to be announced

*See pp. 120-1 above.

†See pp. 38 and 73 above.

‡See p. 96 above.

"by a salute which was yesterday fired from the
 "park of artillery. Sambalpur was the principal
 "fortress of a Chief of mountaineers, who takes
 "his title from that place and who holds an exten-
 "sive tract of country between Chhattisgarh and
 "Cuttack. He was nominally subject to this gov-
 "ernment, but did almost maintain independency
 "and only paid small tribute very irregularly.
 "Governing a numerous tribe of hardy mountain-
 "eers and possessing such a stronghold as Sambal-
 "pur, he had been hitherto able to elude the power
 "of the Rājā of Berar : and all attempts to subdue
 "his country had invariably failed. The reduction
 "of his strongest fortress will, it is thought, be now
 "followed by his speedy submission and by the full
 "establishment of the Marāthā authority through-
 "out his territories. The sudden attack which has
 "been thus successful was not preconceived.
 "Chandāji Bhonsle, an officer of the Rājā's troops,
 "being in the neighbourhood, strayed with two
 "rocketmen into the forest of bamboo canes which
 "surrounds the fort and, coming unexpectedly
 "upon it, found it carelessly guarded and remarked
 "that the wall had fallen into the ditch in one
 "place. He wantonly threw a rocket into the fort
 "by which the thatched buildings it contains were
 "accidently set on fire. Observing that the garri-
 "son was busied in endeavouring to extinguish the
 "fire without suspecting the occasion of it, Chandā-
 "ji sent for troops from the camp who arrived in
 "time to surprise the fort. They made themselves
 "masters of it and put the garrison to the sword.
 "Should this success be followed by the complete

“reduction of the country belonging to the Chief
 “of Sambalpur it must certainly be considered as
 “an important event to the Rājā of Berar, since
 “the strength of his dominions will be much in-
 “creased by thus connecting different parts of them
 “which were, in a manner, cut off from each other,
 “while an almost independent Chief occupied an
 “intermediate extensive tract of country.”*

Bastar,
 Kanker and
 Kālāhandi.

102. *Bastar, Kanker and Kālāhandi.*—These chiefships were loosely attached to the Nāgpur dominions. They were frequently in open rebellion; but the Nāgpur Rājās were able to secure an irregular tribute from them or, at least, an admission of liability to military service. The areas included in Bastar and Kālāhandi were, presumably, much the same as they are to-day. Kanker, however, is now reduced in extent having formerly included the tract round Dhamtari. The whole revenue derived by Vyankoji from the immense area comprised in Sambalpur, Bastar, Kālāhandi and Kanker did not exceed one *lākh* of rupees.

*Colebrooke's despatch No. 32, dated Nāgpur, the 6th of April 1800, to the Governor-General.

CHAPTER X.

COLEBROOKE'S DESPATCHES OF 1799 TO 1801 A.D.

103. I now turn to a narrative of the events which led up to the second Marāthā War and to the reduction of Nāgpur to a position of political dependence on the British government. It is, however, not possible in this brief sketch to give more than an outline of the negotiations which preceded the outbreak of hostilities with Raghoji.

104. Sir John Shore, who succeeded Lord Cornwallis in 1793 A.D., had, by his weak administration and, in particular, by his refusal to assist the Nizām in 1795 A.D., added greatly to the strength both of the Nāgpur State and of the other "Country Powers." Richard Wellesley, who took over the office of Governor-General from Shore in May 1798 A.D., quickly realized the dangers of inaction in the face of French intrigue and the avowed hostility of Tipu. He, therefore, at once prepared for war and, at the same time, opened negotiations with a view to an alliance with the Nizām and the Nāgpur Rājā against Tipu and Daulat Rāo Sindia. In furtherance of this scheme Henry Thomas Colebrooke, the famous orientalist who had come out to India in 1783 A.D., was pressed into the diplomatic service and sent to Nāgpur, where he arrived on the 18th of March 1799 A.D.

Lord Wellesley succeeds Sir John Shore.

**Colebrooke,
Resident at
Nāgpur.**

105. Colebrooke was ill-suited to the task before him or, as his son and biographer puts it, to "a department so uncongenial to his turn of mind and tastes as the diplomatic"; and he seems to have found much difficulty in fathoming the simple motives which inspired Raghoji's policy. At first all seemed to go well. Colebrooke reported that he believed Raghoji to be "sincerely attached to the British Government" and "well disposed to a treaty of defensive alliance in the terms of the Governor-General's instructions." Raghoji's Ministers assured him that "a treaty between the two States was highly gratifying to the Rājā and the very thing he most wished." Colebrooke, however, had not been at Nāgpur for many weeks when news was received of the fall of Seringapatam on the 7th of May 1799 A.D. and of the final overthrow of Tipu. Thereafter the Governor-General's interest in the Nāgpur negotiations flagged; and for nearly a year Colebrooke was left without instructions. Raghoji, whose main interest in Colebrooke's mission was, probably, to secure for himself the consequence he derived from the presence of a British envoy at Nāgpur, meanwhile kept Colebrooke amused by professing readiness to continue the negotiations whenever they might be reopened. In October Colebrooke writes of "the Rājā's solicitude to conclude a treaty of alliance" and speaks of "daily enquiries" as to whether instructions to proceed with the negotiations had been received. Nānā Pharnavis died in March 1800 A.D. and Colebrooke reported that "it seems highly probable that he (Raghoji) now looks to a treaty of alliance

with the British Government as the only pledge of his future safety."

106. At last on the 16th of April 1800 A.D. the Governor-General issued orders to renew the negotiations at Nāgpur. Colebrooke, on receiving these instructions, reported that he had no doubt that the Nāgpur Rājā was "sincerely anxious to be admitted to an alliance with the Company." Yet the most cursory examination of the terms now offered by the Governor-General might have shown him that their acceptance by Raghoji was most unlikely. The form of a triple alliance between Nāgpur, the Nizām and the Company was maintained; but a condition of the new proposal was the establishment of a British subsidiary force in the Nāgpur territories which would have at once transferred the military control of the country to the British and made Nāgpur no more than a tributary State. It was impossible for Raghoji to subscribe to an alliance which would at once deprive him in his relations with Fort William of that independence which he had only recently secured in his relations with Poona. Practical, if not theoretical, autonomy had, throughout their history, been for the Marāthā rulers of the Nāgpur State the ultimate goal of all their policy; and it should have been obvious to Colebrooke that nothing but the most imminent fear of political annihilation would have made Raghoji consent to hand over the military control of his country to the British. Moreover, a treaty involving such a political submission was the less likely to prove palatable to

Proposal
for a sub-
sidiary
alliance.

Raghoji at a time when his military strength, territorial sovereignty and revenue resources had all recently expanded. His State was more powerful than it had ever been since the death of Raghoji the Great. Nevertheless Colebrooke wrote in May 1800 A.D., "The Rājā's undisguised eagerness to "become the ally of the Company affords me ground "for the hope that I shall not find it difficult to "obtain his cheerful acquiescence in the condition "which will be annexed to the proposed alliance. "There is also room to expect that he will be less "averse from accepting a subsidiary force than the "jealousy of his temper might naturally render "him. . . . I shall hope he will be easily induced to "make the first overture himself for a permanent "British force to be established in his dominions."

Failure of
Colebrooke's
negotiations.

107. Colebrooke's eyes were soon opened. When he attempted serious negotiations the Rājā disappeared on a "hunting excursion." Thereafter weeks passed in evasive discussions. In June he realized that the Rājā's reluctance arose "from vague apprehensions of losing his independency if he accepts a subsidiary force"—reluctance which, he fondly hoped, would be "overcome by his keen fears of intended aggressions from Daulat Rāo Sindia". At the end of July the Rājā "still continued to procrastinate" and no progress could be made. The reality of the situation then began to dawn on the English envoy. "The policy of this Court", Colebrooke writes towards the end of August 1800 A.D., "has always hitherto been to "maintain its independency by cultivating the

“relations of amity with all surrounding States without forming a decided connexion with any one”; and he begged “leave to remark that the Rājā “has evidently no present intention of bringing “to an immediate conclusion the negotiations “opened here.” But he still hoped that the settlement of the treaty with the Nizām would encourage the Nāgpur Rājā to agree to it. But here too he was at fault. The terms of the new alliance with the Nizām were both offensive as well as defensive and were thus a menace to the Marāthās. The Nāgpur Rājā and his Ministers were quick to appreciate this point and, when they heard of the Hyderabad alliance, were more strongly opposed than ever to any endorsement of its terms. Colebrooke was left to deplore “the total inconsistency” of the Nāgpur Court’s conduct “with its “professions continuously made and repeated until “the conclusion of the new treaty of alliance [with “the Nizām] was formally announced.” He noted, however, that “the Rājā studiously avoids “giving a direct refusal to the proposal of acceding “to the treaty of Hyderabad, though evidently “resolved not to avail himself of the option given “to him by that treaty.”

108. At last in January 1801 A.D. Colebrooke perceived that he was merely being played with. Colebrooke asks for his recall.
“I hope your Lordship will not think me pre-
“sumptuous”, he writes, “when I beg leave to suggest the expediency of recalling me from this
“Court. The Rājā of Berar derives from the presence of a British Resident at his Court the benefit

“of an actual alliance with the British government
“without making any return for those benefits and
“without being bound by any engagements to the
“Company The weight which he obtains
“among other Marāthā States through the presence
“of a British Resident at his Court and through the
“consequent appearance of connexion with your
“Lordship’s government is so valuable to him
“that, in all events, he will, doubtless, solicit the
“reappointment of a Resident, and thus afford your
“Lordship an opportunity of granting his request,
“at a time when he has it less in his power than at
“present to employ the favourable disposition
“manifested by your Lordship towards him for a
“purpose which tends towards the obstruction of
“your Lordship’s views.” And again, “I still
“entertain no doubt of the Rājā of Berar’s inten-
“tion to employ the appearance of a connexion
“with the British government and even the menace
“of forming a close alliance with the Company
“for the purpose of obtaining concessions from the
“Court of Poona or, at least, arranging a conven-
“tion with other Marāthā Chiefs on equal terms.
“By such means he hopes to establish his entire
“independence of support from any other State
“and even looks to become the arbitrator between
“the powers of Hindostan.” Thus, after two years
residence at Nāgpur, Colebrooke at last realized
the truth. The Governor-General realized it too.
He wrote, “The conduct of the Rājā of Berar
“during the whole negotiation appears to me to
“have been insincere and illusory. He seems at
“no period of time to have been really desirous

“of becoming party to the general defensive alliance concluded with His Highness the Nizām. “It appears to have been the Rājā’s policy to “render his negotiation with the British government subservient to his particular views at the “Court of Poona I have, therefore, resolved to withdraw the residency from Nāḡpur “I shall direct the Resident at Poona to make such “provision as may be necessary for the conduct “of the political relations of the British government with the Court of Nāḡpur and for obtaining intelligence of its views.” Lord Wellesley communicated to Colebrooke “my entire approbation of your conduct and my sense of your “zeal, diligence and ability during the whole “of your residence in Nāḡpur”; that gentleman withdrew on the 18th of May 1801; and thus an episode concluded which was flattering neither to the Governor-General’s appreciation of the political aspirations of Nāḡpur nor to the perspicacity of his local agent. The British government had, in fact, in the course of twenty years veered round from one extreme estimate of the Nāḡpur State to another. Hastings, when Mudhoji was at his feeblest, described Nāḡpur as “the most powerful of the States which bear the Marāthā name” and would have supported Mudhoji’s claim to the headship of the whole Marāthā Empire. Wellesley, when Raghoji II was at the zenith of his strength, negotiated with him as a third-rate potentate who could be cajoled and frightened into submitting to terms which would

for ever have destroyed his independence. Colebrooke's unsuccessful negotiations had no other result than to open the eyes of the Nāgpur Court to the danger with which their independence was menaced from the rapid growth of British influence in India. They thus prepared the ground for the conflagration which was soon to follow.

**Colebrooke's
description
of Nāgpur
and Rājā's
Court**

109. Besides Colebrooke's despatches, from which the preceding sketch of the political negotiations of 1799 to 1801 A.D. has been drawn, there are some private papers made available in his "Life", published in 1873 A.D. by his son Sir T. E. Colebrooke. These contain some interesting references to Nāgpur and to the Rājā's Court.

"*8th June 1799.*—The town of Nāgpur is situated "in a valley, surrounded by barren hills of no great "elevation. The town is, like most "towns in India, ill-built with narrow, dirty "streets. But the ground surrounding the palace "is more open; and the palace itself is a large and "(for a Hindu owner) a magnificent building. It "consists of half a dozen courts, completely sur- "rounded with buildings two or three stories high, "lined internally with a narrow colonnade and "having a dead wall outside. I have only seen the "public apartments. They are spacious, particu- "larly the principal hall of audience, and are well "decorated with pier-glasses, pictures, girandoles "[chandeliers], etc. The reigning prince has not "only a taste for architecture, which he has dis- "played in the palace he has built for himself, but

“he has also a turn for gardening. I benefit by it;
“for I have got for my abode a neat garden with
“a tolerably good house in it. The garden is laid
“out in straight walks with cut hedges, *etc.* But I
“have been long enough absent from England not
“to be fastidious about the laying out of grounds.
“ Of the Court I may well say that the
“Rājā is in his manners more like a private gentle-
“man than a sovereign prince, and an Asiatic one
“too. His manners are simple, with little pomp
“and less appearance of pride. The courtiers
“naturally copy their sovereign and live more
“like friends than servants with him. Yet the
“Court is not devoid of splendour and dignity.
“I have seen in it a numerous assembly of nobles,
“sitting at a respectable distance along the walls
“of a magnificent apartment, while the select few
“surrounded the Rājā’s throne and sometimes
“conversed but oftener listened to the singing of
“dancing women. This part of the Rājā’s magni-
“ficence is what he seems most attached to, next
“to the diversion of tiger-hunting. All day and all
“night the exhibition of music and dancing is
“continued; and so attached are people of the
“place to that amusement that, even while taking
“the diversion of fishing, they have a set of singers
“embarked with them in each boat. Of his fond-
“ness for tiger-hunting I can give you no better
“proof than his quitting the affairs of State for ten
“days together to go in pursuit of tigers. At this
“moment he is absent on such an excursion in the
“course of which he killed four tigers in one day.”*

**Life*, pp. 131—3. The Rājā’s tiger-hunting had more connection with affairs of State than Colebrooke suspected. See p. 156.

Extracts
from Cole-
brooke's
Journal
kept at
Nāgpur.

110. "The dominions of the Bhonsle extend
"from the Bay of Balasore on the east, beyond the
"head of the Tāpti towards the west, reaching
"beyond the Nerbudda on the north, and ap-
"proaching to the Godāvāri on the south. In this
"vast tract Raghoji possesses some rich provinces
"scattered among more extensive tracts of forest.
"He counts among his tributaries many Chiefs of
"mountaineers; holds a paramount authority over
"the province[s] of Chhattisgarh [and Chāndā]
"allotted to his brother Vyankoji Bhonsle as an
"appanage; and shares the revenue of Berar proper
"with the *Nawāb* Nizām Ali Khān, the titular
"*Subahdār* of the Deccan. From the fertile prov-
"inces of Cuttack and Garha with those of Deogarh
"and Multai* and the districts contiguous to Nāgpur,
"including also his share of collections in Berar
"proper, he levies a scanty revenue with which he
"maintains a large but ill-appointed army and
"supports the state and splendour of a sovereign
"prince with some show of magnificence and with
"much ill-concealed parsimony. Like most Asiatic
"princes he is fond of pleasure; yet the propen-
"sities of a sensualist have not rendered him care-
"less of the affairs of his government. He is, on
"the contrary, diligent in business and patient in
"fatigue and daily employs many hours in the
"despatch of business and in consultation with his
"ministers. At the time I visited his Court, the
"minister most in favour was the Persian *Munshi*

*"Multāi was anciently called Multāpti, or source of Tāpti, because it is situated near the source of that river."

“(Shridhar Pandit) whose office might be described
 “as answering to that of Secretary for Foreign
 “Affairs, though he interfered in other departments
 “also. The next in favour was the *Chitnavis*
 “(Krishna Rāo), or Secretary for domestic trans-
 “actions. The *Pharnavis* or *Dirān* (Bhawānī
 “Kālu), though his office be of higher dignity, had,
 “at that time, less influence. These constituted
 “the Council and were the persons whom I always
 “found with the Rājā at private audiences. These
 “and their nearest relatives as well as the Rājā’s
 “own kinsmen and also the principal commander
 “of the forces were often admitted to the Council;
 “and they always sat near the *masnad*, while the
 “rest of the courtiers of every rank were ranged
 “along the walls of the apartment at public audi-
 “ences. As all officers are expected to attend the
 “Court and make their obeisances to the Prince
 “while at the capital twice a day and, in particular,
 “on gala days, the number of courtiers sitting
 “round the apartment was always great.”*

111. Colebrooke writing on October the 30th, 1799 A.D., gives the following description of the *Dasahrā* festival :—“We were asked to attend the
 “celebration of the day. We did so; and the
 “spectacle was, certainly, grand. The immense
 “concourse of spectators on the plain south of
 “Nāgpur exceeded what I could have supposed the
 “town of Nāgpur to contain. They must have
 “assembled from far and near on the occasion.
 “The avenue was lined with troops and with

Account
 of the
Dasahrā
 festival.

"spectators from the river to the place where the
 "procession was to move to. Near an hour before
 "dark I had noticed that the Rājā was setting off;
 "and I was desired to set off also and meet him on
 "the plain. However, it was past sunset before he
 "crossed the Nāg river at the edge of the town.
 "His own, his brother's, his son's, and mother's
 "sari patkās led the way, carried on the largest
 "elephants. The flags and standards of different
 "chieftains were also carried on elephants, and the
 "kettle-drums of some, if not of many, on camels.
 "He sat in a silver *ambāri*, bowing to the right and
 "left as he went along. An empty silver *hauda*,
 "with a parasol shaped like a peacock, attended
 "him—his son driving an elephant of his own, an
 "amusement the Marāthā nobles do, here at least,
 "much delight in. Many of the largest Ceylon
 "and other Deccany elephants bore *ambāris* in
 "which all the Chiefs and nobles rode, dressed with
 "magnificence and adorned with the richest
 "jewels. The procession stopped at the end of
 "the avenue, where a small tree, or a branch of
 "one, had been planted, close to a low altar of
 "earth. Here everybody dismounted. The Rājā
 "and others proceeded to perform a *pujā* (to wor-
 "ship some divinity) there; and we were desired
 "to sit on one side, so as not to see their ceremony.
 "As soon as the religious celebration was finished
 "the whole company was assembled and sat a little
 "while in conversation; after which we took leave
 "and returned home; and the Rājā and his proces-
 "sion soon after took their road homewards also."*

**Life*, p. 164.

CHAPTER XI.

THE WAR OF 1803 A.D.

112. When Colebrooke left Nāgpur on the 19th of May 1801 A.D. he carried with him the Rājā's "assurances of unalterable friendship and regard" for the Governor-General and "professions of faithful attachment towards the British government and the Honourable East India Company." Vyankoji, however, hinted to Colebrooke "in terms which could not be misunderstood" that his brother's sentiments were insincere. He declared that a meeting of Marāthā Chieftains had been summoned by the *Peshwā*; that it was Raghoji's intention to attend; and that the purpose of this convention was to arrange a confederacy against the British. When Colebrooke pressed for evidence in support of these allegations and "means of proof to convince my superiors," he received the significant reply that "proof would appear within a few months and evidence would arise of its own accord."

Secret
hostility of
Raghoji.

113. Wellesley's aggressive policy had, indeed, made an outbreak of hostilities inevitable. Subsidiary alliances were formed with Mysore in 1799 A.D., with the Nizām in 1800 A.D., with the *Nawāb* of Oudh in 1801 A.D., and with the Gaikwār in 1802 A.D.; and engagements of a similar character were pressed not only on Nāgpur (as we have seen)

Lord
Wellesley's
aggressive
policy.

but also on the *Peshwā*, Bāji Rāo II. The Governor-General pursued his policy with the utmost pertinacity; "and apparently was not fully conscious that he was asking the *Peshwā* and all the "Marāthā Chiefs to renounce their independence "and sink into the position of mere dependents on "the British power. . . . Lord Wellesley, undoubtedly, was too sanguine in hoping that he "could induce all the Marāthā Chiefs to surrender "everything which made life worth living in their "eyes and to accept his invitation which so closely "resembled that of the spider to the fly."* Only the occasion was now wanting for a Marāthā challenge to the British bid for supremacy; and it was not long delayed. In October 1802 A.D. Yeshwant Rāo Holkar, disputing Sindia's authority over the *Peshwā*, defeated the combined forces of Daulat Rāo and Bāji Rāo at Poona. Bāji Rāo promptly flung himself into the arms of the British and, on the 31st of December 1802 A.D., signed the famous Treaty of Bassein, a subsidiary alliance with the East India Company, which at once constituted a *casus belli* for Sindia, Holkar and Nāgpur.

**Declaration
of War.**

114. In March 1803 A.D. the British assembled an army on the northern frontier of Madras, under the command of Arthur Wellesley, afterwards the Duke of Wellington, to support Bāji Rāo against his brother by adoption whom Yeshwant Rāo Holkar had put forward as *Peshwā* in his place. By April Arthur Wellesley had entered Poona and by May had reinstated Bāji Rāo, being supported

*Smith's *Oxford History of India*, pp. 596 and 599.

in these operations by Colonel Stevenson Commanding the Hyderabad subsidiary force. Meanwhile Sindia had collected an army at Ujjain and, moving southward, crossed the Nerbudda on February the 4th. Colonel Collins, the British Resident in Sindia's camp, was instructed in May to insist on Sindia's return to the north of the Nerbudda and to demand an assurance that his negotiations with Raghoji Bhonsle and Yeshwant Rāo Holkar, then in progress, were not directed to combined hostilities against the British. Sindia declared in public *Darbār* that he could not afford the satisfaction demanded of him until a meeting should have taken place between him and Raghoji, when the British Resident would be informed "whether it would be peace or war." Raghoji by this time had reached the vicinity of Sindia's camp at Chikhli in Berar; and on June the 4th a juncture of the confederate forces was effected. But an open rupture with the British was still avoided, as Daulat Rāo and Raghoji were eagerly engaged in an attempt, which however proved abortive, to draw Yeshwant Rāo Holkar into the coming struggle. On July the 18th Arthur Wellesley, who had meanwhile been vested with "full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements might become necessary either for the final settlement of peace or for the active prosecution of war", demanded that Daulat Rāo and Raghoji should immediately separate and retire from the frontier of the Nizām's territories to

their respective capitals. Further evasions followed; but at last, the rejection of this demand being plainly to be inferred from the conduct of the confederate Chieftains, Colonel Collins withdrew from their camp on August the 3rd and war was declared.

**Capture
of Ahmad-
nagar.**

115. "The season pressed for a decision. The "actual prevalence of the rainy monsoon in the "provinces of India which must become the theatre "of war was highly favourable to our operations "and equally unpropitious to any hostile movement of the native powers." Vigorous action was, therefore, taken and the fortified town of Ahmadnagar was captured by escalade on the 8th of August. Wellesley then moved northward to the Godāvāri which he crossed on the 24th of August, reaching Aurangābād on the 29th. The Confederates now ascended the Ajinthā *ghāt* into Hyderabad, desiring to carry the war into foreign territory and at the same time to exploit any possible confusion that might follow the recent death of the Nizām. But Wellesley, hastening along the left bank of the Godāvāri, headed them back to the neighbourhood of Bhokardan and Jāfarābād. He then met Stevenson at Badnāpur on September the 21st, when it was decided that their two divisions should move separately forward and attack jointly on the morning of September the 24th. But Wellesley came unexpectedly on the enemy on the 23rd and decided to put matters to the test at once.


**Battle of
Assye.**

116. The battle which followed is thus described by Mountstuart Elphinstone, then Political Assist-

Wellesley's staff., "*Camp near Assye*. ten miles from Jāfarābād, September 27th (1803).*—
"I am going to write you a detailed
"account of the battle of Assye. . . . I
"learn that, when we met Colonel Stevenson
"at Badnāpur [on September the 21st], it was
"determined between him and General Wellesley
"to make three marches and then fall on the enemy
"on the same day. The enemy were then thought
"to be at Bhokardan, thirty miles in a direct
"line from where we were on the first day. On
"the day after our first march, news was brought
" (false news it turned out) that the enemy had
"moved to Hasanābād, a good deal farther to the
"west, and intended to go still farther west. Next
"day [September the 23rd] we moved north to Nāl-
"ni, where we were taking our ground when we
"learnt that the enemy were close to us. Shortly
"after, the General was told that the enemy had sent
"off all their horse to attack Colonel Stevenson. On
"this he sent to order the cavalry, who were taking
"up their ground, to come on, and to order the
"Quartermaster-General to take up the colours
"again, which was done. I was at this time behind
"the General in my palankeen; but, seeing that
"something was going to happen, I got out. I
"found the cavalry almost come up and the Gene-
"ral and his party dismounted, loading their pistols.
"I followed their example and then mounted.
"I suppose it was when the General sent for the
"cavalry that he also sent for the infantry and
"ordered one battalion under Colonel Chalmers

“to stay behind with the baggage. After we
“mounted again we went on two miles. (Observe
“that ‘I suppose’ is almost always understood
“about distances, times, numbers and other things
“difficult to judge of.) We then came to the brow
“of a rising ground from which we saw the enemy
“in two large, seemingly regular, camps at the dis-
“tance of two miles from us. I have put down the
“infantry camp [in the plan below]; I don’t know
“where the other was. After looking at the coun-
“try for a short time and reconnoitering the enemy
“through a glass, the General left the cavalry halt-
“ed and rode back to bring on the infantry; leav-
“ing Captain Johnson, the engineer (a very active,
“zealous, cool, useful man), to find out the road
“for the guns. This he easily did, for the descent
“was not great; and in about an hour the infantry
“came up and were shown the road. The General
“then rode back to the cavalry, who had formed in
“line (at A) facing a very large body of the enemy’s
“horse (B) who were advancing up the rise which
“was very gentle. Here I thought we should have
“a charge and, as the General kept riding off to-
“wards the infantry every now and then to see how
“they got on and then back to the cavalry, I was
“kept in great anxiety for fear he should go off and
“miss the charge, for I had no notion there would
“be anything worth seeing with the infantry. At
“last the enemy’s horse halted a half, or a quarter,
“of a mile off and sent on a few fellows to fire at
“the cavalry; they shot a horse; and then some
“troopers were sent to drive them back and all was

SKETCH PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ASSYE.



Explanation of the Plan.

"A. Our cavalry on the hill where the enemy was first seen.
 "B. Their body of horse. Sindia is said (by the General among others) to have been in this party.
 "C. The march of our infantry in column.
 "D. The enemy's camp. I fancy their guns were drawn up parallel to the nālā when first they cannonaded us, and that afterwards they changed their post on what it is at HHH.
 "E. The Kailna nālā.
 "F. The ford.
 "G. The infantry of our army in two lines, with the names of regiments marked.
 "H. The enemy's first line.
 "J. Our cavalry formed in the rear of the infantry.
 "K. The enemy's second line, which I never saw and am not sure about, were there.
 "L. The Juwā nālā.
 "M M. Our troops after changing their position. The piquets kept a great deal too

"much to the right and left a breach in the line which the 74th was obliged to fill up and the piquets were passed by the 74th and the two battalions.
 "N. The place where the 74th suffered so much.
 "O. The cavalry going to charge the party who were annoying the 74th. The place in the Juwā nālā where there was a slaughter of that party is marked with a large L.
 "P P. The cavalry charging the broken infantry of the enemy.
 "Q Q. The cavalry formed to charge the last time. I don't know precisely where they crossed.
 "R. Some infantry of the enemy. The General says, not their right but a new formation.
 "S S. The General returning with the 78th and afterwards joined by the 7th N. C.
 "T. The last position taken by the 78th and 7th N. C.
 "U. The village of Assye."

“quiet. The General left the cavalry to watch
“them and rode off to the head of the infantry
“(CC), which was now come nearly opposite the
“enemy’s camp (DD). At this time the enemy
“began to cannonade. The shot fell pretty thick
“round but did scarce any damage on account of
“the distance. However, it bounded off the
“ground and made the people duck; and one shot,
“somehow or other, hit Mr. Campbell. Brigade-
“Major to General Wellesley, in the heel and
“brought him off. We kept moving on and got
“among ravines, when they cannonaded hotly but
“still ineffectually; except that one shot went close
“to the General and took his orderly trooper’s
“head off. Then we came to the Kailna *nālā*
“(EE) and found the only ford good for guns (F).
“After some delay we got the guns over and began
“to form the line (GG) at right angles to the *nālā*.
“Our guns opened and fired while the line was
“forming and, after it was formed, the enemy
“(HH), who were advancing on us and beginning
“to get near us, renewed and redoubled their can-
“nonade which had slackened. It was no longer
“ineffectual, for it knocked down men, horses and
“bullocks every shot. When the line was formed
“it was found that many of our guns could not be
“dragged on for want of hands. The General then
“told them to limber up, but the bullocks were
“killed. He then ordered them to be left behind
“which was done, but not immediately, and all the
“time the men were getting knocked down very
“fast. The General was very impatient; he was

“forming the line to the left himself; but he sent
“several messages to the right to move forward,
“which was done at last. The army was drawn
“up in two lines. In the first were the piquets,
“two native battalions and the 78th. In the se-
“cond were two battalions and the 74th.* The
“line advanced under a very hot cannonade.
“When we got near enough the enemy to hear them
“shout, the General rode back to the cavalry,
“whom he had sent for and who were now in the
“rear (JJ). He rode full gallop, told Colonel Max-
“well to take care of the right of the infantry and
“rode back at speed. In coming back, as in going,
“there was ‘the Devil’s own cannonade’ (an ex-
“quisite Irish phrase which I have found out) and
“three horses of our party were knocked down.
“The General galloped forward to a line which
“was before us, and we were getting near it very
“fast when it fired a gun our way; we were barely
“out of musket shot. Some body said, ‘Sir!
“that is the enemy’s line’. The General said,
“‘Is it? Ha, damme, so it is!’ (you know his
“manner) and turned. Before we got to our own
“line we had the satisfaction to fall in with several
“pieces of fine shining brass cannon which the
“enemy had just left. We were away about ten
“minutes or a quarter of an hour. Our line con-
“tinued to advance; and the enemy’s right and

*[The Corps which fought at Assye were the 19th Light Dragoons (European cavalry); the 74th and 78th Highlanders (European infantry); two battalions Madras artillery (European); three regiments Madras cavalry (Indian); and five battalions of Madras sepoys. In all about 1,500 European and 3,500 Indian troops.]

“right centre (so all say; I doubt whether their
“right fell back) fell back on their second line
“(KK) which was on the Juwā *nālā* (LL). Their
“left stretched beyond our right flank and it kept
“its ground. When the enemy’s right and centre
“retreated, our line changed front (MM) so as to
“face the second line on which we advanced; and
“this was the hottest part of the action. The
“party on the right were very troublesome; round
“and grape flew in all directions. About this time
“the 74th, who were now at the right of our line
“(N), suffered prodigiously from the cannon and
“were so thinned as to encourage a body of the
“enemy’s horse to charge them. They did so and;
“I am assured by more than one eye-witness,
“broke and dispersed the few of them who had
“survived the cannonade. This was the critical
“moment. The 74th (I am assured and convinced)
“was unable to stop the enemy; and I know that
“the sepoys were huddled in masses and that at-
“tempts, which I saw made to form them, failed;
“when ‘the genius and fortune of the Republic’
“brought the cavalry on to the right. They
“charged the enemy, drove them with great
“slaughter into the Juwā *nālā* and so saved the
“74th. After this the cavalry crossed the Juwā and,
“the infantry continuing to advance, drove the
“enemy’s infantry across the Juwā. They seemed
“to retreat in good order; but some of them must
“have been broke, for the cavalry, which had then
“crossed the *nālā*, charged up its bank (PP), mak-
“ing a dreadful slaughter but affording a most

“delightful spectacle to us who were halted on the
 “side nearest the field of battle, unable to cross
 “on account of our guns. The cavalry, having
 “thus crossed on the right of the line and charged
 “along in front of it, recrossed to the left and
 “were formed (QQ) to charge a body of infantry
 “(R)—I fancy part of the enemy’s right that we
 “had passed, for we were much outflanked both
 “the right and left. When the General, returning
 “from the *nālū* with the 78th (SSS), came close to
 “them, he took the 7th Native Cavalry from them.
 “The General was going to attack a body of the
 “enemy (from their left, I believe) who, when we
 “had passed them, went and spiked our artillery
 “and seized our guns and recovered some of their
 “own and turned them all against our rear, which
 “annoyed us a good deal. When the General was
 “returning to the guns there was a heavy fire and
 “he had his horse killed under him.* Soon after
 “he came up to the cavalry, the enemy cannonad-
 “ing them hotly as they were formed to charge.
 “Just as he was leaving them I heard the dragoons
 “huzza and saw them begin to charge; *rode a
 “little way after them but, thinking that I had
 “stayed all day with the General and that when I
 “left him he was in hot water, I rode to him but
 “found that the enemy were moving off. We got
 “possession of the guns and halted; and so ended

*Wellesley wrote “The enemy had 1,200 men killed on the field of battle and I suppose about four times that number wounded. . . I lost two horses—Diomed (Colonel Aston’s horse who has carried me in so many campaigns) piked and another horse shot under me.” (Wellington’s *Despatches*, II, p. 372.)

“the engagement. I forgot to mention the result
“of the cavalry charge (which must have termi-
“nated just after I quitted them; for I saw them
“pull up to a trot before I made up my mind to
“leave them). They were brought up by the fire;
“first halted and then walked and then trotted
“back. In this last charge Colonel Maxwell was
“killed. After staying some time with the 78th, I
“rode with the General to the Juwā and there I
“lost him. I then went to the place where the
“74th lost so many men, where I had not been be-
“fore. The ground was covered with dead and
“wounded men and officers of the 74th and of the
“enemy. After dark I found the General in the
“village of Assye (U) close to the place where
“the 74th suffered so much. There the General
“passed the night, not in ‘the pride, pomp, and
“circumstance of glorious war’ but on the ground,
“close to an officer whose leg was shot off and
“within five yards of a dead officer. I got some
“curry and bloody water, which did not show at
“night, and lay down and slept without catching
“cold after all my nursing.* This battle has been
“glorious though so bloody.† We had on the

*Elphinstone writes elsewhere “I got on horseback early in
“the morning of the action, the first time for a month owing
“to a liver complaint.” (*Life*, Vol. I, p. 71.)

†Elphinstone adds on October the 3rd, 1803, “I went yes-
“terday evening to the field of battle. It was a dark, cloudy
“evening. I rode by myself, and saw *plurima mortis imago*.
“Some of the dead are withered, their features still remaining
“but their faces blackened to the colour of coal, others still
“swollen and blistered. . . Kites and adjutants, larger than
“the Calcutta ones, were feeding on the bodies and dogs were
“feasting in some places and in others howling all over the
“plain. I saw a black dog tearing, in a furious way, great

“field four Native Battalions, 700 strong originally
 “but, with 100 men each on the rear guard and
 “the same on baggage guards, they were reduced
 “to $500 \times 4 = 2,000$; the 78th, 600; the 74th, 569;
 “the artillery, 150; total 3,319. The cavalry at
 “most 1,200. Total of all descriptions, 4,519. I
 “have made the battalions too weak and have not
 “counted the Pioneers. The General said we had
 “5,000 and odd. The number of killed and wound-
 “ed returned to the General is 1,584. The 74th
 “lost, killed and wounded, exactly 400. The whole
 “loss of Europeans must have been 600.”*

Battle of
 Argāon.

117. After their defeat at Assye the confederate army fled down the Ajinthā *ghāt*, collected their scattered forces and moved westward along

“pieces of flesh from a dead man, looking fiercely and not
 “regarding me. I thought the group horrible and sublime. At
 “last I began to feel a good deal of horror—awful but not
 “unpleasant—when by way of adding to the sublimity, the
 “evening gun fired and, to my surprise, I heard a ball whistle
 “over my head. This, I suppose, was some neglect of the
 “artillerymen. The General says he has certain accounts of
 “Sindia and the Berar Rājā having separated. This may be
 “only temporary or it may be for the purpose of attacking
 “the Bengal provinces in two places; but the late defeat, the
 “death of Yādhav Rāo [Sindia's *Dāwān*] and the bad news
 “from all quarters, make it likely that they have broken up.”
 (*Life*, Vol. I, pp. 74-5.)

*Elphinstone's *Life*, pp. 64—69. “The Nāgpur Rājā is
 “said to have had 18,000 troops at Assye” (Elphinstone's des-
 “patch of 27th of August 1804). Sindia's troops consisted of
 “16 regular battalions of infantry (amounting to 10,500 men)
 “and . . . some very large bodies of horse consisting.
 “it is stated, of between 30 and 40,000 men” (Bengal Papers,
 p. 241). Arthur Wellesley wrote “I really believe it was one
 “of the most furious battles that has ever been fought in this
 “country” (Wellington's *Despatches*, II, p. 356). His own
 account of the battle is given in Appendix E. The correct
 casualty figures on the British side were:—Europeans killed,
 164; Europeans wounded or missing, 419; Indians killed, 245;
 Indians wounded or missing, 1,229; Total, 2,057.

the Tāpti river to protect Burhānpur and Asirgarh in Nimār, at the same time menacing the British with an inroad into Hyderābad. Arthur Wellesley, nevertheless, sent Stevenson northward, while he himself stayed to watch the enemy's movements. Stevenson had little difficulty in occupying Burhānpur on October the 15th and in capturing the famous fortress of Asirgarh six days later. Having thus disposed of Sindia's main possessions in the Deccan, he was directed to move towards Gāwilgarh, Raghoji Bhonsle's chief stronghold. Meanwhile the Confederates had separated. Sindia moved eastward into Berar, while Raghoji made a dash for the Godāvari to plunder. Wellesley set off in pursuit of Raghoji, who soon hurried back into Berar and joined up once more with Sindia's forces, the British General following. "On the "29th November the British troops under General "Wellesley came up with a considerable body "of Sindia's and the Berar cavalry, accompanied "by the greater part of Raghoji Bhonsle's regular "infantry and a large portion of artillery; and, "as Sindia had not fulfilled the conditions of "the truce which he had himself sought, the Gene- "ral resolved, notwithstanding the remonstrances "and protestations of the ambassador who was still "in his camp, to attack the enemy with all possible "vigour. He immediately, therefore, moved for- "ward to Pathuldi, where he was joined by Colonel "Stevenson, and found that the Confederates had "retired from that very spot, their rear being still "discernible from a lofty tower in the vicinity.

“The day was still extremely hot and the troops
“were so fatigued that the General felt inclined
“to postpone the pursuit until the evening; but
“he had scarcely halted when large bodies of the
“enemy’s horse were noticed in front, with whom
“the Mysore horse skirmished during a part of
“the day; and, when the General moved out to
“push forward the piquets of the infantry to sup-
“port the Mysore cavalry and to take up the
“ground of our encampment, the whole army of
“the Confederates was perceived, formed in a long
“line of cavalry, infantry and artillery extending
“a front of five miles on the plains of Ārgāon
“immediately in front of that village and about six
“miles from Pathuldi, at which place the General
“intended to have encamped. Though it was late
“in the day yet, finding that it was the resolution
“of the enemy to risk an action, General Wellesley
“made no hesitation but instantly advanced, with
“his whole army in one column, in a direction
“nearly parallel to the enemy’s line and with the
“British cavalry leading. The enemy’s infantry and
“guns were in the left of their centre with a body
“of cavalry also on their left. Sindia’s army,
“consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was
“on the right, having upon its own right a body of
“*Pindāris* and other light troops. In the rear of
“their long line stood the village with the gardens
“and enclosures of Ārgāon and in their front a
“plain which, however, was much cut by water
“courses. The united armies were commanded by
“Sindia in person and Manyā Bāpu (Vyankoji),

“brother to the Rājā of Berar.* As the British
 “army neared the Confederates, it was drawn up
 “in two lines, the first consisting of the infantry,
 “the second of the cavalry; and the right wing was
 “advanced in order to press on the enemy’s left,
 “whilst our left and rear were covered by the
 “Mogul [*i.e.*, Hyderabad] and Mysore horse.
 “No sooner had the British come pretty close
 “than the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked
 “by a large body of Persian troops, who maintained
 “a most desperate conflict for some time but were
 “at length totally destroyed: at the same time
 “a charge of Sindia’s cavalry was repulsed with
 “great bloodshed by the first battalion of the 6th
 “regiment; when the whole hostile line gave way
 “and fled with the utmost precipitation and con-
 “fusion, leaving 38 pieces of cannon and all their
 “ammunition in the hands of the victors. Though
 “late in the evening yet, as it was moonlight, they
 “were pursued by the cavalry who cut off vast
 “numbers and captured the whole of their ele-
 “phants and baggage. All the British troops were
 “under arms till a late hour in the night.”†

*“The Rājā’s brother Vyankoji Bhonsle, called also Manyā
 “Bāpu but more commonly Nānā Sāheb . . . commanded at
 “Ārgāon, where he stood till he was deserted by all his adher-
 “ents except Beni Singh and till his situation was rendered
 “dangerous by the near approach of the British line . . .
 “Beni Singh had eight battalions, of which four were destroyed
 “at Ārgāon and Gāwilgarh.” (Elphinstone’s despatch of the
 24th of March 1804).

†*Memoir of the War in India* by W. Thorn, pp. 300—2.
 Major Thorn omits to notice how nearly the battle of Ārgāon
 ended in defeat for the British. Arthur Wellesley in a private
 letter wrote, “If we had had day-light an hour more not a
 “man would have escaped. We should have had that time

Prepara-
tions for
siege of
Gawilgarh.

118. As the loss of the British army at Ārgāon was comparatively slight, Wellesley decided to proceed at once against Gāwilgarh. Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asirgarh for the siege; and it was arranged that he should make the main attack on the northern gate of the fortress from the village of Labādā, while Wellesley supported him by minor operations against the other two gates to the south and north-west. Superhuman efforts were needed to carry the

“if my native infantry had not been panic struck and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broke and running off when the cannonade commenced at Ārgāon which was not to be compared with that at Assye? Luckily I happened to be at no great distance from them and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there I am convinced we should have lost the day. But, as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms and I was on horseback from six in the morning until twelve at night.” (Wellington’s *Despatches*, II, p. 561.) Elphinstone thus describes a visit to the field of battle on the 30th of November. “After breakfast I went with a party to the field of battle. . . I rode along the enemy’s line with Blakeston and Johnson. We counted twenty-nine guns, three of which were of iron. In one part of the line, where the 74th and 78th charged, the ground is covered with dead. They are all Mussulmans, dressed in blue. They have long beards and fine countenances. There are many old men among them. Three of the group are almost as fair as the fairest Europeans, except in the parts exposed to the sun. They say this party was called the *Fārsi Risāleh*. Others say they were Arabs. There are three or four hundred of these fellows lying close to one another. . . From there we went to the place where the cavalry charged. We rode through the field and up the garden. We did not see so many dead as we expected but there were a great many, some with terrible wounds: three or four with their heads cut off and carried away.” (*Life*, Vol. I, p. 90.)

ordnance and stores over mountains and through ravines for a distance of 30 miles from Ellichpur to Labādā. But the task was accomplished between the 7th and 12th of December, the batteries opened fire on the 13th and by the night of the 14th the breaches in the double wall of the outer fort were declared practicable. The assault was fixed for 10 a.m. on December the 15th, the command of the storming party being entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel Kenny.

119. Elphinstone took an active part in the assault and wrote the following account of his experiences. The Assault. "I went up to Colonel Kenny, said I "heard he was to lead the storming party and that, "if he would allow me, I would be of his party. "He bowed and agreed. Soon after Colonel "Stevenson asked Colonel Kenny if he was ready. "Colonel Kenny said 'Yes'. He was ordered to "advance. We drew our swords, stuck pistols in "our belts or handkerchiefs tied round our middle "and, passing in rear of the batteries, marched on "to the breach. Colonel Kenny led the whole; "with him went Winfield, Johnson (who had got "an unfortunate *Patel* to go with him) and myself, "and perhaps Lutwidge and an officer of the 94th. "Then followed the 94th regiment. Our advance "was silent, deliberate and even solemn. Every- "body expected the place to be well defended. As "we got near we saw a number of people running "on the rampart near the breach. Colonel Kenny "said they were manning the works. I asked him "if they were not flying? He said, 'No; no; they

“won’t fly yet awhile’. We went and got close to
“the works, to a wide hedge where Johnson had
“been during the night. I was amazed that they
“did not fire; our cannon fired over our heads.
“We got to the breach, where we halted and let
“the forlorn hope, a Sergeant’s party, run up;
“then we followed, ran along and dashed up the
“second breach and huzzaed and leaped down into
“the place. Such of the enemy as stood were put
“to the bayonet; but most of them ran off to the
“right and down a narrow valley which led to a
“gate [the north-west gate]. Here they met Col-
“onel Chalmers coming on with half the 78th. He
“had been sent round by the General to attack
“this gate [and got in when the enemy opened it
“to get out]. The 94th pressed behind, firing from
“above, and a terrible slaughter took place. After
“this we endeavoured to push on when, to our
“astonishment, we discovered that we had only
“gained a separate hill and that the fort lay behind
“a deep valley, beyond which appeared a double
“wall and strong gates. *Ibi omnis effusus labor*;
“the troops halted and the officers endeavoured to
“form them. I was at this time with Johnson and
“Lutwidge, having lost Colonel Kenny in the con-
“fusion after getting over the second breach. I
“thought we should have to entrench ourselves and
“wait till guns would be brought up to breach the
“inner walls. But Colonel Kenny, almost alone,
“had run straight on to the gate where he was now
“perceived.* The Europeans found the road down

*This officer died of wounds received in the assault and is buried at Ellichpur (*Amraoti Gazetteer* of 1911, p. 97).

“and crowded after him. The first wall joined to
“a steep hill; and the Europeans began slowly and
“with difficulty to climb up one by one. Beyond
“the first wall was a narrow, rocky road, over-
“topped by a steep rock, and another wall and gate
“over which those who climbed the first wall would
“have to go, which the steepness and height of the
“wall made impossible. While the Europeans
“were clambering over, the enemy kept up a fire
“from their works; in the meantime our people
“poured in at the breach and covered the hill
“opposite to the enemy. They fired on the enemy;
“and the valley was filled with such a roar of
“musketry as can hardly be conceived. The sight
“cannot be described. At last our men got over
“and opened the first gate. Scaling-ladders were
“brought, got up the hill and applied to the second
“wall. The enemy fled from their works; we
“rushed over the wall and the fort was ours.”*

*Elphinstone's *Life*, Vol. I, pp. 103—6. “When General
“Wellesley entered the fort his first enquiry was for the
“*killedār* and he went immediately to his house. His son, a
“fine lad of 9 or 10 years of age, said he did not know where
“he was; that he had gone out about two hours before and
“had not returned. The poor fellow was ignorant of his fate
“perhaps; but, when order was sufficiently restored to admit
“the inhabitants who survived to venture out, a search was
“made and his body with that of Benisingh [who commanded
“the Nāgpur Rājā's regular infantry at Ārgāon] was found
“amidst a heap of slain near the gateway. These two men of
“good Rājput families had determined to die in defence of
“their trust and, according to the custom of their country,
“to save their wives and daughters from destruction by putting
“them to death before they went out to meet their own. From
“some cause unknown to us this was but imperfectly perform-
“ed; of twelve or fourteen women but three, I think, were
“dead when our men discovered them; and three or four more

Treaty of
Deogāon.

120. Immediately after the fall of Gāwilgarh the Nāgpur Rājā deputed an ambassador to attend on Wellesley who was encamped at Deogāon, an insignificant village at the foot of the hills. Negotiations commenced on the 16th of December; and the Treaty of Deogāon was signed the next day. Raghoji ceded the whole of Orissa, or "the province of Cuttack" including the fort and district of Balasore.* He agreed to give up all claims to any rights he had possessed west of the Wardhā river, though he retained Gāwilgarh and Narnālā forts and certain limited territory adjoining them.† He agreed to confirm any engagements into which the British might have entered with the Chiefs of the Sambalpur country (which, in effect, withdrew

"with a knife or dagger. Probably these Rājputs entrusted this "shocking duty to hands more humane than their own. General "Wellesley visited them and ordered every respect and care "to be shown to them. Benisingh and the *killedār*, however "personally brave, do not seem to have been able to frame "any regular plan for the defence of the inner wall or to have "infused much of their own spirit into their sepoys; the former "is said to have killed or wounded two or three of our men "before he fell." (Journal of Major-General Jasper Nicholls quoted in Wellington's *Despatches*, II, p. 587). This slaughter of their womenfolk by Rājputs was known as *janhar*. Another striking instance is quoted by the present writer in *Rāj-Gond Mahārājās*, pp. 64-5.

*This whole area had already been occupied by the British. Detail of the operations is given in Thorn's *Memoir*, Chapter VIII. They were conducted by Lt.-Col. Harcourt who took command at Ganjam on the 11th of September 1803. Balasore was occupied on the 21st of September; the fort of Barābati near Cuttack was stormed on October the 14th; the pass of Barmul occupied on the 2nd of November; and the whole province then reduced.

†This consisted of the *parganahs* of Akot, Argāon, Warner, Bhatkhuli and Khatkali yielding a revenue of 3½ *lāks*. *Vide* treaty with the Nizām, dated the 12th of December 1822.

the whole of that country from his suzerainty)* He engaged never to employ in his service any Frenchman or European subject of a power the government of which was at war with the British government, or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government; and it was mutually agreed that each party to the treaty should permit an accredited minister to reside at the Court of the other.† The terms were severe. They involved a reduction of Raghoji's revenue by about 45 *lākhs* of rupees out of a total of about 111 *lākhs*.‡ His army was demoralized and his treasury empty. His State never recovered from the blow and remained for the rest of its history dependent on the British government.

*Lt.-Col. Broughton occupied Sambalpur on the 2nd of January 1804.

†See Appendix F for detail of the treaty.

‡Jenkins (*Report of 1826*, p. 64) says "Raghoji's territories 'before the war yielded a revenue of about one crore of 'rupees. By the treaty they were reduced to 60 *lākhs*'. But it is not clear whether or no these figures include Vyankoji's receipts from his appanage of Chāndā and Chhattisgarh.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ARMY OF RAGHOJI II.

Expansion
of army
under
Raghoji II.

121. An attempt is made in this chapter to give some account of Raghoji II's army. The English records, unfortunately, say little or nothing of the forces of Raghoji the Great, during whose reign the military reputation of the Nāgpur house was at its highest. All we are told is that "his army was "principally composed of horse. His standing "force was about 15,000 but liable to be augmented "every year according to the exigencies of the "moment."* The first contemporary English notice of the Nāgpur army occurs in the degenerate days of Mudhoji, who is described in 1788 A.D. as employing 10,500 cavalry and "300 sepoys awkwardly clothed and ill-disciplined," supported by 15 pieces of field artillery "ill-conditioned and ill-served."† Raghoji II, however, as his wealth increased with the careful husbanding of his resources and the expansion of his territorial dominion, made very great additions to his army. Though personally of a timid and unwarlike disposition, he realized the need for a strong force to combat the rivalry of Sindia and the pretensions of the Poona *Darbār* and, later, to withstand the

*Jenkins *Report of 1826*, p. 56. Kincaid and Parasnis (II, p. 274) say that Raghoji the Great led 50,000 men into the Carnatic in 1740 A.D.

†See pp. 87 and 98 above.

growing authority of the British. Already in 1790 A.D., within two years of his accession to real, instead of nominal, sovereignty in Nāgpur, Raghoji had increased Mudhoji's awkward squad of 300 sepoys to two battalions (about 1,300 men), armed and equipped on the British model.* The conquest of Garha-Mandlā and the capture of Hoshangābād, Chaurāgarh and Sambalpur further testify to his growing military strength, which culminated in the accumulation of a numerous, if not really powerful, force by the time hostilities with the British broke out in 1803 A.D. In that year he had at his command 25,000 infantry (of which 11,000 were regular battalions), 4,000 Arabs and 18,000 horse. His field artillery consisted of about 90 pieces of ordnance.†

122. Mountstuart Elphinstone, on being posted to Nāgpur as Resident after the war, submitted on the 24th of March 1804 A.D. a detailed return of Raghoji II's army, which is included in Appendix G. From this document it appears that, even after his heavy losses at Assye, Ārgāon and Gāwilgarh and in spite of disbanding a number of battalions of regular infantry and 7,000 irregular horse immediately after peace was signed, Raghoji had still (including his brother's troops) 23,835 men at his disposal. "The regular battalions", Elphinstone tells us, "are of different strengths. I conjecture "that the whole may amount to 4,000 men; they "are all natives of Benares, Oudh and the adjoining provinces. Beni Singh had eight battalions

**Description
of army.**

*See p. 114 above.

“of which four were destroyed at Ārgāon and “Gāwilgarh. Bhawāni Pāndhre had four battalions “under Bālārām, Ramzān Khān, Resib Ali Beg and “Mr. Mell, a Portuguese of Goa; but they have “all been disbanded within these two months. . . . “Besides these, there were several independent “corps. I have heard of 40 field pieces which “the Rājā has. Of these 28 are at Nāgpur and the “rest at Hoshangābād and Garha-Mandlā. The “ordnance (38 guns) captured at Ārgāon belonged “to Beni Singh and some independent corps. The “other Brigade under Pāndhre, which was in every “respect inferior, was not in that action.” His Household Troops were, however, the *corps d’élite* of Raghoji’s army. These consisted of a body of some 4,000 irregular Arabs (who were terribly cut up at Ārgāon), a body of Pathāns, a few companies of sepoy, clothed, as well as armed, in European style, and several corps of Marāthā troopers, known as *Bārgirs*, whose horses were the property of the Rājā and who constituted what was known as the *Pāgā*. The Rājā’s *Pāgā* in 1804 A.D. numbered 1,800 horse and his brother Vyankoji’s 900. The rest of the army consisted of irregular cavalry, or *Silāhdārs*, who owned their own horses. They appear to have numbered about 10,000 to 12,000 in 1804 A.D.

Number
of troops
uncertain.

123. The difficulty, however, of giving an exact estimate of the forces the Rājā could bring into the field, or even of those already in his service, is explained by Elphinstone in the following passage. “The greatest abuses take place in mustering

“the troops. The *Silāhdārs* borrow horses from
“each other to enable them to stand muster; and
“they are allowed to practise this with little con-
“cealment by the muster-masters, who receive small
“salaries and subsist, principally, on the bribes given
“them on such occasions. The deduction to be
“made from the nominal strength of the army
“on this account must be very great. In one
“instance that came to my knowledge a person who
“had, nominally, 175 horse kept only 129. He
“paid 1,000 rupees to the muster-master to be per-
“mitted to carry on this deceit. On the other hand,
“the Rājā has the means of calling out in case of
“war a much greater force than that in the list. Of
“seven thousand horse that he has discharged since
“the peace a great part belong to Chiefs who are
“still in his service, though with fewer followers
“than formerly; and they could immediately
“assemble almost the whole of the 7,000 horse
“again. There are also many people who have
“never been on any service who are, nevertheless,
“ready to join an army the moment war breaks
“out for the sake of plunder alone; and, though
“they do not fight in pitched battles, they are
“often well armed and mounted and capable of
“giving great annoyance to an enemy. Those who
“are worse mounted are still useful in collecting
“grain and forage and selling it in camp bazars.
“They differ from *Pindāris*, as the latter enter into
“engagements with the governments under which
“they act, giving up some part of their profits for
“protection. The numbers of this description of

“Rājā had at the battle of Assye only 18,000 troops
 “in his pay, while his army was attended by 30,000
 “persons of the sort described. In addition to the
 “troops in the list, the officers in charge of the
 “country maintain some force out of the revenue
 “of their provinces, who are not reported to
 “Nāgpur.”*

**Methods of
 recruitment
 and pay-
 ment.**

124. Jenkins, writing in 1816 A.D., gives the following detail of the system by which the troops were recruited and maintained. “When a *Sardār* [leader] enters the service with a *risālā* [troop] of horse or infantry, an engagement, called a *razināmā* [agreement], is taken from him to the following effect. First, he agrees to serve twelve months for 11 or 10 months’ pay, which he is to receive according to the custom of the service. 2nd—In time of war, at home or abroad, all buried treasure, property etc., to be given up to the *Sarkār* [State]. 3rd—The cannon, elephant carrying the flag of an enemy’s Chief and his personal horses taken in battle to be given up to the *Sarkār*. 4th—In time of war, mutiny or at the moment of going into battle demand of pay or dismissal not to be made, under pain of becoming subject to any punishment the *Sarkār* may inflict. When this paper has been given in, the party is mustered by the proper officers and the muster-roll submitted to the Rājā, who signs it and notes upon it with his own hand the rate of

*Despatch No. 25 to the Marquis Wellesley, dated the 13th of August 1804.

“pay. The paper is then delivered to the *Sar-*
 “*daftar** to include in the army estimates. He pre-
 “pares the estimate and the Rājā countersigns it.
 “It is then entered in the *daftar* (office records) and
 “a copy is given to the *Risāldār** as a voucher to
 “entitle him to draw the pay of the *risālā* (troop).
 “There are several articles of deduction, according
 “to the custom of the service, besides the one or
 “two months’ pay in the year specified in the
 “*rāzmāmā*. The whole of the deductions amounts
 “to a fourth, a third or even six annas in the rupee
 “on the nominal rate of pay, according to the
 “understanding entered into at the beginning.
 “About two-thirds of the remainder is given by
 “irregular payments in the course of every month;
 “and the accounts are made up twice a year, when
 “the remaining third is paid—a portion in clothes.
 “This is one of the profits of the Rājā’s private
 “trade, as these clothes are furnished from his own
 “*dukāns* [shops] and forced upon the troops at
 “an advanced value. Another of these profits
 “arises from lending money for the subsistence of
 “the troops at the enormous interest of six *per*
 “*cent per* month. This high interest does not deter
 “the troops from borrowing because the *Sāhukārs*
 “[money-lenders] require deposits, whilst the
 “Rājā’s bankers lend upon the credit of the pay
 “that is known to be due; which the *Sāhukārs* will
 “seldom do because, amongst other reasons, in
 “prosecuting the recovery of their debts before the
 “Rājā they are obliged to give a *douceur* of a fourth

*The *Sardaftar* prepared the Army Estimates. The *Risāldār*
 negotiated and settled the terms of service.

“of the amount to recover the rest. The late Rājā
 “also, in settling the accounts in person, resorted
 “frequently to actual supplication to induce the
 “troops to give up part of their claims; and he
 “generally succeeded in getting something by these
 “means. . . . The Arabs always insist upon a
 “monthly payment and will not be kept in
 “arrears.”*

Rājā's
 treatment of
 his troops.

125. Elphinstone gives the following further information regarding Raghoji's army. “The money
 “necessary to pay these troops is much less than
 “might be supposed. The average pay of *Silāhdār*
 “horse may be about 25 rupees: of this a soldier
 “serving with his own horse is entitled to about
 “20 rupees, the rest goes to the Chief of the party.
 “The [? troops are never] regularly paid but in
 “time of war when they happen to be ill supplied.
 “At other times they get occasional advances on
 “no fixed plan but, I suppose, amounting to what
 “is absolutely necessary to support a man and
 “horse in this cheap country. It is, however, to
 “be observed that the *Pāgā* and infantry are more
 “regularly paid than the *Silāhdārs*. The former
 “corps consist of soldiers mounted on horses be-
 “longing to the government, like our cavalry,
 “whereas the *Silāhdārs* furnish their own horses.
 “The pay of these soldiers, who are called *Bārgirs*,
 “amounts to seven or eight rupees a month. They
 “are commanded by some of the principal officers
 “in the army. The horses are fed by government
 “through its own agents. The pay of a private

*Despatch to the Governor-General, dated the 18th of July 1816.

“in the regular infantry is six rupees a month. “The Rājā has neglected his disciplined troops “since the late war and has increased the number of “his irregular infantry. Of the Europeans in his “service no one remains but a Dutchman, named “Lafeebrazon. The others [two Germans “and an Englishman] were discharged some “months ago and were murdered by the hill people “before they got out of the Rājā’s country.”* “It is certain that he [Raghoji] is not “scrupulous about the manner in which he “settles the claims of his army: those “troops which are retained and whose services are “not immediately wanted receive from time to “time small sums, such as are absolutely necessary “for their support, on account of their pay, which “is allowed to remain in arrears till the Rājā has “occasion to employ them or till their necessities “induce them to mutiny. When a corps is ordered “on service the soldiers and the officers (who are “generally the owners of their horses and contract “to furnish the men) refuse to march till their “arrears are paid; and the Rājā is then forced to “come to some compromise with them. When he “was sending off troops to Hoshangābād he was “obliged to consent to pay those who went a “considerable portion of their arrears; but even of “this they were compelled to take half in clothes “which were sold to them at double their real “value. When the Rājā was discharging troops it “frequently happened that a disbanded corps went

*Despatch to the Marquis Wellesley No. 25, dated the 13th of August 1804.

"in a body and seized the officers of government
 "whom they considered as responsible for their
 "pay. The person whom they seized endeavoured
 "to prevail on the Rājā to satisfy them; but was
 "usually forced to discharge a great part of their
 "dues out of his private funds. The Rājā has
 "more than once been in similar situations him-
 "self, particularly about the beginning of last
 "month, when a party of Afghans surrounded the
 "gates of his *zenānā* and stood there day and night,
 "clamourously demanding their pay, upbraiding
 "the Rājā for his conduct to them and even re-
 "proaching him in the harshest language with his
 "late losses and misfortunes. The Rājā submitted
 "to these indignities for two or three days and
 "tried to persuade some of his ministers to appease
 "the Afghans; but those to whom he applied
 "pleaded their poverty and he was at last obliged
 "to issue money from his own treasury, on which
 "the Afghans withdrew. I stated in my letter to
 "Your Excellency (No. 10) the manner in which
 "the Rājā had plundered the men of one of his
 "battalions.* Others have preferred returning to
 "the government part of the money that had been

*The passage referred to is the following:—"The Rājā of
 "Borār continues to discharge troops. He has lately disbanded
 "three battalions of infantry. He seized the leaders of one
 "battalion and retains them in confinement with a view to
 "extort money from them. Another of these battalions, hav-
 "ing by their clamours obtained a small part of their arrears,
 "were returning to their native country in the northern parts
 "of India when they were attacked by a party of the Raja's
 "horse, said to be acting under his orders, and plundered of
 "all the money they had received and of such arms as they
 "happened to have (their muskets and guns having been taken
 "from them when they were discharged)." (Despatch No. 10
 of March the 1st, 1804.)

“paid to them, on condition of their receiving
“passports which should prevent their being attack-
“ed on their journey to their own country. The
“conduct of the Rājā to his troops affords strong
“ground for believing that he is either disposed to
“maintain the peace or destitute of the means of
“disturbing it.”*

126. The foregoing quotations will have indicated that, although Raghoji II made a large numerical increase in his military establishment, he was not the man to create an efficient military force. Raghoji imitated Sindia's military policy.

He seems to have imitated the policy of Mahādji Sindia but without that Chieftain's vigour and skill. It was Mahādji who first, about 1790 A.D., enlisted large numbers of Rājputs and Mahomedans in his army; and it was Mahādji who, impressed by the success which the French and British had won with sepoy regiments, gradually built up a large body of regular infantry clothed, armed and disciplined on the European model and supported by a numerous and powerful artillery. He thus abandoned the traditional tactics of Marāthā fighting—that form of predatory guerilla warfare in which the army (consisting, as that of Raghoji the Great had consisted, mainly of extremely mobile cavalry) avoided any set collision with the enemy, lived upon the country through which it passed and depended for success more upon the harassment and disorganization of the opposing forces than upon a frontal attack.†

*Despatch No. 12, dated the 24th of March 1804.

†Grant Duff, II, pp. 213—5. The rival merits of Marāthā and European methods of warfare were discussed as early as 1760 A.D., *vide* Kincaid and Parasnis' account (Vol. III, pp. 62 and 65) of the battle of Panipat.

**But did so
half-heart-
edly.**

127. Grant Duff writes, "The great success of 'Sindia's regular infantry, rendered efficient by "the talents and energy of de Boigne, led most "of the Marāthā States to introduce regular bat-
"talions as part of their armies. Many Marāthās,
"however, were of opinion that this departure
"from usage would prove their ruin; infantry and
"guns compelled them to fight when
"flight was more judicious; and some of them
"predicted that, if they ever attempted to combat
"Europeans with their own weapons, they would
"one day experience defeat still more fatal than
"that of Pānīpat. . . . Raghoji Bhonsle, the Rājā of
"Nāgpur, did not in this respect follow the exam-
"ple of the generality of the Marāthā Chieftains."*

This last statement is incorrect, as the quotations I have given will have shown. Raghoji did, between 1790 and 1803 A.D., recruit more than a dozen regular battalions, armed and clothed on the European model and recruited exclusively from Upper India. He also raised a substantial park of field artillery as a necessary complement to his regular forces. But his parsimonious mind rebelled at the thought of employing a highly paid European commander such as a Dudrenec or a de Boigne,† while he had not sufficient decision of character to accept, and adhere to, a definite military policy. Though he raised a number of regular battalions, he failed to bring them to an adequate pitch of efficiency and was uncertain how to make

*Grant Duff, II, pp. 265-6 and 277.

†de Boigne received Rs. 10,000 a month *plus 2 per cent* on certain land assignments.

full use of them in time of war. During the operations of 1803 A.D. Raghoji Bhonsle and Daulat Rāo Sindia were, Grant Duff writes, "quite "undecided as to their plan of operations. Some-
"times Sindia proposed to depend on his battalions
"and artillery : at other times Raghoji persuaded
"him to act on the predatory plan;"* and, as
soon as the war was over, a large number of
Raghoji's regular battalions were disbanded. Add
to all this Raghoji's personal timidity and unwar-
like reputation and it is not surprising that his
military establishment failed to justify itself.

128. There is one other peculiarity about Raghoji's army which it is important to notice. It was almost entirely composed of foreign and immigrant mercenaries. The idea of national or territorial defence, such as Shivāji inspired in the Konkan, never appealed to the inhabitants of Raghoji's dominions. He had to depend almost entirely on soldiers recruited from outside his own borders. As Jenkins says, "It may be observed
"that the armies of the State were never raised
"or recruited in Deogarh; nor is there any ancient
"military force of the country, like the class of
"peons in Mysore, who were employed in police
"duties or in the preservation of internal tran-
"quillity. The cavalry was composed of Marāthās
"from the Poona territories and from different
"parts of the Deccan, with Musalmān adventurers
"from Hindostan; and the infantry consisted of
"Arabs, Gosāins and Pardesis. Some of the

No national
or territorial
recruitment.

“cavalry have found employment in the [British]
“auxiliary horse and a portion of the infantry are
“retained as *Sibandis*.^{*} All the others have quitted
“the country and dispersed in different directions.
“It seems remarkable that so few of the military
“adventurers, who accompanied the first Raghoji
“from Berar and served in the armies of his
“successors, should have thought of forming per-
“manent establishments in the district; and it is
“not improbable that the absence of a race of
“native soldiers, which must have grown out of
“a contrary system, has both contributed to the
“speedy and complete settlement of the country
“and saved the government from the expense of
“providing for a numerous class of individuals.
“These Marāthā soldiers do not appear to have
“considered this country as their home; in general,
“they looked to military employment as the sole
“means of obtaining livelihood and, on the ruin
“of that service, they either retired to their pater-
“nal abodes or engaged in the armies of other
“States. A few Marāthā families were scattered
“over the districts in the vicinity of Nāgpur, the
“members of whom both engaged in tillage and
“served as soldiers or sent *Bārgirs* to serve in their
“room. These individuals, who were termed
“*Silāhdārs*, were most numerous about Kātol,
“Kanoli, Paunār and the districts to the southward
“of Nāgpur. Some of them had small establish-
“ments of brood mares and reared a few horses of
“an inferior size and value. The greater pro-
“portion, however, of this class have quitted the

“country; and those who remain have broken up
“their breeding establishments and entirely depend
“upon agriculture for a subsistence. The total
“number of this class, scattered in the districts
“between the Wardhā and Waingangā, according
“to a census made about five years ago, was only
“seven hundred and eighty-two, and it is supposed
“they now do not amount to half so many.”*

*Jenkins' *Report of 1826*, pp. 22-3.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF RAGHOJI II.

Limited
area admin-
istered from
Nāgpur.

129. The character and scope of Raghoji's civil administration, so far as it was directly regulated under his orders by officials of the State, may now be indicated. In Berar, as explained in Chapter II, the Nāgpur Rājā claimed no more than the right to collect a certain share of the revenue. Administration was in the hands of the Nizām. The whole of Chāndā and Chhattisgarh with Sambalpur, Sargujā, Kālāhandi and Bastar formed the separate appanage of a cadet of the Nāgpur house and was thus, for administrative purposes, under independent control. The province of Orissa and the Nerbudda valley with Garha-Mandlā were in the hands of *Subahdārs*, who were largely left to their own devices so long as they satisfied the revenue demands of their master.* Any attempt, therefore, to portray the character of the Nāgpur administration must be confined to a description of Raghoji's central control and of the local administration of the Deogarh province which alone was directly regulated from the Capital.

The Land-
revenue
System in
Deogarh.

130. Sir Richard Jenkins, in an unpublished report of the 18th of July 1816, written immediately

*"Raghoji Bhonsle probably takes no concern in the internal "administration of Cuttack so long as he draws a substantial "revenue from it." (Forster's Despatch of the 16th of October 1790.) See p. 114 above.

after Raghoji's demise, gives the following account of the "general nature of the administration, financial and judicial," with special reference, as he tells us, to the administration of the province of Deogarh. "First, with regard to the financial department, it is superfluous to observe that the revenue of the State arises principally from the land rent. The Sayer,* though a secondary, is not an unimportant branch, embracing, as it does, almost every article of European taxation. In most districts of the Rājā's dominions the Sayer is farmed in its principal sub-divisions, as are the Customs on exports and imports and the inland tolls throughout the country, the taxes on spirituous liquors and on tobacco. . . . The general system of finance as relating to the land-revenue is the same in Gondwāna [Deogarh] as in Berar†. . . Some of the institutions of the system seem to have been introduced into Gondwāna [Deogarh] under the Gondi government by an administration seeking to improve itself upon the model of its more civilized neighbours; but the Marāthā government completed the assimilation. There are, however, local differences arising out of the different circumstances of the two countries some of which will be noticed below. The whole of the country [*i.e.*, Deogarh] with trifling exceptions is under the direct government of the State. There

*The *Sair* was primarily an export, import and transit duty on home productions, passing from one part of the country to another or beyond the frontier, and on foreign productions in transit; but it also included numerous other taxes of a miscellaneous description on sales of houses, cattle and slaves, on stamping cloth, etc. (See Jenkins' *Report of 1826*, p. 118.)

“are no *jāgirs*,* properly so called; and, in the
 “lands assigned for the payment of their troops, the
 “military Chiefs are exactly on the same footing
 “as other Collectors, being obliged to account for
 “the surplus of the revenue after their assigned
 “share may have been realized and being over-
 “looked in all their proceedings by the persons
 “appointed for that purpose throughout the
 “country. The office of these persons is exercised
 “with considerable strictness and their connivance
 “with the Collector, which is sometimes detected,
 “severely punished. These are a *Warārpānde*
 “or Register, and a *Pharnavis* who keeps the
 “accounts of receipts and disbursements.† A
 “certain number of districts, including the city and
 “*parganah* of Nāgpur, are considered as set apart
 “for the Rājā’s expenses and are called his *Khāsgi*
 “(or private estate). They are under a separate
 “management—in no respect, however, different
 “from the rest. The revenue of them comes im-
 “mediately into the Treasury and is never diverted,
 “as assignments or otherwise, to the payment of

*Grants of land the revenue of which was remitted, wholly or in part, in return, usually, for an undertaking to supply a certain quota of troops.

†There was for each *parganah* or sub-division a *Kamāishdār* (Collector) on Rs. 200 to Rs. 500 *per annum*, a *Warārpānde* (who kept the records regarding the state of cultivation) on Rs. 100 to Rs. 150 *per annum plus* Rs. 2 *per village* in his charge; and a *Pharnavis* (who kept the accounts of all receipts and disbursements) on Rs. 100 to Rs. 250 *per annum plus* Re. 1 *per village* in his charge. There were 60 *Kamāishdārs* in Deogarh below the *ghāts* alone and, presumably, as many *Warārpāndes* and *Pharnavis*. The local *Warārpāndes* and *Pharnavis* were controlled by headquarters officers of the same name known as *Sadar Warārpānde* and *Sadar Pharnavis*. See Jenkins’ Report of 1826, pp. 89 and 99.

"the troops. The land-revenue is under *amāni*
 "[direct departmental] management, the *Āmils*
 "[Collectors] receiving regular salaries, according
 "to the respective size of their districts, and their
 "accounts being checked, and the assignments
 "regulated, under the direct superintendence of the
 "officers above mentioned. In its real operation,
 "however, this is not much superior to the farming
 "system. The office of *Māmlatdār*, *Kāmdār* or
 "*Kamāishdār*, as the Collector is indifferently term-
 "ed, is conferred on the person who can offer the
 "highest *nazarānā* [cash payment]; and, whilst the
 "ear of the *Rājā* is open to the complaints of the
 "ryot, it is not for the purpose of redressing those
 "complaints but for that of regulating his [the
 "*Rājā*'s] extortions on the Collector, whilst the
 "new ways and means thus discovered are included
 "in the list of the subsequent assessment. . . .
 "The revenues are collected through the medium
 "of the *Patels*, or headmen of villages, who have
 "the internal management and are responsible for
 "the revenues of their respective villages. In Berar
 "the *Patels* are obliged to give a collateral security
 "to the *Āmil* for the amount of the revenues of
 "the village; and the *Patels* of several villages are
 "compelled to a bond, called *sankal zamāni* or
 "'a chain security', to be reciprocally responsible
 "for the personal appearance of one another; but
 "I do not find these institutions in Gondwāna
 "[Deogarh]. In Berar and other countries of the
 "Deccan the office of *Patel* is hereditary and sale-
 "able. In the greatest part of Gondwāna [Deo-
 "garh] the *Rājā* is considered to be the hereditary

“*Patel* of all the villages; and the inferior *patelgis*
 “[village headships] consequently are not strictly
 “hereditary, nor are they saleable, excepting by
 “the *Sarkār* [State]. The village officers, so called,
 “are little more than subordinate Collectors with
 “the powers of a *Patel* and with such of the emolu-
 “ments as the *Rājā* may have assigned them. . . .
 “The *Patels*, however, are not arbitrarily removed
 “so long as they perform their engagements.*
 “There is the usual establishment of village officers,
 “some enjoying *inām* [revenue free] lands, some
 “merely payments in grain from the ryots. There
 “are no hereditary *Zamindārs* [superior office-
 “holders] in the *parganahs*; but in the account
 “there is a reservation of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent (as in Berar
 “of 5 per cent) for the *Zamindārs*, which goes to
 “the government. This seems to have been the
 “same under the Gondi government which pre-
 “ceded that of the *Marāthās*. In other parts,
 “however, as in the districts of Berar, east and west
 “of the *Wardhā*, etc., the old institutions of here-
 “ditary *Deshmukhs* and *Deshpāndes* for the *par-*
 “*ganahs* and hereditary *Patels* for the villages re-
 “main unimpaired; whilst in *Garha-Mandlā* and
 “*Chhattisgarh* there are many hereditary *Zamin-*
 “*dārs* [landholders], who pay their revenue to the
 “government without any direct interference on

*This passage, especially in the contrast it draws between
 the weakness of the *Deogarh Patel* and the strength of the
Berar Patel, indicates the artificial status created subsequently
 by the British when they conferred proprietary rights upon
 Village Headmen in the Central Provinces. The *Berar Patel*,
 though his office was “hereditary and saleable”, never received
 such an endowment.

"the part of its officers in their municipal arrange-
 "ments.*. . . . The revenue is realized in a
 "money payment under several heads as the *ain*,
 "or original assessment of the village, and the
 "various additional imposts during the Gond
 "government, in which is seen the *sardeshmukhi*
 "of ten *per cent* imposed by the Marāthās before
 "the conquest. These are followed by the *pattis*,
 "or additional assessments, of the Marāthā govern-
 "ment, of which I have seen a list of thirty-six.
 "The Gond Rājā has his share on the *ain*, origin-
 "ally amounting by agreement to a third but now
 "reduced to about a *lākh* and a quarter of rupees
 "*per annum*. He has an officer in each *parganah*
 "who keeps regular accounts of the receipts and
 "disbursements and has the privilege of putting
 "his seal, with that of the Rājā, on all public docu-
 "ments relating to the internal administration of
 "Gondwānā [Deogarh]. The usual time of form-
 "ing the *jamabandi* [revenue demand] is in the
 "months of July and August when the seed of the
 "*kharif* [autumn] harvest is in the ground; and the
 "collections immediately commence. One instal-
 "ment of three-fourths of the amount is then paid
 "and the other fourth in January before the ripen-
 "ing of the *rabi* [spring] harvest,† so that, to
 "liquidate the demands of the government, the
 "ryot is obliged to borrow money on the security
 "of the crops on the ground, for which he pays

*The term *Zamindār* in reference to Garha-Mandlā and
 Chhattisgarh signifies a great hereditary *land-holder*—a status
 distinct from that of the *Zamindār* in Berar who was a heredi-
 tary *office-holder*.

†But see *Report of 1826*, p. 89.

“an interest of 25 *per cent*, besides that the amount of the debt is liquidated in produce at a rate which has been fixed at the time of the valuation of the crops and which is much below the selling price. For any advances from the *Sarkār* he pays the same rate of interest on repayments. The ryot is, of course, always in debt either to the *Sarkār* or to bankers; and indeed, when he happens to have a capital which might keep him out of this predicament, he is not long allowed to keep it or is obliged to conceal it by having recourse to borrowing like his neighbours. Moreover he does not know the whole extent of the demands upon him until the end of the year when the accounts are made up, as no year passes without a new *patti* or assessment being superinduced on the *jamabandi* by the orders of the *Rājā*.”

Criminal
and Civil
Justice in
Deogarh.

131. “ The administration of civil and criminal justice as well as of the local police is in the hands of the Collector, who investigates and decides upon all cases, excepting capital crimes or such as involve considerable persons or much property, that arise in his district. The latter cases are usually referred entirely to the *Rājā*; the former are investigated by the *Āmil* and the decision referred to the *Rājā*. In larger jurisdictions (including several districts, as Jubbulpore, which is under a *Subahdār*, and the different *jāgirs*, as they are improperly termed, assigned for the payment of troops), the *Subahdār* or the *Jāgirdār* is, of course, the person to whom the

"case is referred by the Collector; but he [the
 "Subahdār or Jāgirdār] has no capital jurisdiction
 "and can only submit the case for the Rājā's
 "orders. The officers of government, the *Panch*
 "and other respectable persons ought to be called
 "in by the Collector as assessors; or, if it happens
 "to be a question of caste, the assessors are chosen
 "accordingly. Fines and corporal punishment, not
 "extending to life or limb, seem to be inflicted
 "at the discretion of the Collector, not to mention
 "the tortures he is authorized to employ, if neces-
 "sary, to realize the revenues. In criminal trials,
 "it is usual, first, to write down the deposition of
 "the plaintiff and to take from him a bond, ac-
 "knowledging himself to be worthy of punishment
 "by the *Sarkār*, of being considered infamous by
 "the *panchāyat* and of being ejected from his caste,
 "if his deposition shall be proved false. The de-
 "fendant's depositions and bond are taken in like
 "manner. Witnesses are then called, from whom
 "a similar bond is taken, and their depositions
 "also written down. Oaths are not administered
 "excepting in very particular cases; but fines are
 "imposed for false evidence. In civil suits the
 "proceedings are similar. If it be a case of *mu-*
 "perty, a fourth part is payable, by the person in
 "whose favour the cause is decided, to the *Sarkar*,
 "as *shukrāna* or an offering of thanks. The same
 "proceedings take place in the *adālat* [court] of
 "the City, whose jurisdiction, as a Civil and Crimi-
 "nal Court, was formerly extensive but seems now
 "confined nearly to that part of the City where it
 "is situated. The different quarters of the City

“have each their petty Courts, called *chauris*,
“which are, at once, offices of police, of civil and
“criminal justice and for the collection of the
“excise duties within their respective jurisdictions.
“These are subject to the principal *chauri*, which
“is under a *Faujdār* [properly, a military officer],
“and, besides the other local duties above mention-
“ed, is the custom-house of the City. All serious
“causes are, however, carried before the *Rājā*, who
“either investigates them himself or appoints pro-
“per persons to do so, reserving only the decision
“for his own province. In common cases it would
“appear that justice is pretty well administered,
“but, where there is an ability to bribe, all forms
“are disregarded and the highest bribe obtains the
“favourable award. Capital punishments are very
“uncommon. Even murder may be compounded
“for, if the murderer can pay, and the relations
“of the person murdered choose to accept, the
“composition fixed by the *Sarkār*, usually 350
“rupees. This, however, can only benefit criminals
“of some property. Women and *Brāhmans* are
“never capitally punished; and the amputation of
“the right hand is the highest punishment for
“theft; but gang robbery is capital in any but the
“gangs authorized by the *Rājā*. Before these
“gangs, indeed, all police must give way. They
“are the terror of the merchant travelling through
“the country and of the people of any property in
“the City, where these robberies are not unfre-
“quently attended with murder; but the only object
“of the enquiry which the *Rājā* institutes on such
“occasions is to ascertain from the owner the value

“of the property lost, in order to be a check on the
 “accounts of the depredators. The same persons
 “are at once employed for the general police and
 “the private depredations of the Rājā; and the
 “effect of this combination is that, with the ex-
 “ception of the Pindāris and of the Gonds who
 “plunder about the skirts of the hills, there are few
 “of the profession who rob on their own account.
 “Even this, comparatively speaking, is an
 “advantage to the country; and, upon the whole,
 “the general and direct authority of the Rājā over
 “every part of his dominions [Deogarh] and the
 “absence of the local influence of hereditary
 “*Zamindārs* [Landholders] are not unfavourable
 “circumstances for the ryots, who have thus fewer
 “oppressors. The hereditary influence of *Zamin-*
 “*dārs* is, no doubt, an useful instrument of police
 “under a strong and wise government; and the
 “absence of them deprives the ryots of their natural
 “leaders when driven to resist oppression; but,
 “in the defective politics of India, the power of
 “such leaders is more frequently used to disturb
 “the public tranquillity than to maintain it, and
 “to take advantage of a weak, than to resist a
 “strong and oppressive, administration.”

132. “The revenue department at the Capital
 “consists of the *Vakil*, who has the general superin-
 “tendence, conducts the negotiations with, and
 “takes the securities of, the Collectors; the *Phar-*
 “*navis*, who has the *daftar* [records] of the actual
 “receipts and disbursements of the Collectors fur-
 “nished by his subordinates in each district; the

The centra
 control at
 Nagpur.

“*Warārpānde*, or general Register, who has under him all the provincial Registers; and the *Sille-khānawālā*, or Treasurer. It may be observed that this latter officer has nothing to do with the provincial treasurers, called *Potnavis*, who are servants of the Collectors.”

Rājā's
private
trade.

133. “I have omitted to mention the Rājā's private trade, as one of the sources of his revenues. His Highness has many *dukāns* [shops] for the sale of clothes and of grain and for banking in the City. He also engages in foreign trade and, in short, thinks no mode by which money may be made discreditable. His example is, of course, followed by his family and the Court.”

Heads of
expenditure
other than
Army.

134. “. . . . The household expenses include the allowances to the *Bāis* [ladies] and to *Bālā Sāhib* [Heir Apparent] as Prince; the allowance to the latter is said to have amounted to twelve thousand rupees *per* month. These are exclusive of a few villages assigned to each for *Pān* and *Supāri* [pin or pocket-money]. The principal Ministers have also some villages in *inām* [free grant] besides their allowances, which are trifling, and perquisites. The Rājā has about 400 elephants and 200 camels. A part of these are generally stationed in the different villages of the *Khāṣgi parganahs*, the expenses being regularly accounted for with the Collectors and the amount remitted in their disbursements. The Rājā has about 400 *Jasuses* [spies] or *Harkārās* [orderlies]

"in the intelligence department at four rupees a
 "month, besides about the same number employed
 "and subsisted in different districts in subordina-
 "tion to, or for the purpose of dunning, the
 "Collectors for their instalments. At the *Dasahrā*
 "all the Court and army get clothes; at the *Diwali*
 "the chief merchants and bankers of the City; and
 "Collectors or officers of any description on their
 "appointment to a new situation. Besides these
 "are the presents sent to foreign Courts and on a
 "hundred other occasions. His Highness's gifts
 "to Brāhmans were never very great; nor have the
 "pagodas in His Highness's dominions any con-
 "siderable endowments. In two respects His High-
 "ness, though generally fond of money, was
 "esteemed exceedingly liberal. He spared no ex-
 "pense to get intelligence; and he gave considerable
 "sums every year to promote marriages (a matter
 "of obligation so indispensable amongst the
 "Hindus) where the parties were in any want of
 "pecuniary assistance. All the late Rājā's expenses
 "were strictly superintended by himself and the
 "accounts carefully checked. All articles required
 "for the annual consumption of his household and
 "for his horses, elephants and camels were laid
 "up in store at a cheap rate and served out daily
 "or weekly with every precaution to prevent
 "embezzlement."

135. "I have not been able to obtain an account
 "of the expenses of keeping up the principal forts
 "in the Rājā's dominions. These are, 1st Gāwil-
 "garh; 2nd Narnālā, the two at present garrisoned

Principal
Forts.

“by 500 men the expenses of which are defrayed
 “from the four *mahāls* in Berar under the hills;*”
 “3rd Hoshangābād with 500 men; 4th Chaurāgarh,
 “a hill fort with 250 men; 5th Mandlā with 200
 “men; 6th Dhāmoni, a hill fort with 200 men; 7th
 “Sāoligarh with 400 men; 8th Seoni with 50 men;
 “9th Ambāgarh, a hill fort with 30 men; 10th Lānji
 “with 30 men; 11th Wairāgarh with 50 men; 12th
 “Paunār with 30 men; 13th Deogarh, a hill fort
 “with 40 men; 14th Kherlā, a hill fort near Betul;
 “15th Asirgarh, a hill fort near Multai; 16th
 “Partābgarh, a hill fort; 17th Tezgarh.† These
 “are all either of stone or brick but are much
 “neglected and out of repair. There are few of
 “them, I imagine, of any great strength. Chaurā-
 “garh and Mandlā are the next in reputation to
 “Gāwilgarh and Narnālā in the above list.
 “Chāndā is the principal fort in Āpā Sāhib’s
 “territory and is considered to come nearest in
 “strength to Gāwilgarh, though it is on a plain.
 “There are also a good number of petty hill forts
 “in Chhattisgarh, besides Ratanpur and Sambal-
 “pur, but none of any reputation.”

**Annual
 closure of
 accounts.**

136. “All the revenue accounts are closed in
 “June, that being the time at which the whole of
 “the collections are supposed to be realized. The
 “officers of the revenue department meet and

*See para. 96 above.

†Sāoligarh and Asirgarh (not to be confused with the famous Asirgarh in Nimār) are, respectively, to the north-west and north-east of the modern Betul district. Partābgarh and Ambāgarh are in the Bhandārā district. The other forts mentioned are well-known locally.

“compare their accounts. The *Vakil* proves the “engagements of the Collector or *Māmlatdār*; the “*Pharnavis* the gross receipts, expenses of collections, etc., and the net sum realized; the *Warār-pānde* furnishes the accounts of the quantity of land in or out of cultivation compared with the “past year, and the Treasurer the receipts and disbursements of his department. An account containing the result is prepared in common, called “the *Varsālā*, and presented by them to the *Rājā*, “after examining the *jama* or actual receipts. The “*Sardaftar* of the army estimates and the *Bakshis* “of the cavalry and infantry produce the accounts “of the army and the *Khāsgirwālā* [Controller of “the Household] of all the other expenses of the “government. A general account of the *kharch*, “or expenditure, is prepared and a general account “current of the receipts and disbursements drawn “out. The *Rājā* examines the accounts thus made “out; signs the separate accounts of the receipts “and disbursements as well as the general one; and “keeps a memorandum of the result. There are “two principal departments yet unnoticed; that of “the *Chitnavis*, or Marāthā Secretary, and that of “the *Munshi*, which includes the Persian *daftar* “[records and correspondence] and [foreign affairs].”

137. “. . . . To complete the view of the Character
 “character of the State of Nāgpur, however, it will Raghoji
 “not be without its use to attempt a sketch of the
 “character of the late *Rājā*. Such a sketch may,
 “indeed, be considered as a necessary appendix to
 “any description of an Indian government, but

“it is more peculiarly so to a review of the past
“circumstances of this government, to every part
“of which the Rājā’s personal care and, consequent-
“ly, the effects of his personal qualities and habits
“during a reign of 28 years may be said to have
“extended. Rājā Raghoji Bhonsle at the
“period of his death was within two months of
“completing his 56th year. He was of low stature
“and inclined to corpulence. His complexion was
“dark and his features coarse. He had no dignity
“in his mien and his manners were rustic and
“familiar. He was easy of access and affable to all
“ranks and descriptions of people; he seldom
“offended by harsh language the feelings of those
“about him and possessed, in a considerable degree,
“the art of persuasion and of binding men to his
“purposes, though it must be confessed that he
“frequently descended to acts of mean supplication
“which succeeded for the time, from the proper
“feelings of the person to whom they were address-
“ed, whilst they ultimately tended to excite a con-
“tempt for his person that, had his authority been
“less firmly established, might not have stopped
“there. He was particularly fond of children; a
“kind and too indulgent father and uncle to his own
“son and nephews, as children, though too easily
“estranged from them, when they grew up, from
“the natural jealousy of his temper. He, however,
“never lost his affection for his daughters, parti-
“cularly the youngest who was his favourite. He
“had originally four wives. One, the mother of
“the present Rājā [Pārsoji], has been long dead.
“With one he had an inveterate quarrel and she

"never after lived with him. A third was on
 "equally bad terms with him and lived separately
 "from him for some years, until reconciled to him
 "by Sridhar Pandit when he was setting out for
 "Benares. The fourth, Bākā Bāi, was his favourite,
 "but her influence never extended beyond the walls
 "of the harem. He never lived on good terms
 "with his brothers, one of whom, Chimnāji, he is
 "generally believed to have made away with by
 "means of incantations. The inadequacy of the
 "means, simply considered, may seem to throw an
 "air of fable on this accusation; and charity would
 "lead one to hope that it is false, however strong
 "the universal belief of his guilt.* His Highness
 "was remarkable for his filial respect for his
 "mother, whilst she lived, and he never undertook
 "anything of importance without consulting her.
 "He was always indefatigable in business, into
 "which he had been initiated during the reign of his
 "father, so that he ascended the *masnad* [throne]
 "with a perfect knowledge of men and things. He
 "was naturally capable of enduring great bodily
 "exertion; but the advances of age compelled him
 "to abstain in a great measure from exercise, al-
 "though to a very short period before his death he
 "continued the same unremitted attention to public
 "affairs which had marked his whole life but which
 "was little suited to the gradual decline of his
 "strength. There was not a detail of his adminis-
 "tration to which he did not sometimes personally
 "attend. Whether the matter related to foreign

*The story is given in some detail on p. 6 of the *Sketch of 1811*.

“affairs, as negoti⁴ation, correspondence or intelli-
 “gence, or to the internal government of his dom-
 “inions in its financial, judicial or military
 “branches, it was not merely submitted to his
 “general inspection but in many cases actually
 “managed by him; and in accounts, particularly
 “where anything was to be gained or lost, he
 “would sit down for hours, engaged in minute
 “calculations and even personal altercations with
 “the officers, civil or military, to whose depart-
 “ment they related. To enable him to do this he
 “gave little time to sleep and none to absolute
 “recreation, unless the duties of religion, which he
 “observed with great exactness and with an ambi-
 “tion of undertaking ceremonies above the rank in
 “which he was placed in the scale of Hindu castes,*
 “may be termed a recreation. Even these, how-
 “ever, were not a necessary interruption of busi-
 “ness; and attention to affairs was never deemed in-
 “consistent with the usual amusements of the Court
 “or the seasons. His Highness was in personal
 “disposition rather passionate and, on some occa-
 “sions, cruel. He had, however, the art of con-
 “cealing his enmities, where it was politic or
 “dangerous to show them, but he never forgot or
 “forgave an injury. He was obstinate in his own
 “way of thinking, though never refusing to listen
 “to the opinions of others. He was timid both in
 “his personal and political character. He was
 “jealous of his authority and suspicious of others,

*The Nāgpur Bhonsles still aspire to recognition as Kshatri-
 yas; and claim, as such, the use of Vedic, instead of Pauranic,
mantras at their religious ceremonies. These the Brāhmans
 with rare exceptions, refuse to recite. See p. 9.

"which may have been, in part, the reason which
 "led him to interfere so much in the details of
 "his government; but the principal causes of it,
 "probably, were the habits of business formed
 "from his earliest youth, the insight he then
 "acquired into the scenes of venality which every
 "department of the administration presented and
 "the desire to draw into his own treasury, as he
 "really did, many of those gains which the Minis-
 "ters had been accustomed to intercept.
 "He was certainly hostile to the British govern-
 "ment; and no benefits could efface from his
 "recollection the losses and the disgraces he had
 "suffered. But he bitterly repented having been
 "betrayed into an abandonment of the temporizing
 "policy of his family by joining the Marāthā con-
 "federacy. He had sense enough to see that noth-
 "ing open can now be attempted, with probable
 "success, to shake our power; but he was happy to
 "encourage any surreptitious efforts to undermine
 "it and credulous, to an absurd degree, with re-
 "gard to any reports to our disadvantage. He
 "was too old to be enterprizing, saw the folly of
 "coalitions with such materials as India now
 "presents and, while he seemed resolved never to
 "part with his fancied independence, he carefully
 "avoided giving us offence, though he was equally
 "disinclined to do anything to please us when he
 "had no immediate object in view."*

*Despatch to the Governor-General from Richard Jenkins, Esquire, Resident at Nāgpur, dated the 18th of July 1816. Jenkins' character sketch of Raghoji II, quoted in the last paragraph of this chapter, is repeated in his *Report of 1826* (pp. 67-8), but in more critical terms.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCLUSION.

138. I have now completed my account of the Nāgpur State and of its relations with the British in the 18th century. It remains briefly to indicate the place which the Marāthā period fills in the political and economic history of the Central Provinces. The debt which this part of India owes to Marāthā rule is greater than is commonly supposed.

Functions
performed
by the State.

139. The kingdom which Raghoji the Great founded was of the normal mediaeval type. It rested upon military conquest; and the Nāgpur Marāthās, following in this the political practice of the Moguls, recognized only certain primary functions as appertaining to the State. They defended the country from foreign invasion, suppressed internal revolt and policed the larger towns. But they accepted very little responsibility for the general welfare of the rural population. They maintained no proper rural police. They established no regular *mofussil* courts for the administration of criminal or civil justice. There was no State expenditure on schools or on communications. The resources of the country were mostly absorbed by the Rājā in maintaining his Court, in paying his army and in supporting the hierarchy of subordinate officials needed for the collection of his revenues.

140. At the same time Marāthā rule in the Nāgpur territories constituted for the mass of the people an immense advance upon the system of government which preceded it. Before the Marāthās came, the country was divided up into a number of petty semi-indigenous principalities. Each of these was again sub-divided into greater and lesser chiefships. The States themselves were frequently at war, and were always at enmity, with one another; and every greater and lesser Chief was ready, as soon as external control was relaxed, to break out into internecine hostilities with his neighbours. There can have been under such a system but slender security for life and property and but little encouragement for either trade or agriculture. The chaotic conditions which Motte noticed in Sambalpur in 1766 A.D.,* which Blunt reported as prevalent in Bastar in 1795 A.D.† and which Roughsedge found in existence in Sargujā in 1818 A.D.‡ were typical of the state of the country before the Marāthās conquered it. And it was because the Marāthās had not established their authority in these outlying tracts that it was possible for such anarchy and confusion to continue. Jenkins speaks of the "impoverished state" in which the Waingangā district was found by the Marāthās when they first entered it, due to "its being parcelled out at that time amongst a number of petty *Zamindārs* of wild and irregular habits, constantly engaged in hostilities with each

Great advance on previous system.

*See p. 36 above.

†See p. 123 above.

“other or in rebellion against their nominal “Chiefs.” He observes that, under the sway of the Bhonsles, “the country is said much to have improved and to have received a great increase of population.”*

**Increase of
prosperity
under Mar-
āthā rule.**

141. Jenkins' verdict, that the advent of the Marāthās “no doubt accelerated the general prosperity”, may be accepted as authoritative.† The Nāḡpur Rājās substituted one indisputable authority for a score of rival or rebellious chieftains and secured for an agricultural people that immunity from external disturbance and stability of village life which were essential preliminaries to progress. In Orissa (as in other very outlying portions of the kingdom) the Nāḡpur administration did not function. But Sir W. Hunter's exposure of Marāthā misrule in that remote and isolated province must not be taken as justifying a general condemnation of the Nāḡpur government. Wherever they could stabilize their authority the rule of the Nāḡpur Bhonsles constituted, as I have said, an immense advance upon the system which had gone before it. In establishing over the greater part of the kingdom direct relations between the Rājā and the cultivating classes they rendered a special service to the country. “Upon the whole”, Jenkins writes in 1816 A.D., “the general and direct authority of the Rājā over every part of his dominions “and the absence of the local influence of hereditary *Zamindārs* are not unfavourable circum-

*Jenkins, p. 106.

†*Ibid.*, p. 75.


“stances for the ryots who have thus fewer oppres-
“sors.”* But the introduction of direct Marāthā
rule, wherever it was well established, meant far
more than this. It laid the first foundations of a
regular revenue system; it encouraged immigra-
tion; it fostered tradè as a necessary means of con-
verting raw produce into specie; and it stimulated
the economic development of the country.† The
territory which now forms the Central Provinces
was in pre-Marāthā times a backwater, but remote-
ly connected with trade conditions and political
movements in other parts of India. The Nāgpur
Bhonsles brought this backwater into the broad
stream of Indian economy and history, just as the
British have since linked it with ocean currents of
world politics and prices.

*See p. 209 above.

†In the time of Raghoji the Great the price of grain (*juār*)
was one *khandi* or 400 lbs. per rupee; under Jānoji the rate
was 200 lbs. per rupee; under Mudhoji it was 150 lbs. per
rupee; while under Raghoji II it rose gradually from 80
to 50 lbs. per rupee. See para. 15 of *Notes suggested*
by a perusal of Sir J. Malcolm's revenue report on Mālhwā,
written in 1820 and preserved in the Nāgpur Secretariat.

APPENDIX A.

GENEALOGICAL TREE OF THE NĀGPUR BHONSLES.



*Supposed by the British to have been the brother of Shāhu Rājā of Sātārā—see Appendix B.

†Supposed by the British to have been adopted by Shāhu Rājā of Sātārā—see Appendix B. Mudhoji and Bimbaji were Raghoji I's sons by his first wife, Sulā Bāi Mohite. This lady was the first cousin of Sagunā Bāi Mohite, the youngest wife of Shāhu Rājā of Sātārā (*Sketch of 1811*, p. 2, and local information). This connection by marriage is the only authentic relationship known to exist between the Nāgpur and Sātārā Bhonsles. Grant Duff (I, pp. 442 and 550) states that Shāhu married Raghoji I "to the sister of one of his own wives of the *Shirke* family"; that Mudhoji and Sābaji were the two *younger* of Raghoji I's four sons, though born of the elder wife; and that they were "*nephews* of the late Rāni of Sātārā, Sakwār Bāi Shirke."

APPENDIX B.

THE BRITISH OFFICIAL VERSION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN NĀGPUR, SĀTĀRĀ AND POONA.*

“Shāhuji married a person named Tārā Bāi; “but, having no children by her, he adopted his “brother Parsoji’s great-grandson, Mudhoji “Bhonsle, whose disposition, however, was considered so tyrannical that Shāhuji was compelled “to dismiss him; and he, therefore, sent for “Jānoji, the elder brother of Mudhoji, who was “on his way to Sātārā when Shāhuji died in 1740 “after a reign of 50 years. . . . Shāhuji was “succeeded by his cousin Rāmrajā. . . . Rām- “rajā was also the adopted son of Shāhuji’s widow, “Tārā Bāi. Rāmrajā being a very weak prince, “the *Peshwā*, Bāji Rāo, the son of Bālāji Vishwā- “nāth, . . . usurped the whole power of his “master. At that time Raghoji Bhonsle, the “ancestor of the present Rājā of Berar, was the “*Bakshi*, or Commander-in-Chief, of the forces “and, as such, held the province of Berar in “*jāgir*. When Bāji Rāo usurped the authority of “the Rājā of Sātārā, Raghoji Bhonsle proceeded to “Berar and there established an independent gov- “ernment. It appears, however, that he continued “to acknowledge the supremacy of the Rājā of “Sātārā and the authority of the office of the “*Peshwā* as the civil executive authority of the

*Extracted from pp. 256-7 of *Bengal Papers relative to the Marāthā War of 1803* printed by order of the House of Commons, 5th and 22nd June 1804.

“State. . . . The situation of Berar with relation to the *Peshwā* certainly differs from that of the other provinces comprehended in the Marāthā State. . . . Raghoji had pretensions (founded on his descent) to the State of Sātārā after the death of Rāmrājā, who had no issue. The preservation of his nominal subordination to the State of Sātārā favoured the eventual accomplishment of those pretensions; but the dread of the superior power of the *Peshwā* prevented their ultimate success. . . . Under these circumstances it cannot be supposed that the Rājā of Berar considered himself to be subordinate to the *Peshwā*, although it was his interest to act with him on important occasions, as a member of that empire of which the *Peshwā* was the executive civil authority. On occasions of meeting between them the Rājā of Berar was treated, in consequence of his descent, as a superior in rank and, in the capacity of the first constituent member of the empire, claimed the right of sending to the *Peshwā* a dress of honour on his accession to office. The same system has continued until the present period. The Rājā of Berar still maintains his pretensions to be Rājā of Sātārā and, *a fortiori*, to the office of *Peshwā* on the same grounds as the first Rājā of Berar. . . . The justice of his pretensions, however, has never been admitted.”

APPENDIX C.

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE NĀGPUR BRANCH OF THE BHONSLE FAMILY, *from the conquest of their country to the present time, submitted to the Right Hon'ble Earl Cornwallis, K.G., Governor-General, by George Forster, Resident at Nāgpur, on the 11th of April 1788 A.D.*

According to the received tradition of the country, it appears that Kānhoji Bhonsle* about 70 years ago† under the sanction of the Shāhu Rājā laid the Gondwāna‡ and Berar§ countries under occasional contribution, and resided commonly in the fort and district of Bhām.** A brother of Kānhoji, named Santāji, disgusted, it is said, at the oppressive conduct of this Chief, left him and entered into the service of Bakht Buland,†† the prince of the Deogarh division of Gondwāna, by whom he was raised to great

*The name of a sect in which were classed the former princes of the Marāthā country, entitled the Shāhu Rājās.

†Some time previously to the year 1720 when the Marāthā State after the death of Aurangzeb assumed independence and power.

‡This extensive territory, which before the Marāthā conquest contained two distinct principalities, Garha-Mandlā and Deogarh, is bounded on the north by Bundelkhand at the distance of about 70 miles to the northward of the Nerbudda; on the east it includes Ratanpur; on the south it extends to the vicinity of the Godāvari; on the west to the river Wardhā; and on the north-west to the Nerbudda. For obtaining a geographical knowledge of these places and rivers—*vide* Rennell's map.

§Berar lies generally between the Tāpti, Wardhā and Godāvari rivers—*vide* Rennell's map.

**They are situated in Berar.

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**They are situated in Berar.

††This prince resided at Deogarh, about 80 miles to the

honours and power. Kānhoji, on some pretence, having invaded the Gondwāna, was defeated by Bakht Buland, who in that service received a distinguished personal aid from Santāji. When the intelligence of this event reached Sātārā, the Shāhu, having been displeased at Kānhoji's irregular remission of the Gondwāna tribute, expressed his approbation and permitted Raghoji Bhonsle, a nephew of Santāji desirous of partaking of his relation's good fortune, to proceed to Deogarh, where Bakht Buland gave him an employment in his army and, apprised of the young man's connection with Santāji, charged Chānd Sultān, the prince's eldest son, with the special care of his advancement. Bakht Buland, it is related, supplied Raghoji, then about fifteen years of age, with a sum of money, to enable him to conclude a marriage with a sister* of the Shāhu Rājā, for which purpose he went to Sātārā† where he remained until the death of Bakht Buland. Kānhoji, his uncle, having on this event invaded the Gondwāna, Raghoji was directed by the Shāhu, who conferred on him the title of *Senā Sāheb*,‡ to raise an army and reduce the power of Kānhoji whom

*A sister by marriage. On the tenure of this proximity Mudhoji, the present Chief of Nāgpur, maintains secret pretensions to the dominions of the *Peshwā*, which were encouraged by our government during the last Marāthā war.

†Sātārā was the original seat of the Marāthā government but, since the Brāhman administration, has been removed to Poona.

‡*Senā*, in the Sanskrit, signifies army and *Sāheb*, in the common language of the country, commander, master, etc. The family of Bakht still hold the title.

he, accordingly, attacked and, having totally routed his forces, took him prisoner and conducted him to Sātārā. About this period Chānd Sultān died and was succeeded by his son, Mir Bahādur, whom Wali Shāh, an uncle of this prince, rebelled against and put to death. Raghoji, then engaged in an expedition in the Carnatic, was privately solicited by the widow of Chānd Sultān and a party she had formed to place Akbar Shāh, another of her sons, in the government; and for this service an ample reward would be bestowed on him. Raghoji, assenting to the requisition, proceeded into the Gondwāna where he was opposed by Wali Shāh's *Diwān*, whom Raghoji defeated and took prisoner in the field. A negotiation was entered into between them specifying that a fourth of the whole revenue should be given up to the Marāthā Chief; and the *Diwān* assured him that, if Wali Shāh did not acquiesce in the treaty, he might enter the country the following year and levy contributions at pleasure. In the course of the next year it appears that Raghoji again entered the territories of Wali Shāh, who had refused to ratify the *Diwān's* treaty, and after various success subdued this prince, who with his son falling into the hands of the conqueror, Akbar Shāh, the son of Chānd Sultān, was invested in the government. Raghoji, placing agents in Nāgpur* for collecting a certain

*Founded by the father of Bakht Buland, about 100 years ago. Bakht Buland, of the tribe of Gonds, the name of the inhabitants of this country, was, when a youth, forcibly converted to the Mahomedan religion in the reign of Aurangzeb whose army overran the Gondwāna.

amount of the Gondwāna revenue which had been granted for the services he had performed, returned to Sātārā.* In the space of a few years subsequent to this revolution it is related that, on Raghoji being offered a large donation by parties discontented with the governing prince to displace or cut him off and confer the country on his brother Burhān Shāh, the Marāthā Chief adopted the measure and expelled Akbar Shāh who, after making some fruitless attempts to recover his former possessions, took refuge in the dominions of the Nizām of the Deccan where he died. Raghoji soon after this occurrence established an unparticipated authority in all the territories which had been held by the family of Burhān Shāh, whom investing with a revenue for his subsistence he deprived of all executive power. Raghoji removed the seat of government from Deogarh to Nāgpur which he surrounded with a wall† and, after a term of thirty-three years, in which with a renowned military reputation he swayed and actually governed a great part of the Gondwāna,‡ Raghoji died about the year 1758 at Nāgpur leaving four sons.§

*Raghoji, who held an important station in the service of the Shāhu Rājā, had also from his military successes been enabled to maintain an independent and numerous body of horse with which he made himself formidable in the southern parts of India and in the province of Bengal.

†This fortification is of little strength. Since the death of Raghoji the town of Nāgpur has been greatly augmented.

‡This Chief also subdued Cuttack and fixed the Berar tribute.

§Jānoji, Mudhoji, Bimbāji and Sābāji. The first and last were the sons of one mother, and Mudhoji and Bimbāji of another. [This is confirmed by the *Sketch of 1811*, p. 2.]

Jānoji, the eldest, succeeded to the supreme possession of the territories, certain portions* of which were allotted to the maintenance of his brothers. This Chief, having no children, adopted the eldest son of Mudhoji, whom he took into his house and avowed his intention of appointing him to the succession. But on the death of Jānoji, which happened in the year 1772, Sābāji, in conjunction with Dariyā Bāi, the widow of the late Chief, seized on the government and the person of Mudhoji's son. This party on the payment of a large sum† obtained a grant from the *Peshwā*, authorizing Sābāji to govern the Gondwāna territories. Mudhoji, raising a force, made war against his brother which, at the end of about three years, terminated in favour of Mudhoji, who slew Sābā in an action that was fought in the vicinity of Nāgpur. The event of this success devolved on Mudhoji the possession of the country, and, forming an accommodation with Dariyā Bāi, they solicited the *Peshwā* to place Mudhoji's eldest son, Raḡhoji,‡ at the head of the government. This application was acquiesced in by the Poona administration, the different members of which received, on this occasion, a more valuable donation than on the former.§ During the government of Jānoji, it is

*The districts of Chāndā, situated in the southern quarter of the Gondwāna, were given to Mudhoji, and Ratanpur with its dependencies to Bimbāji. Sābāji had, during his father's life, received from the Nizām of the Deccan in military tenure the Dārwhā districts, which compose a part of the Berar province.

†Said to be twenty-five *lākhs* of rupees.

‡Who had already been adopted by Jānoji.

§This sum is computed at forty *lākhs* of rupees.

said that, as a vassal of the Marāthā State, he entered into a stipulation with the *Peshwā* to remit him a tribute of ten *lākhs* of rupees* or furnish for his constant service a body of four thousand horse. This agreement was irregularly performed by Jānoji who, being at the head of a large force and an active soldier, often wholly withheld his payments or made them sparingly and seldom took a part in the common policy of the Marāthā State. The *Peshwā*, to punish a conduct he deemed contumacious, availed himself of a favourable crisis and invaded the Gondwāna with a numerous army, many districts of which he laid waste, and plundered the town of Nāgpur, the greatest part of which was then destroyed. Jānoji, unable to face the *Peshwā* on the field, speedily assembled the choicest of his troops and made rapid marches towards Poona. This operation obliged the *Peshwā* to move to the defence of his own country; and, knowing that he had no mean enemy to combat, he found it expedient to cease hostilities and form an accommodation with Jānoji, from which the Poona administration acquired no advantage. Since that period it is not seen that the *Peshwā* has received any tribute from the Bhonsle government, excepting the sums paid for the grants that were issued in the names of Sābāji and the younger Raghoji."†
 [The remainder of Forster's Sketch of 1788 A.D. is given on pages 88 to 103 above.]

*[Grant Duff (I, p. 551) says *nine lākhs*. See pp. 8 and 22 above.]

†[This Nāgpur version of the Treaty of Kankāpur is strikingly at variance with that quoted from Grant Duff on pp. 24 and 25 above which is, of course, authoritative.]

APPENDIX D.

TREATY WITH THE "RĀJĀ OF BERAR" IN 1781 A.D.*

Whereas a friendship is firmly established betwixt Mahārājā Mudhoji Bhonsle and the English, the following articles are accordingly settled by Senā Bahādur through Rājārām Pandit :—

1st.—The Rājā Senā Bahādur shall send 2,000 good and effective horse along with Colonel Pearse to assist the English in the war against Hyder Nāik; that the officer commanding them shall act under the orders of the said Colonel, or the officer who shall command the Bengal troops in the Carnatic; and that they shall receive from the officer who shall command the Bengal troops in the Carnatic an allowance for their support at the rate which hath been settled in a separate paper by the Governor-General and Council and Rājārām Pandit, month by month, in the same proportion as the English troops shall receive their pay.

2nd.—That the army of Rājā Senā Bahādur will immediately leave Orissa and march in an expedition against Garha-Mandlā; let the Governor-General and Council of the English, from a regard to the friendship which subsists betwixt the family of Bhonsle and the English, give orders that an English officer with a body of the troops, now stationed in Hindostān, may march from that quarter to assist the Rājā in the above-mentioned expedition and, having reduced Garha-Mandlā, establish immediately the Rājā's garrisons there.

*See p. 78 above.

3rd.—That in order that the friendship betwixt the family of Mahārājā Mudhoji Bhonsle and the English may daily be strengthened and augmented, let the Governor-General and Council for the present send a trusty person to Nāgpur; and hereafter the *Diwān*, Diwākar Pandit, will come from that place and have an interview with the Governor-General when, with their mutual advice and approbation, the desires and demands of both parties will be adjusted and settled.

4th.—That if it should happen from particular circumstances that an interview betwixt Diwākar Pandit and the Governor-General cannot take place, in that case the desires and demands of both parties may be settled at Nāgpur by the intervention of a trusty person; and the bonds of friendship shall be so firmly established betwixt the family of Bhonsle and the English that no infraction or injury can ever by any means happen to them.



Account of the monthly expense of the troops to be sent along with Colonel Pearse.

Two thousand *Sawārs* or horse, at Rs. 50,000 *per* month for each 1,000, making altogether one *lākh* of rupees *per* month. Dated 8th *Rabi-us-Sāni*, in the 22nd year of the Reign.

The said allowance shall commence from the time of the troops leaving Cuttack; and when they shall have finished the service and, having received their dismissal from the Commander of the English

troops, they shall return to their own country; their pay shall be continued according to the number of *manzils*, or day's journeys, which they may be from the place of their dismissal to the city of Cuttack.*

*Aitchison's *Treaties*, I, pp. 414-5.

APPENDIX E.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY'S ACCOUNT OF THE
BATTLE OF ASSYE.*

To—Lieut.-Colonel Munro, Camp at Chichkher,
1st November 1803.

“MY DEAR MUNRO,—As you are a judge of a military operation and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which, I think, I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts. Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor-General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road round the hills between Badnāpur and Jālnā: and I have to observe that this separation was necessary—first,

*See p. 176. This letter is given in Wellington's *Despatches*, Vol. II, pp. 338—342.

because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed or, probably, avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd we were not much more than eight miles.

As usual we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common *harkārās* of the country. Their horse were so numerous that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the *harkārās* in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European. The *harkārās* reported the enemy to be at Bhokardan. Their right was at Bhokardan, which was the principal place in their position and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bhokardan. I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bhokardan, as I thought, on the 23rd. But, when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had

marched and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground. At all events it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true; and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprized Colonel Stevenson of this determination and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kailna.

When I found their whole army and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack because I saw clearly that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Nālana, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking I might have been attacked there in the morning; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it was. I, therefore, determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks and the people who were employed to draw them were

shot, and they could not all be drawn on; but some were; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use. Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village; instead of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies. Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men and its unity and efficiency that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was that we had then no reserve left; and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs. After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there till I made a movement upon

it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated: and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake; but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye. After the action there was no pursuit because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward; and he also moved upon Bhokardan. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a *nālā* in the night and arrived at Bhokardan, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th. The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Ajinthā *ghāt*, and eight from Bhokardan. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place they set off and never stopped till they had got down the *ghāt*, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was that I

might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week for want of the necessary number of medical men. I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizām's *Sardārs*, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizām's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the *ghāt* and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhānpur and Asirgarh. I have defended the Nizām's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry[?] *ghāt*, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurangābād; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt [to relieve] the siege of Asirgarh, and I moved up to the northward and descended the Ajinthā *ghāt* and stopped Sindia. Stevenson took Asirgarh on the 21st October; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rājā of Berar had come to the south with an army. I ascended the *ghāt* on the 25th and have marched a hundred and twenty miles since in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizām's territories. I have been near the Rājā of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If that is the case I shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet,

if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country,* that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pandit. Believe me, etc., Arthur Wellesley.”

*[i.e., the Nizāms territories.]

APPENDIX F.

TREATY OF DEOGAON IN 1803 A.D.

To—The Governor-General, Camp at Ellichpur,
17th December 1803.

MY LORD,—I have the honour to enclose the English, Marāthā, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace which I have this day concluded with Yeshwant Rāo Rāmchandra, the *Vakil* of the Rājā of Berar. I have made the treaty in the name of the British government and its allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by Your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the allies in the treaty and to engage that they shall ratify it will become sufficiently obvious when the character and conduct of the government of these allies are recollected. It will remain with Your Excellency to give such orders as you may think proper to the Residents at the different *Darbārs* to obtain the assent of the allies to this treaty. But I should imagine that the Rājā of Berar will be satisfied with Your Excellency's ratification.

The cessions under the treaty are made to the British government and its allies; and I have drawn it in this manner in order that Your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rājā shall ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the *Subah* of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter; but I shall request the Resident at

Hyderabad to apprise His Highness's ministers that it must be considered only a temporary arrangement; and that all the acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace shall be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

I wished to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttack; but I have no information upon the subject. Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt stated his opinion that it would be convenient if the districts of Sonpur and Baud were ceded besides Cuttack; and Mr. Melville his, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttack countries which would have joined the northern *Sarkārs* with the province of Bundelkhand. But upon reference to the map, which is all the information that I could procure, I found that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand, on that side, to such a degree as to make it necessary to give up part of what I demanded on this side; or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether. I learn also, by a late letter from Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rājās of Sonpur and Baud; and, if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company's territories under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. If he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttack the boundary for which Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt wished; but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

By the 3rd article, the Company and their allies gain, on this side, the whole province of Berar; and

the frontier of the *Subah* of the Deccan will be carried forward to the Wardhā river. The countries thus ceded are old possessions of the *Subah* of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by him and the Rājā of Berar in different proportions at different times. When the latter was admitted to a participation of them, he received one-fifth, afterwards a fourth, then half by treaty and, latterly, four-fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rājā of Berar entirely from this fine country than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttack. The revenues of Berar, on this side of the Wardhā, are computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rājā had appropriated entirely to himself countries the revenues of which are computed to have been ten *lākhs* of rupees; and the remainder, under different treaties, was to be divided equally between him and the *Subah* of the Deccan. However, I have reason to believe, from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rājā of Berar never received more than thirty *lākhs* as his share of the countries on this side of the Wardhā. Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Sindia; but, whatever may be the real value of the acquisition, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rājā towards the *Subah* of the Deccan and by his renunciation of all claims, of every description, not only on the countries ceded

but on the other territories of the *Subah*. In the course of the conferences in the negotiation, the minutes of which I shall have the honour of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rājā's minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territory.

By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rājā shall have possession of the forts of Narnālā and Gāwilgarh. In fact, these forts are of greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains than to that which possesses the plains. Without them the Rājā could not have exercised the powers of his government over the Gondwāna Rājās in those mountains, a race of people who, above all others, require restraint; and to have given them to the *Subah* of the Deccan would have added nothing to His Highness's power.

I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains immediately under the hills will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills. The loss to the *Subah*'s government will be but trifling in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rājā were not interested, as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

The 7th article provides that the Honourable Company are to arbitrate between the Rājā and the *Subah* of the Deccan and the *Peshwā*. The Rājā's minister was desirous that I should consent

to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by those powers; but I refused this, on the ground that I could not consent to anything of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British government and its justice, as the best security the Rājā could have for his claims upon the *Subah* of the Deccan and the *Peshwā*; which proposal was accepted. The territory which the Rājā wished to secure by this demand was the province of Garha-Mandlā, of which he ought to collect the revenues in participation with the *Peshwā*; but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use. At all events, it appears to me to be an important point gained, and highly honourable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice against the demands of its allies.

There was no objection on the part of the Rājā's minister to the 8th or 9th article of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

The 10th article is one of considerable importance. The Rājā's minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rājā and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said that, after ceding Berar and Cuttack, the Rājā had no territories excepting what he had conquered from the *Zamin-dārs*, Rājās, etc.; and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his territories. I told him that, whatever might be the consequence, the article was indispensable and must be

agreed to; that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British government had wished for the destruction of the Rājā's State; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government; and I promised him that the British government would apply it to as few cases as possible, consistently with an adherence to good faith. The *Vakil* was satisfied with this assurance; which I requested him to convey to the Rājā, as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his *Darbār* will have the strongest objections.

I had demanded an hostage for the performance of the 11th article of the treaty; but, upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me that the best security the British government could have would be its strength and continued success; and I had, therefore, determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the *Vakil* said that the Rājā would send to me whomever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might, possibly, be a security against his hostility. It appeared to me that he would not consent to send either of those persons; and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply and which might have risked the whole treaty.

I hope that Your Excellency will approve of, and ratify, this treaty. It appears to me to provide

for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rājā's government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is every reason to believe that the Rājā of Berar is as poor as the other Marāthā chieftains. I have written to Mr. Webbe to inform him that I have signed this treaty and to request him to prepare to set out for Nāgpur as soon as possible. In the meantime, I propose to send the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone to the Rājā, to act as Resident till the arrival of Mr. Webbe. In case Your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or me, according to circumstances; as I might be at a great distance and the ratification might not reach the Rājā in the time specified. Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform Your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Marāthā powers and their relations with each other and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I, therefore, take the liberty of recommending him to Your Excellency.

I have the honour to be, etc., Arthur Wellesley.*

TREATY of PEACE between the HONOURABLE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY and their ALLIES, on the one part, and SENĀ SĀHEB SUBHĀ RAGHOJI BHONSLE, on the other, settled by MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY on the part of the HONOURABLE COMPANY and their ALLIES, and by YESHWANT RĀO RĀMCHANDRA on the part of SENĀ SĀHEB SUBHĀ RAGHOJI BHONSLE; who have each communicated to the other their full powers,—1803.

Article 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company and their allies, on the one part, and the *Senā Sāheb Subhā Raghoji Bhonsle*, on the other.

Article 2.—*Senā Sāheb Subhā Raghoji Bhonsle* cedes to the Honourable Company and the allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore.

Article 3.—He likewise cedes to the Honourable Company and their allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories of which he has collected the revenues in participation with the *Subah* of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession which are to the westward of the river Wardhā.

Article 4.—It is agreed that the frontier of *Senā Sāheb Subhā* towards the territories of His Highness the *Subah* of the Deccan shall be formed to the west by the river Wardhā from its issue from the Injardy hills to its junction with the Godāvari. The hills on which are the forts of Narnālā and

Gāwilgarh are to be in the possession of *Senā Sāheb Subhā*; and everything south of those hills and to the west of the river Wardhā is to belong to the British government and their allies.

Article 5.—Districts amounting to four *lākhs* of rupees *per annum* contiguous to, and to the south of, the forts of Narnālā and Gāwilgarh, are to be given over to *Senā Sāheb Subhā*. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major-General Wellesley and delivered over to *Senā Sāheb Subhā* at the same time with the forts.

Article 6.—*Senā Sāheb Subhā* for himself, his heirs and successors entirely renounces all claims of every description on the territories of the British government and their allies, ceded by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th articles, and on all the territories of His Highness the *Subah* of the Deccan.

Article 7.—The Honourable Company engage that they will mediate and arbitrate, according to the principles of justice, any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the Honourable Company's allies, Sikandar Jāh Bahādur, his heirs and successors and Rāo Pandit Pradhān, his heirs and successors, respectively, and *Senā Sāheb Subhā*.

Article 8.—*Senā Sāheb Subhā* engages never to take, or retain, in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British government, or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government. The Honourable Company engage, on their part, that they will

not give aid or countenance to any discontented relations, Rājās, *Zamindārs* or other subjects of *Senā Sāheb Subhā* who may fly from, or rebel against, his authority.

Article 9.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited Ministers from each shall reside at the Court of the other.

Article 10.—Certain treaties have been made by the British government with feudatories of *Senā Sāheb Subhā*. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to *Senā Sāheb Subhā* when this treaty will be ratified by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council.*

Article 11.—*Senā Sāheb Subhā* hereby renounces for himself, his heirs and successors all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Daulat Rāo Sindia and other Marāthā Chiefs, to attack the Honourable Company and their allies. He engages not to assist those Chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

Article 12.—This Treaty of Peace is to be ratified by *Senā Sāheb Subhā* within eight days from this time and the ratification is to be delivered to Major-General Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are

**Vide* Treaties with Tributary and Feudatory States of Orissa, Aitchison's *Treaties*, Vol. I, Part III. The Rājā manifested the utmost reluctance to ratify this clause, and it was only under the threat of renewed hostilities that he consented to sign the lists.

to be delivered and the troops are to withdraw. Major-General Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council and that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

Done in Camp at Deogāon, this 17th December 1803, answering to the 2nd *Ramzān* 1213 *Fasli*. Ratified by the Governor-General and Council on the 9th January 1804.*

*Aitchison's *Treaties*, I, pp. 415—7.

APPENDIX G.

I.—LIST OF MINISTERS AT THE NĀGPUR COURT,
submitted by the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone on the
24th of March 1804 A.D.

Names.	Offices.	Remarks.
Shridhar Bāpu Pandit.*	Munshi ..	Shridhar Pandit's family have long been employed as <i>Munshis</i> to this government under Raghoji and Mudhoji. He is a great favourite with the Rājā, to whom he has been attached since he was very young. He now possesses entirely his master's confidence which he formerly shared with Kushābā Chitnavis: he was joined with that Minister in an embassy to Poona in 1802, one of the objects of which was thought to be to prevent the ascendancy of the British influence at that Court. He is much liked for his moderation and conciliatory manners; he is supposed to be very sick; his father, his elder brother and his cousin are in no public employment.
Yeshwant Rāo Rāmchandra.	Vakil to General Wellesley's camp.	This person has been <i>Vakil</i> at Hyderabad and at Holkar's Court, where he was sent with the boy Khande Rāo before the late Marāthā War. Shridhar Pandit's brother is married to his sister.
Keshav Rāo Rāmchandra.	Vakil at Hyderabad.	Brother to Yeshwant Rāo.

*Mentioned in *Sketch of 1811*, p. 6.

Names.	Offices.	Remarks.
Jaikrishna Rāo	Agent with the English Residency	Jaikrishna Rāo is the son of Sitārām, brother to the two last mentioned persons; he once had the management of a battalion of infantry, in which battalion Yeshwant Rāo Holkar was confined while at Nāgpur; he has been employed at Poona and Hyderabad and was last <i>Vakil</i> to Sindia's camp and came from Argāon with Bālāji Yeshwant, Sindia's <i>Vakil</i> , to try to prevail on General Wellesley to halt on the 29th November last.* He is much in Shridhar Pandit's confidence.
Bābā Boā ...	<i>Chitnavis</i> ...	This person is hereditary <i>Chitnavis</i> —an appointment given by the Rājā of Sātārā. This family did the duty of that office during the reigns of Jānoji and Mudhoji; but Kushābā, his Deputy, rising into favour, he ceased to be employed, though he retains his office.
Gangādhara Phattā.†	Deputy <i>Chitnavis</i> .	The brother of Kushābā who died during the late war. Gangādhara is in employ and in confidence but is very young.
Bhawāni Kālu...	<i>Diwān</i> ...	The father of Bhawāni Kālu was originally a Commander of 15 horse; he was then employed as a revenue officer in Berar, was made <i>Diwān</i> by Jānoji and succeeded by Bhawāni. Bhawāni was in great favour with Chimnāji; he made himself many enemies while in power, among the bitterest of whom is Vithal Pant Subhedār; he still retains the office of <i>Diwān</i> but is little employed and not very much

*See p. 177 above.

Names.	Offices.	Remarks.
Dhaoshā Bāpu... Bālāji Kālikar ..	Treasurer ... Under-Treasurer.	consulted; his duty is divided between Rāmāji Rām, Bālāji Kālikar and others; he was cousin to the late <i>Bakshi</i> Pāndurang. One of his sons, Mādhav Rāo, is a Paymaster of infantry and another, Balwant Rāo, is in Nānā Sāheb's confidence. Not employed. He is in great confidence; he receives all the revenue accounts, which ought to be done by the <i>Diwān</i> , and he does the most part of the duty of Treasurer.
Harbāji Katarni Sadāsheo Abdeo	} Accountants.	} All under Kālikar.
Bābāji Ganesh Sheorām Pāndurang.		
Rāmji Karu ...	Cash-keepers.	
	Collector of Nāgpur, Mint Master and Head of the <i>Adālat</i> .	This person's father was head of a revenue district in Berar; he is in great favour with the Rājā; he has the management of the bazars, the care of the police and the administration of justice.
Bāpu Huddār ...	Governor of Gondwāna.	A native of Berar, raised by Raghoji to be Pānde or Chief Collector of Berar and Governor of Gondwāna; he is reckoned a sensible man, is on good terms with the Ministers and a favourite with the Rājā.
Mahādji Amrut*	<i>Makhlasī</i> ...	Every paper issued by the Rājā requires his signature to authenticate it; he has <i>jāgirs</i> in Gondwāna. His family has long been in employ.

*Mentioned in *Sketch of 1811*, p. 7.

Names.	Offices.	Remarks.
Trimbak Nārāyan.	Deputy to Governor of Gondwāna.	Deputy to Mahādji Amrut.
Sheorām Kākā	<i>Durakdūr</i> ...	Abstracts all accounts and lays them before the Rājā.
Bālāji Nārāyan	Keeper of jewels.	
Sadbā ...	Deputy Keeper of jewels.	
Raghoji Bhonsle	Keeper of wardrobe.	Was a common camel-driver to Mudhoji Bhonsle and is now a great favourite.
Dukāji Korke*	Cash-keeper of the household.	
Alafuddin* ...	Head of the Camel Department.	
Bhawānji Bhonsle.	Head of the Elephant Department.	Dharmāji is a great favourite; has a charge in the <i>Pāgā</i> and is in possession of a great deal of country.
Dharmāji Bhonsle.*	<i>Musāhib</i> or Companion.	
Vyankoji Bhonsle.	<i>Musāhib</i> ...	A favourite who is always with the Rājā.
Satwāji Ingle ...	Head Architect and in charge of water pipes.	An old servant of the Rājā; much dreaded by all the officers of government because the Rājā has great reliance on all he says.
Sambhāji Kasar	<i>Chaudhari</i> and Head of the <i>Pot-dārs</i> .	Is in great favour with the Rājā who often talks familiarly with him; he is thought to take those opportunities to calumniate every one and is universally disliked.

Names.	Offices.	Remarks.
Mahādji and Vaidāji Nagurā.	Head of <i>Harkārās</i> .	These persons had the management of all the Rājā's <i>Harkārās</i> and spies; they procure intelligence and forward letters.
Gambhirji Deshmukh.	} <i>Bāridūrs</i> ...	<i>Bāridār</i> is an office like that of <i>Huzryā</i> at other Marāthā Courts; and the duty is to attend the prince and carry messages of all sorts and orders. Their office is important or otherwise according to the confidence they are in
Jānoji Deshmukh.		
Fakirji ...		
Rāmchandra Wāgh.	<i>Musāhib</i> to Nānā Sāheb.	A <i>Mūnkari</i> of ancient family who was in great friendship with Nānā Sāheb.
Chandāji Bhonsle.	<i>Musāhib</i> to Nānā Sāheb.	Distinguished himself at the first taking of Sambalpur. [See p. 151 above.]
Sitārām Sadāsheo.	<i>Diwān</i> to Nānā Sāheb.	Manages Nānā Sāheb's troops and <i>jāgirs</i> .
Bhikāji ...	<i>Chitnavis</i> to Nānā Sāheb.	
Krishna* ...	<i>Pharnavis</i> to Nānā Sāheb.	
Yeshwant Khande Rāo.	<i>Diwān</i> ...	<i>Diwān</i> to the Rājā's mother; he manages all the <i>jāgirs</i> .

Besides the above, there is an establishment of officers of State for Burhān Shāh, a person descended from the Mahomedan king of the Gonds who inhabit the woods and mountains of this part of India; but these officers are only nominal.

II.—RETURN OF THE “RĀJĀ OF BERAR’S” ARMY, with a list of the principal officers belonging to his Court, submitted by the Hon’ble M. Elphinstone on the 24th of March 1804 A.D.

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
The Rājā’s Pāgū .	1,800	These are the property of the Rājā; the detachment in Hoshangābād is commanded by Dhondibā Bhonsle.
Nānā Sāheb’s Pāgū	900	The Rājā’s brother.
Bāi Sāhebā ...	500	The Rājā’s mother.
Bālā Sāheb ...	500	The Rājā’s son.
Gundo Shankar ...	150	These are two brothers; one of them holds the office of <i>Biniwālā</i> or Quarter-Master-General—a respectable office.
Balwant Rāo Shankar.	150	
Vyankat Rāo Pāndurang.	200	This young man is the son of Pāndurang, who was principal <i>Bakshi</i> and cousin to Bhawāni Kālū. He is not appointed <i>Bakshi</i> but does the duty. He is much liked by the soldiers. Pāndurang died during the late war
Āpāji Gopāl ...	75	This young man is the son of the Rājā’s sister. He is always about the Rājā and is in great favour
Gujābā Dādā ...	400	
Govind Rāo Ajanti .	75	
Vithal Pant Subhēdār.	200	A native of Kopali in the Konkan. His father was sent here by the <i>Peshwā</i> , Bāji Rāo

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
		the elder, and was detained by the Rājā and made <i>Subhedār</i> of Berar. He and Vithal Pant managed their province well and improved it much. This person is in great confidence. He commanded the army that conquered Hoshangābād eight years ago* and the army which was left to protect this country while the Rājā and his brother were with Sindia's army. His Deputy in Berar was Trimbak Rāo Bhāu who, after enriching himself with the plunder of the country on the Godāvari during the war, fled, it is believed, to Hyderabad.
Dhār Rāo Pātankar.	100	These troops belong to Garha-Mandlā, where Nānā Gātki is Governor, but are serving with his son in Hoshangābād.
Nānā Gātki ...	400	
Somāji and others	600	A family related to the Rājā and further connected by marriage. Somāji's daughter is married to Bālā Sāheb, the Rājā's son.
The Wāghs ...	500	This is a considerable family. The party in Hoshangābād is under Padāji. Rāmchandra Wāgh is of this family.
Mugut Rāo ...	100	A <i>Mānkari</i> or man of old military family.
Chauhān ...	150	Do. do.
Pāndhre ...	150	Do. do.
Nelwādi ...	200	Do. do.
Dhānji Shirke ...	250	Related to the Rājā.
Bimbāji Himālan...	200	
Dhondibā Shelke ...	200	
Mahādji Velanki ...	200	

*See pp. 139 and 142.

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
Nāgappā Amdelnor	300	This person had some employment in the southern part of Berar and continued to plunder there after the peace.
Sakhārām Bakshi	350	He is an officer of reputation. It was he who with Annā Bhāskar cut in on the rear of the British army at the battle of Assye. [See p. 174 above.]
Rāmji Bansod ..	100	He was first accountant to the <i>Khāns Pāgā</i> under Chimmāji. He got into favour with Raghoji, who gave him some districts in Berar and afterwards sent him in some command with the first expedition against Hoshangābād. He is <i>Thānedar</i> of Multāpi, a place about 120 miles from Nāgpur on the Hoshangābād road.
Govind Rāo Bakshi	100	This person lately suffered himself to be surprised and has had some of his party cut up by the Afghāns [of Bhopāl].
Nāgo Pant ..	200	
Vyankat Rāo Yeshwant Pāntāone.	700	
Badnāji Powār	50	
Vyankat Rāo Bhagwant.	600	
Rāmchandra Rājā...	500	His ancestors were Rājās of Mungī Paithan on the Godāvāri.
Sambhāji Rājā ...	50	Rājā of some place called Jcāti.
Bhām Deo Rājā ...	50	Rājā of Kingāon.
Mālji Ahir Rāo ...	300	The family of Mālji Ahir Rāo was in the service of the Poona government. His immediate ancestor joined the Rājā

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
		of Berar after the battle of Pānipat and conducted the retreat of his army.* His family is connected with the Rājās. Mālji has been much employed against the Nizām on the banks of the Godāvari and lately on the Wardhā. He was surprised at Sconi some time ago and returned to Nāgpur in disgrace.
Daulat Rāo Ghātge.	200	
Beni Rām ...	150	
Rām Rāo Gujar ...	200	The Gujars are related to the Rājā. Gujābā is a Gujar.
Haibat Rāo Jādhav	100	
Govind Rāo Ghorpare.	50	
Yusuf Khān and Muhammad Khān Kadarzayi.	55	Musalman of Ellichpur.
Debi Singh Jamar-dār.	100	
Bod Singh ...	25	
Jamāl Khān Bisni ...	25	
Gulām Ali Chailā	15	
Nawāb Nur Muhammad Khān.	300	A native of the Punjab; he was formerly in the Nizām's army and served against Dhondibā under General Wellesley; he has been three years in this service.
Mazdār Khān Peni	200	The Jāgirdār of Sohāgpur near Hoshangābād. He has been actively employed of late against Vazir Muhammad and the Bhopāl Afghans.

*This is ambiguous. Jānoji took no part in the battle of Pānipat. He accompanied the *Peshwā* only as far north as the Nerbudda where news of the disaster to the Marāthā arms reached them and they turned back. Grant Duff, I, 620 and Jenkins, p. 57.

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
Muhammad Amin Khān.	200	<i>Zamindār</i> of Seoni and Chhapārā; his district is very extensive
The Bāgal family...	400	The Chief is Sayājī Bāgal.
The Patole family.	300	The Chief is Yeshwant Rāo Patole.
Mule ...	300	
Amrit Rāo .	50	
Hanmant Rāo ...	100	
The Atoles—		
Tulāji Rāo ...	50	
Jairām ...	150	
Deo Rāo Partāl ...	25	
Rannāmi ...	75	
The Māhur family	200	The Head is Vyankoji Mahuikar.
Sardār Khān ...	25	
Daud Khān ...	100	
Muhammad Azim...	25	
Haibat Khān ..	15	
Hākimi ...	75	
Kāsim Miyān ...	50	
Sardār Khān of Ellichpur.	10	
Nawāb Khān of Bhopāl.	10	
Jamshed Khān ...	15	
Dunde Khān ...	25	
Sirmohit Khān ...	10	
Rohillā Khān ...	10	
Saiyyid Muhammad Arab.	25	
Hājī Ali Rohillā ...	15	
Zainuddin Khān ...	25	
Changiz Khān ...	10	
Kamāl Khān ...	25	
The Yekhandes ...	3,000	The Yekhandes are persons who serve singly or with few attendants and get a high pay. This number is probably exaggerated. [See Jenkins, p. 81.]
Sakni ...	75	This person casts guns at the foundry.

Name.	Total.	Remarks.
Bālārām Hazāri ...	25	This person had 900 regular infantry but they are disbanded.
Vyankoji Sagdeo ..	100	A native of Dewalwārā in Berar. His father Trimbak Pant was employed under Mudhoji. Vyankoji was sent to Cuttack with Rājārām and was lately Governor of Orissa.
Pāndurang Singh Ballāl.	25	Belonged to Cuttack. He now lives with Sindia's <i>Vakil</i> .
Bālāji Kānnav	200	The late <i>Faujdar</i> of Cuttack. His troops quitted him when he left the province, except 200 horse and 300 foot who came with him hither by the way of Sonpur.
Bālāji Yeshwant ...	75	Sindia's <i>Vakil</i> . His 75 men are hired by the Rājā.
Jāgobā Dādā ...	50	Mentioned in Major Malcolm's letter No. 5. He was lately invited to Sindia's Court, but declined going.
Rānoji Bhonsle ...	50	
Deopāl Singh of Riwā.	20	
Muhammad Mausim	50	
Attached to the Ministers.	125	To Bhawāni Kālū, 50; to Shridhar Pandit, 50; to Phattā Chitnavis, 25.
Nānā Sāheb ...	5,000	Vyankoji Bhonsle, the Rājā's brother. His force is at Chhat-tisgarh and other places in his <i>jāgir</i> .
Total ...	23,835	

APPENDIX H.

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
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Map
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1800 A.D.